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18 March 1985

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

AL-ANBA' INTERVIEWS ARAB BROADCASTING UNION OFFICIAL

GF311500 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 31 Dec 84 p 12

[Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz Ja'far, president of the Arab States Broadcasting Union and assistant under secretary for broadcasting affairs at the Kuwaiti Information Ministry, by Ahmad al-Bajuri in Kuwait--no date given]

[Excerpts] [Ahmad al-Bajuri] How were you reelected president of the Arab States Broadcasting Union [ASBU]?

['Abd al-'Aziz Ja'far] The Arab States Broadcasting Union was established in Khartoum in 1969 and grew until all Arab League member states joined it. The union's president is chosen according to the alphabetical order of member states. The general assembly is held once every 2 years. The choice of Kuwait was not incidental. There were several reasons for it: Kuwait is always working to further the union's interests, and it is one of the states that is committed to the union's resolutions.

[Al-Bajuri] What is the most important decision adopted by the union?

[Ja'far] I believe that the most important decision is the launching of the Arab satellite [ARABSAT] which is scheduled to take place soon. Regrettably, however, there is no radio or television plan to make use of ARABSAT. It is for this reason that I blame the ASBU.

[Al-Bajuri] What should be done then?

[Ja'far] ASBU should act with the agreement of Arab communications ministers and the Arab Telecommunications Union. I also call for the very speedy formation of a committee of experts to draw up scientific opinions on how ARABSAT can be used. It is also necessary to adopt firm administrative and financial decisions to facilitate the union's work. Many other decisions also need to be made.

[Al-Bajuri] What about recommendations?

[Ja'far] The recommendation which I made and which I hope will be taken into consideration is that propaganda campaigns among member states should stop. I asked the brother representatives of ASBU member states to convey

this view to their countries so that we can at least edify the union. Radio stations must be objective and should not exchange vituperation or abuse.

[Al-Bajuri] What about the attitude of Kuwait Radio toward such media campaigns?

[Ja'far] I can confirm that since I came into office in 1964 until the present day Kuwait Radio has not indulged in any radio campaigns [against other Arab states]. It has not launched any attacks or tirades. If, at the direction of the political leadership, Kuwait Radio was compelled to respond such a response was never offensive. Verbal attacks and vituperation are of no use. The policy of Kuwait Radio, thank God, stems from the state's policy: the state's policy unites and does not divide, says the truth and does not lie.

Once again, as ASBU president and through the pages of AL-ANBA', I appeal to official and nonofficial Arab media to be objective in the views and ideas they put forward and to shun vituperation. I repeat: We in Kuwait have not been driven and will not be driven toward such a course.

[Al-Bajuri] The radio in 1984, what's to be said for it, and what's to be said against it?

[Ja'far] There is a lot to be said for the radio, and little to be said against it. I leave it to others to be fair to us. I respect the views of other people and the views of critics. If such views are clear and frank I accept them; if they contain observations I discuss them.

[Al-Bajuri] What is your view of the songs presented by the radio--particularly as some people say that it is the radio's music control department that is responsible for their low quality?

[Ja'far] I have already said on the radio and in the press that many Arabic and Kuwaiti songs--if we can call them that--are bleating and not songs. This kind of songs will be gradually phased out from the radio, but I do not have a magic wand to institute radical changes. I have given instructions to the music department to compile a full inventory of such songs. We shall do all that we can to raise the standard of Kuwaiti songs.

[Al-Bajuri] In an interview with Radio Monte Carlo you described the programs presented by Kuwait Radio as organized chaos. What did you mean?

[Ja'far] I called it programming chaos. I am pleased to be the first person to coin this term. In my view such programs are successful. I will give you an example: The Voice of the Cooperation Council radio, which was presented live, although it was hastily set up, is the only live experiment in organized chaos. If it was better studied we would have felt the magnificence of organized chaos in that successful broadcasting effort.

[Al-Bajuri] What exactly do you mean by programming chaos?

[Ja'far] I mean by chaos that we should give the presenters, the broadcasters, and the directors the freedom to act and give them our confidence--and yet take them to task when they make mistakes, but not too harshly. Although this type of programming has been successful yet they are still experimental. We will seek to avoid mistakes and correct them.

CSO: 4400/84

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

GULF COUNTRIES DISCUSS AIRCRAFT DISTRESS CALL

GF151720 Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 14 Jan 85 pp 1, 24

[Report by Muhammad Khalid al-Qatmah]

[Text] The airports of the Arab Gulf region were occupied yesterday with the distress call that was picked up by their monitoring equipment and which was said to have come from a Bangladeshi aircraft. But, hours passed and Bangladesh Airlines did not issue a statement to clarify if any of its aircraft had crashed or not. No other airline reported any crash.

Hence, the concerned relevant security organs began to look into the possibility that the distress call was a false one. They were also concerned about reports that an amateur Israeli monitor had picked up this call, because this action raises doubts and questions about the ability of any amateur in this field to pick up a call that comes from a place very far from Israel.

An expert in aviation affairs said that the call was picked up by the monitoring equipment in the Gulf, including the Kuwaiti control tower, was a puzzle and that perhaps this call came from an Iranian aircraft which crashed in the suspected area, that is the Iranian coasts north of Kuwait. [Words indistinct] that the [word indistinct] reasons in order to confuse monitoring equipment in case such an operation is required.

The aviation expert who preferred to remain anonymous, said that every commercial aircraft has transmitting and monitoring equipment. The transmitting equipment is able to pick up and transmit high-frequency calls and it can be used over very long distances. A pilot can contact [word indistinct] able to pick up and distant airports such as those in London and New Delhi, after he takes off from Kuwait. Another type of monitoring equipment has a limited ability to monitor and transmit about 200 miles, or up to 300 miles in case of very good weather in the summer with the intensification of the humidity which helps reception. This equipment is known as a very-high-frequency.

The interesting thing about this call is that it was picked up by an Israeli. This proves the existence of an advanced monitoring base in Israel which observes and records all radio conversations in the Arab Gulf

region. The existence of such a base is not a secret but an explanation to the intercepted distress call.

It is necessary to understand what conversations the alleged Israeli amateur was reporting when he was monitoring those conversations during the hijacking of the Kuwaiti aircraft "Kazimah" and during the aircraft's presence at Mehrabad Airport in Tehran. This alleged "amateur" was reporting the details of the talks between the hijackers and the control tower at Kuwait airport on 8760 khz even though the maximum range of the aircraft's transmitter was only 50 miles.

The acceptable explanation to Israel's ability in comprehensively monitoring the Arab Gulf region is one of the following two explanations:

1. Washington is supplying Israel with information from AWACS aircraft.
2. Washington is carrying out this hostile act after receiving AWACS information is transmitted to the United States.

Why are we pointing out those two possibilities? Because the information of the AWACS aircraft are transmitted through via "scrambler" systems. It is impossible to understand these messages unless Israel has special equipment to decode the messages. Washington must have supplied Israel with this equipment and its codes and if Israel does not have this equipment, then the United States supplies Israel with this information after analyzing it.

It should be noted that in the case of the distress call that was made by the aircraft which kept the region busy, the radars in the Gulf countries did not record the disappearance of any aircraft at the time of the dubious incident. Special equipment at the airport defined the direction of the distress call as coming from the north, that is from Iran.

It is left to the future, if possible, to reveal the secret of this strange call, particularly when there is no amateur in the world who follows such transmissions day and night. This is done only by certain countries including Israel who using such equipment has been able to pick up telephone conversations held via satellites among all the Arab Gulf countries and the world!

CSO: 4400/84

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

POPULATION STATISTICS ON GCC STATES ISSUED

GF051610 Manama WAKH in English 1525 GMT 5 Feb 85

[Text] Dubai, 5 Feb (WAKH)--Population of the United Arab Emirates is expected to reach 2,334,000 by the year 1990. United Arab Emirates population for this year reached 1,556,000 according to statistics issued here today.

Population of the six states of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (AGCC) to range somewhere between 16,500,000 and 18,000,000 by the year 1990 and that population is to reach 14,900,000 this year, the statistics added.

Population grows at a rate of 2 per cent in Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, 6 per cent in Bahrain and Kuwait, 9 per cent in Qatar and 15 per cent in the United Arab Emirates.

AGCC population used to represent 6.3 per cent of the Arab world in 1970 and it reached 7.2 per cent in 1980.

Increase of population was attributed to diminishing of death rates, the increase of birth rates, and the pouring in of expatriates because of the developments projects witnessed recently.

AGCC states gross domestic product grew at 40 per cent a year during the period from 1970-1980 as it reached \$212 billion in 1980.

Per capita income increased from \$882 in 1970 to \$17,337 in 1980.

Consumption of the AGCC increased from \$3.5 billion worth in 1970 to more than \$65.1 billion in 1980. It grew at 34 per cent rate.

CSO: 4400/84

18 March 1985

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

AMF LOAN TO MOROCCO--Abu Dhabi, 20 Feb (MAP)--The Arab Monetary Fund granted a loan of \$10.4 million to Morocco to make up the budget deficit. The credit will be repayable in 3 years, with an 18-month grace period at interest rates of 3.75 and 4.75 percent. The loan agreement was signed on Wednesday in Abu Dhabi by the chairman of the fund, Sa'id Ghubasch, and by the Moroccan ambassador to the UAE, Abdelaziz Lemtiouti. [Text] [Rabat MAP in French 1530 GMT 21 Feb 85 LD]

CSO: 4500/50

ALGERIA

ALGERIAN PAPER REPORTS ON RAWLINGS VISIT

PM220943 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 13 Feb 85 p 3

[APS report: "Nonalignment--a Vital Element in Establishing Real Peace in the World"]

[Text] Algiers--"Algeria and Ghana reaffirm their attachment to the OAU and their commitment to implementing the ideals and objectives of its charter, while expressing their joint intention to work to strengthen and consolidate the continental organization which is a preferential and irreplaceable tool for ensuring the African continent's liberation and development," the Algerian-Ghanaian joint communique issued after the official friendly visit to Algeria by Captain Jerry John Rawlings, Ghanaian head of state and chairman of the Provisional National Defense Council, stresses.

Algeria and Ghana express their concern over the persistence of the West Saharan conflict. They remain convinced that the solution to this conflict lies in direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO, in accordance with the OAU and UN resolutions and decisions.

With regard to the situation in Africa, the communique notes that Algeria and Ghana condemn the imperialist maneuvers aimed at perpetuating the racist Pretoria regime's hegemony in southern Africa by delaying Namibian independence and stepping up aggression against the countries in the region.

The following is the full text of the joint Algerian-Ghanaian communique issued on Tuesday [12 February]:

At the invitation of His Excellency Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and secretary general of the FLN, His Excellency Capt Jerry John Rawlings, Ghanaian head of state and chairman of the Provisional National Defense Council, paid an official friendly and working visit to Algeria from 10 to 12 February 1985.

During his visit to Algeria, Capt Jerry John Rawlings paid his respects at the tomb of the Algerian revolution's martyrs and laid a wreath, and visited the Cherchell Armed Forces Military Academy and the Jihad Museum.

The two presidents had detailed talks on relations between the two countries and on current international problems.

These talks were attended, on the Algerian side, by Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, member of the FLN Politburo, and minister of foreign affairs; Abdelaziz Khellef, member of the FLN Central Committee and minister of trade; Nouredine Harbi, deputy minister of cooperation; Abdelkader Benkaci, head of the department of international relations and cooperation in the presidency; and Abdelhamid Semichi, Algerian ambassador to Ghana.

On the Ghanaian side they were attended by Captain Kojo Tsikata, special adviser to the Provisional National Defense Council; Jol Abbey, Ghanaian high commissioner in Canada and a member of the National Economic Commission; Colonel G. N. Goumil, commander of the border guards; (Moukhtar Moustapha), member of the Provisional National Defense Council Secretariat; J. L.-M. Amussah, director of the Foreign Ministry Africa and OAU department; and Aliver Lawluvi, Ghanaian charge d'affaires in the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

The talks between the two presidents took place in an atmosphere of great friendship, cordiality, and confidence, thus confirming the high quality of the traditional ties uniting the Algerian and Ghanaian peoples in their joint struggle against underdevelopment, colonialism, Zionism, racism, and imperialism.

Relations between the two countries were closely examined. The two presidents highlighted numerous opportunities for cooperation between the two countries and stressed the need to diversify and extend it.

To this end they agreed to step up contacts at all levels and to strengthen, through consultation and understanding, the friendly atmosphere which has always characterized Algerian-Ghanaian relations.

Examining cooperation and trade, the two presidents reaffirmed their desire to develop them further. They agreed to spare no effort to seize every opportunity for cooperation between the two countries in the economic, commercial, cultural, scientific, and technical spheres.

To this end, they expressed the need to convene the Algerian-Ghanaian joint commission as soon as possible.

It was in the same spirit of friendship, consultation, and mutual understanding that the two presidents examined the situation prevailing on the international scene. They expressed their deep concern over the aggravation of tension in the world and the threats to international peace, especially in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

With regard to Africa, the two presidents reaffirmed the importance they attach to the OAU and their commitment to implementing the ideals and objectives of its charter. They also expressed their joint intention to work to strengthen and consolidate the continental organization, which is a preferential and irreplaceable tool for ensuring the African continent's liberation and development.

In this connection, they welcomed the different initiatives taken by the OAU, especially those relating to the creation of a special emergency fund and the convening of an economic summit to face the serious economic crisis and the famine and drought which the African continent is experiencing.

Examining the situation in southern Africa, the two presidents condemned the imperialist maneuvers aimed at perpetuating the racist Pretoria regime's hegemony in southern Africa by delaying Namibia's independence, trying to perpetuate the apartheid system, and stepping up intimidation and aggression against the countries in the region.

The two presidents forcefully reiterated their unswerving support for and active solidarity with the fraternal Namibian people in their liberation struggle under the leadership of SWAPO, their sole authentic representative.

They also reaffirmed their unqualified support for the fraternal South African people in the struggle they are waging, under the ANC's leadership, to win their national rights.

They launched an urgent appeal to the international community for the UN and OAU resolutions on South Africa and Namibia to be implemented as soon as possible. They asked in particular for the immediate and unconditional implementation of the UN settlement plan contained in Security Council Resolution 435. They reiterated their rejection of all attempts to circumvent that resolution and link Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

Turning to the Chad question, the two presidents expressed their concern over the persistence of the conflict. They reiterated their conviction that any solution to the Chad question depends on the elimination of the causes of tension and the necessary respect for Chad's sovereignty and territorial integrity. They called on all sides in Chad to promote national reconciliation, under OAU auspices, and without any foreign interference.

With regard to the situation in northwest Africa, the two presidents expressed their anxiety over the persistence of the West Sahara conflict. They remain convinced that the solution to this conflict lies in direct negotiations between Morocco and the POLISARIO, in keeping with the OAU and UN resolutions and decisions. Finally, they stressed that the SDAR's participation in the 20th OAU summit as a full member is an important step toward completing the peace process started by Resolution 104, adopted by the continental organization's 19th summit.

With regard to the Middle East, the two presidents reiterated their unqualified support for the Palestinian people's struggle for their right to self-determination, to return home, and to build an independent state. They recalled that peace could only be established in the region in the framework of a comprehensive solution with the real participation of the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative, and withdrawal by the Zionist forces from all the occupied Arab territories.

The two presidents expressed their acute anxiety at the scale of the conflict between Iraq and Iran and the considerable damage it is doing to two countries. They launched an urgent appeal to the two sides to end this fratricidal war and peacefully settle their differences in their two peoples' higher interests.

With regard to Latin America, the two presidents expressed their deep concern over the deterioration in the situation in Central America. They reaffirmed the right of all peoples in the region to freely choose their own political, economic, and social system, without foreign interference or intervention. They expressed their view that the crises should be solved by negotiation among all those concerned. To this end, they reiterated their conviction that the Contadora group's final act forms the basis for a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Central America crisis.

The two presidents forcefully reaffirmed their attachment to the Nonaligned Movement's objectives and principles. They expressed their conviction that nonalignment now guarantees more than ever the independence of the nonaligned countries and is the essential and irreplaceable element in promoting equitable international cooperation and establishing true peace in the world.

In this connection, they emphasized the need to introduce a new more just and equitable international order based on the democratization of international relations and the fulfillment of the peoples' aspirations to peace, freedom, and progress.

The two presidents expressed their conviction that the strengthening of inter-African economic relations, the extension of South-South cooperation, and complementarity between the African peoples' economies are all trump cards in safeguarding the specific interests of the African countries in particular and the developing countries in general.

President Chadli Bendjedid expressed his great satisfaction with the visit to the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria by President Jerry John Rawlings and the delegation accompanying him.

On his own account and on behalf of the Ghanaian delegation, President Jerry John Rawlings thanked the fraternal Algerian people and their leaders for the warm and fraternal welcome given to them during their visit to the fraternal Republic of Algeria.

The two presidents viewed this visit, which reflects the ties of friendship, fraternity, and cooperation between the two Algerian and Ghanaian peoples, as a contribution to strengthening and consolidating inter-African solidarity.

His Excellency Capt Jerry John Rawlings invited His Excellency President Chadli Bendjedid to pay an official visit to Ghana. This invitation was accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place on a date to be determined later by joint agreement through diplomatic channels.

ALGERIA

BRIEFS

ALGERIA-ITALY COOPERATION--A framework agreement for cooperation between Algeria and Italy was signed this afternoon on the occasion of the visit by Mr Nicola Capria, the Italian external trade minister. Mr Capria presided, with Mr Abdelaziz Khellef, over the work of the second session of the mixed commission for cooperation. According to the terms of the agreement, the two countries agree to fix their cooperation for the medium and long term. The two parties will see that the actions for cooperation fall within the priorities and objectives of the economic policy of each of the two countries. The Italian side notably will make an effort to facilitate the commercialization of products of Algerian industry in international exchanges and notably on the EEC market, while respecting, of course, its international commitments. [Excerpt] [Algiers Domestic Service in French 1830 GMT 3 Feb 85 LD]

CSO: 4500/48

EGYPT

CONCEPT OF NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL DECRIED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 19 Jan 85 p 10

[Editorial by Kamil Zuhayri]

[Text] Some words are coined by politicians and the people fall for them, or so they think! Among such words is the word normalization.

For normalization is restoring something to its normal state, but so far I have failed to see its meaning or origin when they are talking about Israel.

For if peace is normal and war is exception and normalization the return to peace, what are the indications that Israel truly wants peace?

For there still is the stolen Arab land, Taba, and the occupied Arab territories of Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan Heights and Lebanon, and there is a displaced Arab people, the Palestinian people. So where is peace, and how?

There is the occupation of Egyptian Taba, the Syrian Golan Heights, Arab Jerusalem, the Palestinian West Bank and Gaza, and southern Lebanon, so where is peace and how?! Between '48 and '84 we have lived through five wars in which Egypt participated, and seven wars if we count Israel's wars on Lebanon in '78 and '82, so where is peace, and how?!

What normalization is there with an aggressive, racist Zionist ideology that denies the existence of the Palestinian people, has Judaicized 60 percent of the Arab land occupied in '67, takes the water of the Jordan river and is trying to plunder the Lebanese Litani river? So what is normal and what is abnormal, and what do they mean by normalization?!

Israel occupies and expels and displaces and Judaicizes and steals land and water, and since '67 has been building Jewish settlements in the Golan Heights and West Bank and the Gaza Strip. After Yigal Alon's plan in '68 had been content with a line from north to south parallel to the borders of occupied Palestine of '48, along came Begin's government in '77 to extend the Jewish settlements eastward to the Dead Sea and north of Jerusalem and into Arab cities such as Hebron and Nablus. Then along came the new coalition government headed by Peres to make an announcement this week about the building

of six new settlements. So what is normal and what is abnormal, and what do they mean by normalization?

Israel has rejected Resolution No 242, as Shamir said, and it has rejected the principle of the illegitimacy of occupying land by force, as Begin said, and it has rejected the principle of land in exchange for peace, as Peres used to say, and now it even rejects Palestinians staying on their land, as Kahana says. So what is normal and what is abnormal, and what do they mean by normalization?!

Now Israel is forced to withdraw from Lebanon, and it wants to put forward its theory on secure borders in order to remain in southern Lebanon and steal the waters of the Litani and impose a client army and a regime obedient to its order to achieve "peace for Galilee."

We want peace based on justice but they want peace based on security and that is the problem. Unless a peace is achieved which returns the land to its owners and brings the displaced Palestinians back to their homes to set up their state on their land, talk about normalization before the achievement of a just, complete and comprehensive peace is a waste of time...or has a hidden meaning. As Sa'd Zaghlul said, "Its meaning is that we have no sense!"

12547

CSO: 4504/205

EGYPT

RETURN TO EASTERN BLOC IMPORTS CONDEMNED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 20 Jan 85 p 5

[Editorial by Muhammad al-Hayawan]

[Text] During the sixties we used to import raw materials from the eastern bloc, and those who lived during that period remember the poor results we used to get or live with. Newsprint was yellow...but that does not mean that journalism was necessarily yellow! The newsprint did not absorb ink, so when you finished reading the paper your clothing and hands would be the colour of kohl. Raw plastics would break the mills, buttons would disintegrate after one wash, threads for weaving would break on any machine, spare parts would arrive in bad shape before being used, a pin would have two heads, and other examples that we remember perfectly well from the days of the sixties when we used to depend on the eastern bloc for imports. In addition there was of course the failure to live up to agreements; delivery would be made more than a year behind schedule. They always had an answer ready...they apologized for the bureaucracy. Development plans would be stalled and projects delayed because we used to deal with the eastern bloc.

Those who did not live during that period should ask around in the market. Ask any taxi driver driving his communist-produced car and ask any driver in his western-produced car. Ask about the effectiveness of medicines from here and from there. Ask about any product and its source. Ask those who use them, those who have experience, and you will conclude from all that that dealing with the eastern bloc could harm our progress, could threaten our production, could stall all our projects. We have tried dealing with the eastern bloc and have fully realized that dealing with them is a disaster!

The reason for all that is no secret. It is well known that communism does not encourage productivity in the worker, nor does it give him any incentive for excellence in production. The worker in a communist society has neither a national conscience nor personal incentive because he collects his wages whether he does well or is negligent. A European communist friend told me that his father used to work hard and expend all his energy because he was threatened with dismissal at any moment, but he himself does not worry about that because he can get a promotion without working if he pleases the communist party leadership.

Most of those who reject the latest economic decisions are afraid of that. They are afraid of a return to importing from the eastern bloc because that would mean the ruin of their production. Everything that we have imported from the eastern bloc has been no good, not good for erecting factories, or solving the housing crisis, or feeding the people. If the results of Egyptian production become bad, its chance for export are weakened and they will foist it on the local market for disposal and consumption, and that would mean that we would be going around in endless circles. We will import sheet metal that rusts quickly, we will can Qaha products in it, they will get contaminated with rust and so will not be good for export. So the minister of industry will issue an order that the people in Egypt eat them, with good health even.

12547

CSO: 4504/205

EGYPT

WAFD PARTY CRITICIZED FOR LIVING IN PAST

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 20 Jan 85 p 1

[Editorial by Musa Sabri: "The Past Is Repugnant and Makes One Sick"]

[Text] My request to Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, head of the new Wafd party and the first order magnitude star of the old Wafd party prior to the revolution of 23 July, is to close the files of the past.

The past prior to the revolution is repugnant, disgusting and makes one sick. If those who write in the New Wafd's newspaper, whose distribution is being eroded week after week, imagine that the Wafd's rule prior to the revolution could be described as democratic, and that respect for freedoms can erase facts, then I say to them in all honesty that the pens that lived through that dark period in Egypt's history will not pass over that shameful fabrication, because the aim behind it is to deceive the youth with these great lies. I know young people who have actually been influenced by that, and they imagine, incorrectly, that the New Wafd party is an extension of the democratic struggle of the old Wafd.

What is printed in the New Wafd's newspaper is nothing more than an attempt by the champions of government decay and the collapse of democratic life in Egypt prior to the revolution to defend themselves and to paint a picture of themselves for the masses as prophets of freedom and democracy. And that is not true.

I do not mean to personally defame anyone in these lines, but I will say that it was the general objective circumstances that caused all dreams of the 1919 revolution to wither. Egypt had turned into land completely dominated by the British, and the king, anxious to keep his throne, submitted to everything that British imperialism wanted and imposed on him. The old Wafd had had a glorious history of challenging the tyranny, corruption and thievery of the royal palace, just as it had had a splendid history of resisting British ambitions. But the old Wafd was unable to continue along that straight path which caused it to remain out of power. Since constitutional life began in Egypt, the Wafd had not ruled for more than 7 years, so after he succeeded in taking control of the party, Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din brought forth a new policy, the gist of which was to conclude a truce with the British and to make an alliance with the corrupt king and his retinue of hangers-on and vagabonds,

and thus ensure remaining in power. He pushed on with this new course of action, which aborted the entire history of the Wafd since the minority parties belonged to the palace, which manipulated them as it pleased.

This is the truth which the prominent members of the old Wafd must acknowledge, and they are few. Democratic life since the revolution of 15 May has allowed them to return to the political stage and turn over a new leaf, so why do they not conform to their new situation and look to the future? Why do they not go about creating a popular foundation for themselves in accordance with the new party's programs, and thus really participate in the work of building?

I say it is not in their interest, this method they are using to defend their past, for no-one is still calling them to account for that past, nor is anyone going to overlook their task of forgery and falsification, when our youth is in most urgent need of knowing true history.

Yes, the best thing for them today would be to gather the scattered parts of the new party because things are worn out and painful. There is the leader of their deputies in the ranks of the opposition trying to form a new party! And there is a group from the "Muslim Brotherhood" which is not Wafd and never will be. There are prominent, serious national figures who resigned from the party and disclosed the reasons for their resignations. All of that stabs and rips apart the party leadership. There are those who joined the party to settle their accounts with the 23 July revolution and in that they agree completely with the head of the party. And there is a newspaper which some colleagues use to slander their colleagues personally in the national press with false, lying stories. Yes, there is a lot that is twisted in the New Wafd party, which needs quick surgery to enable it to patch together party unity and go along with the new democratic life.

But the constant return to the past is futile, a deceptive comedy, and will be of no use in changing facts.

As for resorting to slandering the integrity and honor of one's opponents by making up cheap, trivial and lying stories, that is also doomed to failure. It has led to the paper's distribution falling by half, and the drop will multiply as the ruffiansim and provocation goes on. Our colleagues in the new Wafd newspaper have before them the example of what happened to the communists' paper.

All of us must turn towards the future with clean views and pure thought, and criticism intended for the public good. Thus alone will democratic life flourish, and thus also will the Wafd newspaper return to its previous distribution.

12547
CSO: 4504/205

EGYPT

BRIEFS

EXCHANGE SYSTEM PROBLEMS--Recent attempts by Egypt to cut out the black market in foreign exchange have caused rifts between commercial banks and the government. The central bank last month introduced a new floating rate of exchange for repatriated earnings and commercial transactions as a way of directing foreign exchange into the authorised banking system. The move was expected to lead to a devaluation of the Egyptian pound to the level then prevailing on the black market. However, the effect of the new measures has been to deprive foreign banks, many of whom located in Cairo following the late President Sadat's "infitah" policy, of standard commercial business, such as Letters of Credit and other trade-financing facilities. Foreign banks have called for a review of the regulations and even the official Cairo press has complained that economy minister Dr. Mustapha Said's handling of the issue was not in accordance with government instructions. Press complaints are presumed to reflect official displeasure. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 4 Feb 85 p 9]

JOINT BANK WITH TURKEY--Egypt's Arab Investment Bank and Turkiye Is Bankasi of Turkey are to set up a joint investment bank in Istanbul. Initial capital for the bank has been set at \$20mn divided equally between Egyptian and Turkish partners. The new bank will finance industrial development projects. The first general manager is an Egyptian. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 4 Feb 85 p 9]

NEW EXPORT BANK--Despite still unresolved differences over rates of exchange for trade and related activities, Egypt is taking measures to provide stronger institutional backing for the country's exports. The opening was expected over the weekend of the Egyptian Export Development Bank, dedicated to improving the marketing of Egyptian exports by financing trade and, later, by project financing. In the longer term, the bank also expects to offer export guarantee facilities, similar to those provided by Britain's Export Credit Guarantee Department and other European agencies. The establishment of the new bank, which has a capital of 100mn Egyptian pounds, follows a recommendation from the World Bank to set up an institution to provide an orderly and secure flow of foreign exchange for exporters, rather than forcing them to rely upon the vagaries of Egypt's sometimes erratic foreign-exchange market. The World Bank is still embroiled in an argument with the government over the disbursement of \$125mn in assistance for export trade, which the government would like to sell to exporters at what amount to

subsidised exchange rates. The Bank is holding out for an exchange rate closer to that prevailing in the market. Dr Hazem el-Beblawi, the chairman of the new Egyptian bank, is backing the World Bank, arguing that exporters will use the facility efficiently only if they have to pay the full price for it. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 4 Feb 85 p 9]

FRENCH GLASS FACTORY--Egypt has signed a Letter of Intent to Saint-Gobain, the French glass-manufacturing group, and Technip, the project engineering company, for the construction of a float-glass-manufacturing plant in the country. The plant, which is expected to cost \$110mn, will be the first of its kind in the Arab world and will provide glass for Egypt's burgeoning auto industry as well as for construction. In addition, Egypt hopes to export at least 20 per cent of production to other Arab countries. The plant is being provided on a turnkey basis, with Technip responsible for construction and Saint-Gobain for technical advice and design. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 4 Feb 85 p 9]

ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY PURCHASE--Egypt has ordered anti-aircraft gunnery from the Italian arms company Contraves Italiana, a subsidiary of the Oerlikon-Buehrle group of Switzerland. The value of the contract has been reported at 500bn Italian lire. The equipment includes Contraves Sky-guard fire-control mechanisms, Buehrle 35-mm anti-aircraft guns and US-made Sparrow rocket launchers. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 4 Feb 85 p 9]

CSO: 4500/46

LIBYA

OPPOSITION COMMENTARY ON LACK OF FREEDOM IN ARAB NATION

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 1 Feb 85 p 51

[Opinion by 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Bakkush, head of Organization for the Liberation of Libya: "The Absence of Freedom in Our Arab Nation"]

[Text] I have no doubt that we, the Arabs, are the people who talk the most about freedom in this, our modern, era; and I have no doubt that we are the people who lack it the most. It is truly remarkable that some of the Arabs who won the race in the conversation about freedom, and who wrested power from their rivals, were also those who spoke freely about freedom. It is remarkable that those who won the contest became the worst abusers of freedom.

Since the truth does not need a loud voice, I want to pull the veil away from the face of the Arab nation, which is not hidden in any case, and we all will see distinct features. It is impossible for us to dispute their reality, but some of us may differ about their description. With the exception of Egypt, which appears as the forehead of the picture, well-groomed and with a minimum of wrinkles, we see that the rest of the features of the face are filled with wounds on one side and deep scars on the other, and the skin appears a dull gray with sores and bruises scattered over the surface. But from one small area on one of the cheeks, there pours forth a continual, unceasing hemorrhage, threatening all of the face with death and dessication. This is "Libya."

Perhaps I am hurrying here, before someone asks about how I began my article with a story about the absence of freedom in our Arab nation, and how I treated equally, in the issue of freedom, those who governed for some time and those who wrested power from them in the name of freedom, and how I then raised the veil from the face of the nation to turn attention to the sores, scars and hemorrhaging. Perhaps I am hurrying to my desire to call to the Arab nation to awaken, in the view that our real, fundamental problem is nothing other than the issue of freedom, and that silence on this issue is a form of suicide, and that the silent nation is really a strangling nation.

The time has come, urgently, to apply ourselves to this problem, to which we have closed our eyes for some time, and to which rulers and authorities have blinded us for a greater time. We were forced to submit, at one

time to freedom being simply our liberation from imperialist, foreign rule, so that our occupation by even more unjust and harsh local tools and apparatuses was accomplished. After this, we were persuaded that freedom was hidden in bread, and we sat down waiting for bread and freedom, and both failed to keep the promise. How many times they made us dream that the end of oppression and tyranny is the road to freedom, and so we exchanged new for old and old for new, and freedom did not appear. They preoccupied us, and we ourselves participated in activities in search of someone who would gain freedom for us. We surrendered to many who did not give us anything, as well as to those who offered us what they would make us believe was freedom.

The time has come in which we must apply ourselves to the problem of the freedom which we have begun to know and want and we must believe that it is the goal and the means by which to enter the modern age, this age outside of which some of us live completely, in which others live in a furnished room under lease, but beyond the borders of which we all live, equally.

The picture of the Arab nation--which is torn in shreds by controversies and injustices practised within its borders, by visible and invisible wars which broke out between its countries, by wealth squandered on luxuries or terrorism, and by its young generations dying meekly, fearfully, frustratedly, even while the land of Palestine is lost in the crush of their voices--this picture is indebted, in its features and complexion, to an absence of freedom. If the citizen was really free, then the ruler would have freedom of decision. What compels the ruler to error, if not that he imposed himself on the people without freedom, and finds himself in need of adventure to give his position a tincture of legitimacy, and finds himself in need of force to remain in a position he took illegally. Therefore, he has lost the power to make the proper decision, and all his errors drive his strong desire to continue his dark hunger for legitimacy.

Those who believe that a ruler elected freely by a majority, who could be moved from the seat of government to a council in opposition, is weaker in the face of difficult and crucial decisions than a gifted leader whose ability rests only on his talents to gain power by force, are mistaken. Perhaps I am establishing here that free government is inconceivable without free citizens, and that the solution to the problem of freedom is at the same time the solution to the problem of government.

I have permitted myself to talk about the problem of Arab freedom, but I do not wish to appear to claim that I have discovered it for the first time, though I am actually living through a severe trial of the absence of freedom as president and secretary of the Organization for the Liberation of Libya, which brings together efforts devoted to the deliverance of a part of the Arab nation, Libya, from the worst trial experienced by any part of it in its long history. This is the trial of rule by a strange individual, whose abnormality has gone so far as to abandon all freedom, whose greed has gone so far as to reject all civilized contact between people, who celebrated the death of his opponents on television, who boasted openly of crime and terrorism, and who declared his strong hostility to everything true and everything good. By virtue of my capacity in this regard, I have exper-

ience, and am experiencing, the tribulation of the Libyan people, who must be an example, in the issue of their freedom, for our entire nation. The Arab nation's neglect of its right to freedom has driven matters to the extent of its loss of political freedom, then to its loss of the right to life. After having been demanding participation in the affairs of the government, we have begun to demand the right to mere life.

If the one outside the law is the only one who needs a hidden revolver for a voice, while the one defending himself may use a long-range gun, then I will say this, with a loud voice: Egypt has a duty today, its most important duty and appointment in this era. The qualifications for leadership of the Arab nation, which Egypt has embodied through the ages, are not its population numbers. Egypt's weight in the Arab world is not due to its numbers, its area, or even its location. The weight of Egypt which qualified it and qualifies it for leadership is due to its cultural qualifications, and its concern for the problems of the Arab nation. This concern is completely incumbent upon it, just as it is its right. Perhaps the eyes of the majority of Arab people for ages past have looked to the land of the Nile, where a great deal of freedom and democracy is practised, and where the Arab is able to sleep in bed without the authority sleeping at his side.

The issue of freedom brings the Arab nation together more than its interests, petroleum, treaties of unity, or the offices of the Arab League. The issue of freedom is the issue of the Arab people, a present and continuing problem. No one can boast or claim that this amount of freedom is practised outside Egypt. I would perhaps be at a loss as to where to publish these words, if I wanted to publish them outside [Egypt]. Perhaps the Arab generations have realized that nothing has value, not even the liberation of Palestine (in spite of the sacredness of this issue), unless the Arab people are free. Nothing demands that we die for it except freedom, for without it, death becomes better than life.

The Arab nation appears to be convinced today, in spite of the strangling of its voice, that the expenditure of life and thought on any topic without solving the problem of freedom is simply a waste of time. It appears to call out that it is incumbent on Egypt, the free, to confront the solution of this issue. The leader is he who marches to the front, raising the banner of the goal. I charge the people of Egypt, who have led the way from time immemorial on behalf of Arab goals which were less important than the issue of freedom, to provide today the dedication called for [in this issue of freedom].

The duty of exploration calls on the people and government of Egypt to shake the dust from the sword of leadership which still hangs on the wall. Since the conditions and duties of the government as an authority are determined by relationships controlling courses of action, then something more and more far reaching is required of the party, the rest of the parties, intellectuals centers and wielders of pens. If Egypt's official leadership of the people of the Arab nation's effort to achieve freedom were a matter requiring no political transformations to come from it, what would be our concern for the unofficial leadership of Egypt, the National [Democratic] Party, the Wafd Party, and the rest of the parties, which today are

really the originators of the call for the Arab citizen's right to freedom. Perhaps I should affirm, with a broad stroke, that I do not call for cultivation of political controversies early on; this is not one of my goals. But I think that discussion clearly is possible before something becomes a controversy.

The call to solve the problem of freedom by no means applies to one person alone. It is a matter for all Arabs. Utter a shout for freedom, and the echo will return louder than your call.

12780

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TUNISIA

MULTINATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR WATER SUPPLY PROJECTS

Frankfur' /Main FRANKFURTER ZEITUNG/BLICK DURCH DIE WIRTSCHAFT in German
27 Dec 84 p 2

[Text] With the help of international organizations (World Bank, African Development Bank), wealthy Arabic oil states and several industrial nations, including the FRG, significant water supply projects to provide agriculture, industry and private households with water in Tunisia have recently been initiated or already completed. The national Societe Nationale d'Exploitation et de Distribution des Eaux [National Water Supply and Distribution Company] (Sonede), Tunis, is responsible for the drinking water supply of the country.

The 120 km long Mejerda, Tunisia's only river with continually flowing water, is very important to the artificial irrigation and the drinking water supply in the densely populated north of the country. In its watershed lie six retaining dams from which canals channel the water to the arable land and residential areas. In May 1984, a 120 km long canal to the Cap Bon peninsula was officially dedicated to supply the arable land there which totals 20,000 hectares and the resident population with sufficient water. It was constructed with the assistance of the People's Republic of China which participated in the capital expenditures of 82 million Tunisian dinars (1 Tunisian dinar = approximately 3.71 DM) by providing 23 million Tunisian dinars. Besides, 2,000 native workers, 850 Chinese workers were involved in laying out the canal. In the spring of 1984, the African Development Bank approved a 20.13 million dollar credit to enlarge the water supply network on the Cap Bon peninsula.

A new retaining dam on the Mejerda which was dedicated in May 1982 by Sidi Salem near Testour (340 meters long, 122 meters high) has been completed. It is linked with a power plant having a 32 megawatt capacity, once installed, and the equipment for which was provided by Siemens AG, Munich/Berlin, and the Swiss Atelier des Charmilles S.A., Geneva. The Yugoslavian firm Hydro-technica, Belgrade, was responsible for the structural work and the French firm Coyne et Bellier, Paris, was engaged as the engineering consultant. The FRG participated in the total capital expenditure of approximately 70 million Tunisian dinars with capital assistance of 70 million DM.

The country's most recent retaining dam is that which lies on the Oued Joumine in the vicinity of Mateur in the administrative district of Bizerte, about 70 km northwest of Tunis. The official dedication was held in the presence of President Habib Bourguiba in mid October 1983. The Yugoslavian firm Hydrotechnica was also awarded the contract to construct the retaining dam which cost about 62 million Tunisian dinars. A fourth of the capital expenditure was assumed by the Soviet Union. The retaining dam of Joumine makes possible the artificial irrigation of 1500 hectares of arable land in the vicinity of Mateur and assures the water supply of the city of Bizerte which lies 45 km away. The Soviet Union granted Tunisia an approximately 19 million ruble credit in October 1983 which is earmarked for the water supply complex El Barak and the construction of small retaining dams on the Wadis Tine, Douimis, and Melah.

In mid August 1982, the official dedication of the La Mornaghia retaining dam on Oued Mornaghia (30 meters high, 1.4 km long) which was constructed to ensure the water supply of Tunis took place. The French firm Coyne et Bellier was likewise called in as the engineering consulting firm. Already in mid-June 1982, the dedication of the Sidi Saad retaining dam which consists of a primary dam (70 meters high) and a secondary dam (48 meters high) and has a storage capacity of 131 million cubic meters--the same amount as the Moehne reservoir dam in the Sauer district--was held. The retaining dam which was constructed on the Oued Zeroud protects the city of Kairovan from floods and allows the artificial irrigation of 4000 hectares of arable land. The project requiring capital expenditures of about 60 million dinars was partially financed by Saudi Arabia and Canada.

The sixth national five-year plan (1982-1986) projects the construction of additional retaining dams, three large and three smaller ones. The retaining dams in the three large projects are the Siliana retaining dam on the Oued Siliana, a tributary of the Mejerda, the Sejenane retaining dam on the Oued Sejenane in the northern part of the country and the El Houareb retaining dam on the Oued Marguellil in the administrative districts of Kairovan. The three smaller retaining dams, Oued Lebna, Oued El Abid, and Sidi Jedidi, should be constructed having a storage capacity of a total of 8.5 million cubic meters in the vicinity of the Cap Bon peninsula.

The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) approved credit in the amount of 7.5 million Kuwaiti dinars (1 Kuwaiti dinar = about 9 DM) in February 1983 for the construction of the Siliana retaining dam. The 1200 meter long and 53 meter high retaining dam with a storage capacity of 70 million cubic meters will cost about 29 million Tunisian dinars. The estimated cost of the connected irrigation system (4000 hectares) is 14 million Tunisian dinars. Consultation for this project was provided by the aforementioned French firm Coyne et Bellier and the Societe d'Etudes Generales et Hydrauliques, Tunis.

The Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) declared in the spring of 1982 that it was ready to support the construction of the Sejenane retaining dam for which the Soviet Union had completed a feasibility study with 100 million Saudi riyals (1 Saudi riyal = about 0.78 DM). Annually, this dam should

provide 75 million cubic meters of water. The retaining dam which is linked to the Joumine retaining dam via a pipeline should help assure the drinking water needs of Bizerte, Mateur, Tunis, and Cap Bon, as well as the coastal area of Sfax. Additionally, this dam can provide artificial irrigation to 800 hectares of nearby arable land and an additional area in the lower Mejerda valley (3000 hectares).

Tunisia is working towards guaranteeing the financing of the third largest retaining dam project--El Houareb. The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) approved a credit of seven million Kuwaiti dinars in July 1982 for the construction of the smaller Oued Lebna retaining dam. An artificial irrigation system is also planned which will be laid out in an 800 hectare area. The AFESD had earlier approved a credit of 3.3 million Kuwaiti dinars for the industrial water supply of Gabes.

In October 1984, within the framework of financial cooperation with the FRG, the Tunisian government applied for assistance in financing a project which concerns the water supply of scattered rural settlements in central and northern Tunisia. The project whose costs are estimated to run to about DM 90 million concerns the planning and construction of about 110 simple water supply plants for about 280 small scattered rural settlements. The firm Beller Consult GmbH, Freiburg (Breisgau), was called in as engineering consultant.

In March 1980, the FRG approved foreign aid of DM 94 million to Tunisia for the two-year period 1984/85. Of this amount, DM 80 million has been earmarked for financial cooperation, and DM 14 million for technical assistance. The foreign aid is also intended, among other things, for the financing of water resources projects. Considerable amounts for this purpose had already been previously approved by the FRG through the Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW), Frankfurt. In 1982 this consisted of a grant of DM 13 million as a supplemental measure for the irrigation project of the Bou Heurtma retaining dam. In 1981, capital aid amounting to DM 25 million for the water supply of scattered rural settlements and DM 3.5 million for diverting the Oued Ousafa to the Lakhmes storage dam was approved. In 1980, assistance in the form of DM 78.5 million for the Bou Heurtma II irrigation project, DM 90 million for projects concerning drinking water supplies and DM 1.5 million for the Tabarka-Mekna irrigation study was approved. Tunisia had already received capital assistance of DM 35.8 million in 1970 for the Bou Heurtma I irrigation project.

Besides Beller Consult GmbH, other German engineering consulting firms have been involved in the Tunisian water works projects. These firms include the AKT Agrar und Hydrotechnik GmbH, Essen; the GKW Consult Beratende Ingenieure fuer Wasser-, Abwasser-Abfalltechnik GmbH [engineering consultants in water resources and waste management], Mannheim; the Hydroplan-Ingenieur-GmbH, Herdecke/Ruhr, and Instrupa Consulting GmbH, Bad Homburg v.d.H.

In December 1983, the World Bank approved a loan to Tunisia in the amount of 50 million dollars to extend the rural water supply system of about 600 small

villages in all of the country's administrative districts with the exception of the Tunis area. The total project costs are estimated at 104.4 million dollars of which 50 million dollars are foreign exchange costs. The planned completion for this project is 1989. The World Bank has previously made available a loan of 16.5 million dollars for irrigation projects in central Tunisia at the end of 1983. In May 1983, it granted a loan of 25 million dollars for a flood protection project in the vicinity of Sfax.

The aforementioned Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) with headquarters in Kuwait granted Tunisia a loan of 5.7 million dollars in the summer of 1984 to partially finance an irrigation project in the plain from Mornaghia by Tunis. The capital expenditure for this project is reported to be 7.8 million Tunisian dinars. Thus AFESD's overall financial contribution for the realization of development projects in Tunisia has increased to 90 million Tunisian dinars.

The African Development Bank, Abidjan (Ivory Coast), is assisting Tunisia in the construction of an agroindustrial complex in the Ghazala-Mateur area. It approved an approximately 15.8 million dollar credit in November 1983 which is intended, among other things, for the irrigation of 410 hectares of arable land for fruit cultivation and the artificial watering of 500 hectares of arable land. The carrier of the project is the Office des Terres Domaniales (OTD), Tunis, and the project is scheduled to be completed by 1987.

In the autumn of 1983, the Compagnie de Construction Mecanique Sulzer (CCM Sulzer), Mantes-la-Jolie, the French associated company of the Swiss Sulzer group, was awarded the turn-key contract by Sonede to construct a large pumping station which will serve to supply the drinking water needs of Bizerte, Mateur, and Menzel Bourguiba. Previously CCM Sulzer had constructed pumping stations in connection with the Bou Heurtma I and II and Joumine projects. Furthermore, Sonede was awarded the turnkey contract to construct two pumping stations which will supply the drinking water for the Sousse-Monastir area.

A future project involves the construction of an inland lake from Tunisian Chott Gharsa which lies 24 meters below sea level up to the Algerian Chott Melrha (40 meters below sea level). The inland lake could be fed with water from the Mediterranean via a 240 km long canal radiating from the Gulf of Gabes. Tunisia and Algeria agreed in October 1983 upon founding a joint study firm with headquarters in Algiers to examine this ambitious project which, however, does not affect the great Chott El Djerid.

12348

CSO: 4620/19

BAHRAIN

BRIEFS

DROP IN NATIONAL BANK EARNINGS--National Bank of Bahrain has reported a fall in net earnings for 1984, but is maintaining its 30 per cent dividend--a total pay out of 8.4mn Bahraini dinars. Profits were BD13.24mn. Net earnings were BD10.74mn (\$28.5 mn) in comparison with BD12.54mn in 1983. Total assets increased by 14 per cent, from BD560.95mn to BD639mn, but return on average assets declined to 1.8 per cent, after returns of 2.49 and 2.74 per cent in 1983 and 1982 respectively. Revenues increased by 8.1 per cent, from BD15.13mn to BD16.36mn. Loans and credit rose to BD248.01mn, while time deposits increased to BD342.05mn from BD285.44mn. This is the first time for over 10 years that NBB has not improved its profit and earnings. But the chairman, Mr Ahmed Ali Kanoo, said the figures were better than economic circumstances might have permitted. Provisions of BD1.5mn were made for bad and dubious debt and a further BD500,000 against the decline in the value of shares in local investments. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 28 Jan 85 p 12]

BANK LENDING LIMITS--The Bahrain Monetary Agency has told local and offshore banks that its recently published lending guidelines are to be regarded as upper limits and that it intends to hold meetings with bank managers to set lending ceilings for individual banks, according to their capitals and structures. The Agency will also draw up timetables within which banks are expected to come into line with the new limits. The new requirements stipulate that lending to directors should not exceed 30 per cent, regardless of the collateral offered or the capacity in which the borrower approaches the bank. The Agency also clarifies its definitions of capital, reserves and credit. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 7 Feb 85 p 11]

CSO: 4400/93

ISRAEL

COMMENTATOR SEES MERIT IN JORDAN-PLO ACCORD

TA191243 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 19 Feb 85 p 6

[Commentary by Pinhas 'Inbari: "It Is a Breakthrough, Nevertheless"]

[Text] The 'Arafat-Husayn agreement has not been officially made public yet, but the fragments of information about it, those published in the Arab press and those reaching the territories, indicate that this is not a "historic" agreement as presented in Amman, but it does contain a breakthrough.

The breakthrough lies in a clause that won little attention but which is, in fact, the only clause containing real news: the agreement between Husayn and 'Arafat to establish a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation for negotiations. A quote from Kuwait's AL-ANBA' indeed talks about a Jordan-PLO delegation, but according to reports in the West Bank 'Arafat made a far-reaching concession in agreeing that actual PLO members would not participate in the delegation. Instead, "independent" Palestinians, namely, persons who are not members of any PLO organization but whose sympathy to 'Arafat is clear, would participate.

Reference is to Palestinian notables in the territories, such as Rashad al-Shawwa from Gaza or Hikmat al-Masri from Nabulus, who are acceptable to both 'Arafat and Husayn, and who have connections both in Israel and in the United States, or well-known Palestinian professors of the Palestinian lobby in the United States, such as Hisham Shar'abi or Edward Sa'id.

The fury of Fatah left-winger, Faruq Qaddumi, over the 'Arafat-Husayn agreement stems from the fear that the PLO will give up the exclusive right to represent the Palestinians. This confirms the correctness of the reports in the West Bank, that this is indeed the concession 'Arafat made to Husayn.

Of all East Jerusalem papers the pro-Jordanian AL-QUDS was the most enthusiastic. It expressed its joy on the very same day, and only later did its enthusiasm spread to the pro-PLO AL-FAJR as well. The reason for this is that King Husayn emerged strengthened by this agreement. The criterion is the attitude toward UN Security Council Resolution 242, but, contrary to numerous opinions in Israel, the writer of these lines does not believe that Jordan wants the PLO to adopt the resolution, at least not at this stage. The reason: Jordan is aiming at superiority over the PLO in the negotiations

stages, and the PLO's refusal to recognize Resolution 242 will allow Jordan a significant edge. 'Arafat is well aware of this and therefore aimed at recognizing this resolution, but his close colleagues in Fatah are unprepared to accept it since it presents the Palestinian problem as a humanitarian one of rehabilitating refugees, and not a problem reflecting a people's aspiration for statehood.

'Arafat met King Husayn from a position of inferiority, and the king probably did not strain himself in trying to persuade 'Arafat, both in view of the Jordanian interest and in light of his knowledge of 'Arafat's internal difficulties.

As strange as this may seem, it is to be assumed that Washington too sighed in relief when it turned out that 'Arafat did not recognize Resolution 242, since the Americans too are interested in Jordanian superiority in the political process and do not want to recognize the PLO at this stage. In addition, it is reasonable to assume that Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin convinced them that from the Labor Party's point of view, the time is not ripe to trigger the political process on the Palestinian issue, that the party prefers to bury it in "fourth place" on the national order of priorities. Therefore, the PLO's and Jordan's settling for an agreement to set up a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation without the PLO recognizing Resolution 242 is exactly the formula the political process needs now. The PLO is paying the price for its refusal to recognize this resolution by having to hide behind the scenes and giving Jordan priority in regard to representing the Palestinians.

What 'Arafat really wanted to achieve in Amman was not necessarily exclusive representation of the Palestinians--this he had to give up due to his internal and external difficulties--but to guarantee in advance the results of the negotiations that Jordan and the Palestinians who are not PLO members will conduct with Israel. Therefore, one can put one's trust in the published clauses, which stated that an agreement was reached on the final result of the negotiations: an independent Palestinian state linked to Jordan in a confederation.

Needless to say, as long as the PLO does not recognize Resolution 242 it cannot participate in the same delegation with Jordan, as an organization, but has to agree to Jordanian representation together with independent Palestinians. It is through these independent Palestinians that 'Arafat wants to enter the political process based on Resolution 242. It is possible to say, in general, that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have already recognized this resolution. The left-wing flank, which was once known as the National Guidance Committee, accepted the conception of the Palestinian Communists on this matter, Palestinian Communists who recognized Resolution 242 after the Soviet Union did so. The right-wing flank, supporters of the Jordanian-PLO Joint Committee, does not stop calling on the PLO to clearly recognize this resolution. When the joint delegation is set up for negotiations based on Resolution 242, its members cannot include those who refuse to recognize the resolution: They will either not be accepted into the delegation, or they themselves will give their candidacy up.

Now, when 'Arafat begins the tiring campaign to convince his colleagues of the justness of his decision (to this one should note the special political-organizational difficulty in separating the Gaza Strip from the West Bank), he will be able to claim that there is indeed a concession on the point of exclusive representation of the Palestinians, but this is a concession that could not be avoided and is not that important in fact, since the results of the negotiations have already been guaranteed in advance according to the PLO's conditions, as stipulated in the PNC meeting in Algeria. The choice is between cracking the hard nut of Fatah, and with it losing the political opportunity, or withdrawing on the question of representation in return for guaranteeing the political results. 'Arafat, as a result, has a reasonable chance of convincing his colleagues.

'Arafat will also be able to say that since Israel refuses to sit down with the PLO, it will face great difficulties when it is faced by Rashad al-Shawwa and Hikmat al-Masri whom it accepts. The idea of the joint delegation also gives an opening for Syria to join it so as to defend its interests on the Golan Heights, and thus open a new opportunity for conciliation between Fatah and Damascus.

If Syria is not appeased, the PLO will be able to take revenge on it by increasing its isolation in the Arab world through breaking the Rejectionist Front by adding Algeria and South Yemen to the Jordanian-Palestinian move. This move stands a strong chance, to judge by the Algerian president's consent to meet with Husayn and 'Arafat immediately after they reached the agreement.

According to developments in the West Bank, 'Arafat had long ago reached the conclusion that his salvation in the political process will not necessarily come from his supporters, Fatah members, but from that large Palestinian idea in its broad national context and not in its limited-partisan-organizational one.

When 'Arafat resigned during the PLO Executive Committee's meeting, in the course of the PNC deliberations in Amman, it was said that that was "a show," that the resignation was dramatized so as to extort renewed support for 'Arafat. However, those who followed the council's deliberations missed the point: 'Arafat resigned from the Executive Committee which is controlled by organizations and appealed for renewed support from the parliament which is based on the "independent."

This increased reliance on the independent was also expressed in appointing prominent representatives from the territories, from the West Bank to be precise, such as Al-Qawasimi and Milhim, who are not members of any organization, to senior positions on the Executive Committee, and appointing an exile from East Jerusalem, Shaykh 'Abd al-Fahum, who is a member of a PLO organization, Hawatimah's Democratic Front, in this case.

Signs of this new policy started to emerge in the West Bank when, for the first time, 'Arafat's supporters also appeared in the East Jerusalem Electric Corporation under the "Independent List" name, and as far as we know,

additional independent lists are organizing in elections for other institutions.

If this process is indeed exhausted, the West Bank will appear as "independent and supportive of 'Arafat" rather than "supportive of the PLO." Then Israel will have no choice but to accept 'Arafat as a partner in the political process through the West Bank whose representatives will be members of the joint delegation, as mentioned above.

All of these are of course initial signs in a painstaking political process. 'Arafat is leaning more and more on the West Bank, also at the expense of the Gaza Strip, to the discontent of his veteran colleagues, the founders of Fatah who come from Gaza, as well as at the expense of the PLO, the organization. In this process he is increasingly linked to Jordan on whose guarantees he has to rely, and what is more important, the guarantees of the masses of his people in the territories, the real Palestine which is rising up for political negotiations.

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ISRAEL

'INBARI SAYS RESOLUTION 242 POSES PROBLEMS FOR PLO

TA131307 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 13 Feb 85 pp 5, 8

[Commentary by Pinhas 'Inbari]

[Text] While writing this article, the outlines of the understanding between Jordan and the PLO on a joint political move remain unclear, as does the main question: Has the PLO given a positive response to King Husayn's call to accept UN Resolution 242?

The difficulties the PLO has in accepting the resolution, because of its contents, are known. Resolution 242 refers to the Palestinians as refugees, and the PLO's contribution to the Palestinian problem is that it presented it as a national issue. Therefore, it is difficult for the PLO to return to where it stood in its initial stages and to suddenly cancel the high-light of its political achievements: The representation of the Palestinian problem not as a humanitarian problem arising from their refugee status, but as a problem of their aspiration to exist as a nation. The political process implied in 242, however, poses another serious problem to the PLO, not in the ideological sphere but in its political structure--its dependence on the Palestinian people in the territories.

The essence of Resolution 242 is the return of occupied territories. Therefore, the main role in the political process based on this resolution will be carried out by the countries which held the Palestinian territories slated for political negotiations: Jordan is claiming the West Bank, and Egypt is claiming the Gaza Strip. As a result, during the negotiations--which may last for many years--Egypt will again become the main influence in the Gaza Strip, and Amman will play the main role in the West Bank, whether this is directed from the Jordanian Government offices or from the PLO offices.

The trend which is now emerging--though not too successfully--of a political merger between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will come to a halt, and a new process of division will come about. The PLO is not going to like this process in principle, but it will pose difficulties to Fatah in particular. It should be recollected that the Fatah organization was founded by a cell of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, and to date the Fatah leaders stem from Gaza and not from the West Bank. This is why there is relatively more

support for 'Arafat and his associates in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank, where the pro-'Arafat majority is confronted with a strong opposition of leftists who are much more numerous than in the Gaza Strip. This is also reflected in the structure of the PLO office in Amman: Those heading it--including Hamid Abu Sittah, who previously held Fahd al-Qawasimi's position, as well as Abu Jihad [Khalil al-Wazir], the man who took over after al-Qawasimi's assassination--mainly originate from the Gaza Strip. There were people who linked al-Qawasimi's murder to the attempt to stop the shift of the center of gravity of the Palestinian's Amman office on affairs concerning the occupied land from Gaza people to West Bank residents, as part of the process of severing the Gaza Strip from Amman. However, there is no evidence to back this argument. Furthermore, the leftist organizations affiliated with Syria--whose place al-Qawasimi had taken over in the PLO executive--also had weighty reasons for murdering him.

If the territories actually enter the political process connected with Resolution 242, the Fatah leadership will have a serious organizational-political problem when it will have to "concede" its Gaza stronghold to Egypt. The Gaza veterans will then either impose themselves on the West Bank or find themselves forced to hand their position over to West Bank residents.

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ISRAEL

PRO-PLO, LEFT SUPPORTERS WIN GAZA UNION ELECTIONS

TA141236 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Feb 85 p 3

[Report from the south by Dani Tzidqoni]

[Text] The supporters of the PLO and the left won a majority in the elections for the physicians and engineers unions in the Gaza Strip. They are expected to win a similar majority in the attorneys union elections to be held soon.

These three organizations are made up of Gaza Strip academics and constitute a framework for the Gaza Strip's intelligentsia.

Dr Mahmud (al-Dahr), the religious circles' representative, had previously headed the physicians union, but in the last elections the religious won only three seats. The list identified with the Fatah, headed by Dr Zakariya al-'Azar, won four seats, the left won three seats, and the independents won a single seat. The list affiliated with the Fatah and that affiliated with the left have set up a coalition. Al-'Azar was elected head of the union.

In the elections for the engineers union the religious won two seats, while those identified with the Fatah won five seats. The head of this list, 'Aql Matar, was elected head of the union.

The contest for the leadership of the attorneys union is between the present chairman, Fayiz Abu Rahmah, and Ibrahim Sabah of Khan Yunis, both basically belonging to the same pro-PLO political camp.

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ISRAEL

DAVAR ANALYZES W. BANK SETTLERS' ORGANIZATION

TA101117 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Feb 85 p 7

[Commentary by Dani Rubinstein: "The Settlers: An Underground and an 'Emergent State'"]

[Text] In the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, of which there are more than a hundred, over the past few years a series of frameworks, institutions, and similar organizations have been set up which superficially resemble other settlement establishments in the State of Israel. They have regional councils and there are economic companies; there is a military framework for area defense and educational frameworks, planning and other bodies; and there is also a supreme organization called the Council of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza, containing the decisionmaking and implementation bodies. The frameworks of the settlers in the territories are different from any other settlement framework in the State of Israel. The difference lies in the strength of the political emphasis placed on their work. All the settlers' frameworks are aimed at one political goal: the elimination of any possibility of territorial compromise or any concession whatsoever by Israel in the West Bank and Gaza, and this is well known.

In this series of articles an attempt will be made to describe the great power becoming increasingly concentrated in the settlements, a power aimed entirely at one thing: the crystallization of a political force that will force the State of Israel to accept the settlers' ways and political beliefs. From many aspects, lines of similarity can be found between the settlers' frameworks and institutions and those frameworks that have been called an "emergent state" in Zionist history. This refers to social organizational, economic, educational, cultural and even semimilitary frameworks. However, this time there is no question of the establishment of a new state, but of the establishment of a political and ideological infrastructure that will force the State of Israel to annex the territories completely, in accordance with the terms and arrangements determined by the settlers.

As far back as 8 years ago, at one of the Gush Emunim Secretariat meetings, Hanan Porat demanded that Kfar 'Ezyon prepare an "operational headquarters for the eventuality of a landslide." At the time this referred to several hundred or several thousand religious youths wearing knitted skull caps who were holding violent demonstrations in favor of settlement in the West

Bank. Between then and now these people have gone a long way toward the establishment of settlements and organizational frameworks, but the goal remains the same one: to forestall the "possibility of a landslide," that is, the possibility of an Israeli concession and withdrawal from the territories.

Even exaggerating, it is impossible to speak of the entire settlement establishment as an underground framework preparing for the "day of the order," but it certainly can be regarded as a framework which will use every possible means to reject and eliminate that "day of the order" or, as they phrase it: the possibility of a landslide.

One of the most prominent and vocal spokesmen of the settlers, lawyer Elyaqim Ha'etzni from Qiryat Arba', has been hinting for many weeks, in articles in the settlers' publication NEQUDA, about what the settlers might, can, and should do if that "landslide" occurs. On the eve of the last election he wrote: "The State of Israel, which will concede Israeli sovereignty over Judaea and Samaria, will do so only in its own name.... The Jews in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza will not be bound by such an act of alienation and regression." Further on he asked: "In such circumstances, is it permitted to take the law into one's own hands?" And he called upon his friends: "Let us prepare ourselves for the future" (NEQUDA 75); in another article, after the elections, he threatened that, in view of the "Jewish assimilation with Palestinianism... a civil war, in the full sense of the word, could break out" (NEQUDA 82).

Some people will react with scorn to Ha'etzni's declarations, with the headline of his article having been: "Even Now a Civil War Could Break Out," but less hysterical publications and statements by settlers also hint of such a possibility. The conclusion is clear: Anyone who fears a civil war or expects such a possibility should and must prepare for it. This does not prove that the settlers' frameworks are built in preparation for a civil war. Perhaps even the contrary is the case. The settlers are making an enormous effort to impose their way and their political aspirations without a civil war. What chance they have is already another question.

A small and tangible example of this could be the wonderfully organized campaign the settlers carried out last Saturday evening, when they scrupulously blocked off some 30 highway junctions in the West Bank. All the papers reported, with more than a trace of amazement, was the "military structure" and "perfect order" with which, within a few hours, 600 settlers (according to DAVAR) or 1,000, according to the organizers, were recruited. They came in 300 private cars, divided themselves into squads and teams, with command rooms and communications equipment, and they almost completely halted all traffic on the West Bank roads.

This, as stated, is a small example of organizational ability and no far-reaching conclusions should be drawn from it. How typical and fearful is the fact that there was not one official reaction to this. The police did not arrest even one of these people who were breaking the law; they did not interrogate them or even warn anybody. This is evidence of the great political power the settlers' institutions have amassed on their way to imposing their will on Israeli policy.

ISRAEL

NUMBER OF SETTLERS IN W. BANK DOUBLES SINCE 1982

TA111225 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Feb 85 pp 1, 11

[Report by Yehuda Litani]

[Text] The number of settlers in the West Bank at the end of 1984 reached 42,600 in 114 settlements. Seventy-two percent of the settlers (approximately 30,000) live in 15 large communities, while the rest live in 100 small settlements. A quarter of the total number of settlers live in Ma'ale Adummim, east of Jerusalem. These data were published yesterday by the "West Bank and Gaza Project," a research institute directed by Dr Meron Benvenisti.

According to the data, there were 7,300 housing starts in the West Bank at the end of 1982, while at the end of 1984 the number halved. This drop will only be felt in 2 and 1/2 years. The rate of populating the settlements in 1985 will thus be similar to the 1983-1984 average.

Benvenisti reported yesterday that the number of settlers in the West Bank rose by 100 percent between the end of 1982 and the end of 1984--from 20,700 to 42,600. In 1982 there were 71 settlements in the West Bank; in 1983 there were 99; and in 1984 there were 114 settlements (including NAHAL pre-settlements and three unpopulated settlements).

According to the data, up to 20 families live in 42 percent of the communities, 20 to 50 families live in 38 percent, 50 to 100 families live in 8 percent, 100 to 250 families live in 4.5 percent, and more than 250 families live in 7.5 percent of the communities. Settlements of 50 families have problems growing beyond that figure, while those populated by more than 250 families have a great growth potential.

In 1982, 58 percent of the settlers lived in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv metropolitan areas within the West Bank, compared to 71.5 percent who lived in these areas in 1984. (Of the 71.5 percent, 41 percent lived in the Jerusalem area and 30.5 percent in the Tel Aviv metropolis.) In contrast, 20 percent of the settlers lived in mountain ridge areas (this number remaining almost unchanged since 2 years ago), and 8.5 percent lived in the Jordan Valley (a 5 percent drop compared to 1982).

The data show that more than 60 percent of the settlers in the West Bank are religious.

Dr Benvenisti said that in light of current housing starts, and despite the drop in their number, the population of the West Bank toward the end of the 1980's is forecast at 100,000 Israeli settlers. He added that the concentration in metropolitan areas will increase, and that toward the end of the 1980's approximately 80 percent of the settlers will live in these areas. According to Benvenisti, there is a consensus between the Alignment and the Likud regarding these areas.

Benvenisti noted that it was mainly the existing large communities that continued to grow while the new and young settlements grew by only a few dozen families. Therefore, additional settlements have no demographic significance, only political. The decision to establish six new settlements, Dr Benvenisti said, has only declaratory significance. The decision to freeze settlement at this stage is not upheld in reality, because most of the growth and expansion is taking place in the existing large communities. The freeze under current conditions refers only to the building of residential neighborhoods in existing urban communities.

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ISRAEL

WEST BANK SETTLERS AIM FOR ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

TA191342 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Feb 85 p 5

[Article by Uri'el Ben-'Ami: "Economic Autonomy in Judaea and Samaria"]

[Excerpts] The Amana Movement, the settlement movement of Gush Emunim, wants autonomy in Judaea and Samaria. The reference is, of course, to economic autonomy. The aim is to create a system of economic projects that will contribute to the region, to the welfare of its residents, and to finding sources of employment. Amana's declaration of intent is aimed at the long range. "This system will make economic autonomy possible in the future," the representatives of the movement's settlements are told, "so that the Judaea and Samaria regions will not develop just according to the government's policy."

In order to gain control over building industrial plants in Judaea and Samaria, the Amana Movement, together with the development companies of the Shomron, Mate Binyamin, and Gush 'Ezyon Regional Councils, set up the SHABA [Hebrew initials for Shomron, Binyamin, and Amana] company.

SHABA was set up as a private company and in fact controls all components of [plant] building connected with the Judaea and Samaria economy. It is dealing with them in cooperation with familiar economic organizations such as the "Or 'Avodot" company, "Ozar Hishakhon--North America Bank Groups," "Tadir Beton," and others. SHABA has recently won a government tender to establish the science quarter planned for Ari'el. It is active as a maintenance company and deals with all types of insurance, having a level of service and fees which are not inferior to any other company. On the other hand, its insurance profits remain within the system for the purpose of promoting the region.

Eliyahu 'Atya, the industrial development adviser for Judaea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip on behalf of the Industry and Trade Ministry [as published; records indicate he was replaced], claims that only about 15 percent of investments in industry have been allocated to Judaea and Samaria in recent years, while 85 percent were allocated for industry in development towns. 'Atya says that 10,000 dunams were located for industry in Judaea and Samaria and that 2,500 of them are already in different stages of development in the region. There are already about 1,400 dunams prepared for

industry in the Ma'ale Adummim region alone. Eliyahu 'Atya notes that 300 factories and workshops already exist in Judaea and Samaria, with 2,500 workers. They are mainly characterized by high-tech industry. 'Atya says that a condition for the establishment of any plant in Judaea and Samaria is that about 50 percent of its production be exported. Only if the plant can meet this demand, is its establishment approved.

Industry in Judaea and Samaria is divided into five main industrial zones: in Qiryat Arba', Mishor Adummim, Barqan-Ari'el, Qarne Shomron, and Tulkarm. An additional five industrial zones are in the planning stages: in Ma'ale 'Amos, Efrat, the science quarter in Ari'el, 'Immanu'el, and Gush Rehan.

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ISRAEL

COMMENTATOR 'INBARI ANALYZES TRENDS IN GUSH EMUNIM

TA041129 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 4 Feb 85 p 5

[Commentary by Pinhas 'Inbari: "Political Junction in al-Duhayshah"]

[Text] Opposite processes are taking place in "Gush Emunim" and in its awesome enemy, the PLO. "Gush Emunim" is adopting the line of its most extremist elements, whereas the PLO is making an effort to adopt a moderate line. These contrary processes cross at the political junction in al-Duhayshah.

Contrary to the impression which can be formed if one judges by the settlers' battle cries these days, the truth is that the last thing they presently want is a new settlement war. In the past, we have already described "Gush Emunim's" doubts about its future policy, and the dilemma posed to it by the national unity government. The present battle is being waged against the national unity government and, against the national consensus, which "Gush Emunim's" messianic philosophy cannot accept.

If the "Gush Emunim" leaders hoped that the Likud would support them in their new battles, they were disappointed. Vice Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir unequivocally clarified to them that the security situation in the territories today cannot be compared with 1948 or with the situation in Lebanon, and that whoever does so harms the "common interest." Therefore, the alternative left to "Gush Emunim" after the two components of the national unity government have rejected its claims is to wage the political battle of the Tehiya. Perhaps the Tehiya supporters are interested in this--for partisan reasons rather than for reasons pertaining to "Gush Emunim." However, Morasha also has a very strong base in the settlements, and since, unlike the Tehiya, it is part of the national unity government, it will not be able to give far-reaching support to "Gush Emunim" at present.

Due to the fact that in the present circumstances, any battle against the government is a battle against the national unity--especially in the current economic crisis, when public opinion is uniting against more investments beyond the Green Line--"Gush Emunim" must lower its profile, and preserve and solidify its considerable achievements in order to make a breakthrough at a later opportunity. Evidence of this modest spirit is the positive way in which "Gush Emunim" greeted the decision to establish six new settlements.

These settlements are not situated according to "Gush Emunim's" plan, but rather according to the Alignment plan, perhaps with the exception of Migdalim which is on the border of the Allon plan. "Gush Emunim" was willing to settle for these settlements in order to concentrate on strengthening the existing ones. However, due to its unique nature, it is hard for "Gush Emunim" to withstand the "nationalistic" pressures of its more militant components, and it is being swept into battles in which it has no interest at this point. The current battles are centered around Khirbat al-Rumaythah in Hebron, Joseph's Tomb in Nabulus, and convincing the government and Israeli public opinion of the need to introduce a new policy in the territories which would completely repress Palestinian nationalism in general, and that identified with the PLO in particular.

Now, more than ever, conditions are unsuitable for achieving these objectives, and "Gush Emunim" knows this. Evidence to this effect is the endless sit-in of the lonely man in al-Duhayshah: Rabbi Levinger. "Gush Emunim" wants to repress Palestinian nationalism by fighting the phenomena of stonethrowing and Molotov cocktails, by taking a tough approach against "inciters," by expulsions, death sentences, lengthy prison terms for relatively minor offenses, and obviously, by closing down the bases for Palestinian nationalism in the territories: the universities and East Jerusalem newspapers.

Although demands were voiced by "Gush Emunim" a long time ago, many members realize that this is not the right time to wage these battles. Therefore, the Judaea, Samaria and Gaza Strip Settlements Council has not stood by Rabbi Levinger in al-Duhayshah when he raised the banner of these demands. However, when he brandished them, the council could not ignore the challenge put to it by his demonstration. When, unfortunately, an Israeli driver was killed by a Molotov cocktail in Qalqilyah and shots were fired at an Israeli bus in Gush 'Ezyon, the council had to adopt Levinger's line, much against its will.

The actions taken by the settlers were brief, as though only to do their duty. Moreover, in order to demonstrate their reservations about the line imposed on them by Levinger, even now they have not joined him in al-Duhayshah, but rather took another line of action--roadblocking. In any event, now that the Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza Strip Council is in the picture, all the conditions for Levinger to end his sit-in victoriously have been met, and he can now concentrate his main efforts on Khirbat al-Rumaythah, again to the displeasure of the council. However, "Gush Emunim" has no alternative. Now that it has adopted a new policy of protest actions against the national unity government, it will have to continue regardless of the consequences.

Levinger himself now admits that the phenomenon of stonethrowing "is not catastrophic." However, the thing which would worry him--and not only him--is that the nationalistic battle imposed by "Gush Emunim" in the territories is the cause of a new and extremely dangerous phenomenon. The real cause for concern is that the PLO no longer has to import terrorists from across

the Jordan in order to carry out attacks. The West Bankers are beginning to recruit from among themselves.

The meager means possessed by the squads which have been recently operating--Molotov cocktails and light weapons--indicate this is a local organization against the background of a real need for a Palestinian nationalist struggle, rather than terror imported from across the Jordan. What can actually take place is unbelievable. The "popular revolution" which the PLO so ardently desired following the Six-Day War did not take place. The Arabs of the territories knew the Israelis of 1967, and realized that the official policy was to find a political solution and to withdraw. They therefore did not join the PLO, and even turned in the few squads which managed with great difficulty to cross the Jordan and tried to incite the populations. Today, however, they know a different kind of Israeli, and realize that the policy (at least that of the Likud governments) is to annex them to Israel under an inferior status. They are willing to take ever greater risks--with or without the PLO--because the settlers are pushing them into a nationalistic impasse.

The "popular revolution" is starting to surface just when 'Arafat wants to join the political process. One of the main reasons for his move is that he despaired of the popular revolution and the armed struggle.

This is the political junction in al-Duhayshah.

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ISRAEL

DATA ON SETTLEMENTS IN TERRITORIES RELEASED

TA041438 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Feb 85 p 7

[Article by Uri'el Ben-'Ami: "There Are Already 45,000 Jews in Judaea and Samaria"]

[Excerpts] According to data submitted by Pli'a Albeck, the director of civil matters in the State Attorney's Office, 40 percent of the land in Judaea and Samaria will be declared state-owned. This applies to about 2.15 million dunams out of a total of 5.6 million dunams of land in Judaea and Samaria. So far about 1.8 million dunams have already been declared state-owned land.

According to data released by the World Zionist Organization, updated to 1 November 1984, 48,192 people live today in Judaea, Samaria, Gaza, and the Jordan Rift Valley.

According to data released by the Judaea and Samaria Settlements Council, updated to mid-January 1985, there are 49,500 settlers today in Judaea, Samaria, Gaza, and the Jordan Rift Valley, of which 45,000 live in Judaea and Samaria.

Following is the breakdown of settlements according to the number of settlers.

The letters "NR" denote a nonreligious settlement, the letter "R" indicates a religious settlement, and the letter "M" indicates a mixed settlement. The data released by officials of the Judaea and Samaria regional councils is based on a key of 4.5 members per nonreligious family and 5.5 members per every religious family.

Samaria Regional Council

<u>Name of Settlement</u>	<u>Jewish Agency Report (number of persons)</u>	<u>Regional Councils Report (number of families)</u>
R Elon More	860	100
NR Alfe Menashe	1,400	240
NR Barqan	264	55

<u>Name of Settlement</u>	<u>Jewish Agency Report (number of persons)</u>	<u>Regional Councils Report (number of families)</u>
NR Gannim	84	25
R Berakha	117	26
NR Homesh	132	25
NR Hinnanit	112	22
NR Hermesh	45	18
NR Yo'ezer	121	23
R Yizhar	20	12
R Yaqir	350	48
NR Kaddim	34	10
NR Mevo Dotan	124	27
M Ma'ale Shomron	270	48
NR Sal'it	230	45
R 'Enav	180	32
R Qedunim	1,570	230
R Netafim	160	25
R Qarne Shomron	1,820	180
NR Rehan	53	12
R Sannur	40	10
R Shave Shomron	480	65
M Sha'are Tiqva	100	38
NR Shaqed	200	30
R Tel Hayyim	79	25
R Tappuah	162	31
R Pedu'el	no data	13
M Ginnot Shomron	no data	8
M Ornit	no data	1
NR Elqana Gimmel	no data	1
NR Ari'el	1,800	2,900 people [as published]
R Elqana	980	175
R 'Immanue'el	4,000	4,000 people [as published]

Binyamin Regional Council

R Abir Ya'aqov	14	4
NR Adam	28	15
R Bet-El	599	117
R Bet-El Bet	513	92
NR Bet Arye	250	60
M Bet Horon	219	46
R Dolev	68	18
NR Hadasha	245	44
R Neve Zuf	404	93
R Kokhav Hashahar	183	44
M Kefar Adummim	--	65
R Mikhmarsh	166	32
R Ma'ale Levona	48	16

<u>Name of Settlement</u>	<u>Jewish Agency Report (number of persons)</u>	<u>Regional Councils Report (number of families)</u>
R Mizpe Yeriho	no data	47
R Mattityahu	144	22
NR Nili	191	45
M Mishor Adummim	258	no data
R 'Ateret	102	24
NR 'Anatot	83	22
R 'Ofra	633	110
R Pesagot	255	47
NR Rimmonim	136	32
R Shilo	463	75
R 'Eli	47	11
R Nahli'el	46	10
NR Giv'at Ze'ev	1,350	no data
NR Giv'on	371	no data
NR Ma'ale Adummim	9,950	11,000 people

Har Hevron Regional Council

R Bet Yattir	33	20
NR Telem	31	9
NR Livna	113	28
R Ma'ale Hever	61	13
R Susiyya	85	20
R 'Otni'el	48	12
NR Adora	66	13
NR 'Omarim	30	19
R Haggay	32	9
R Karmel	72	17
R Ma'on	32	17
--NAHAL	18	18 (singles)
pre-settlement		
'Amasa		

Gush 'Ezyon Regional Council

NR Har Gilo	225	65
R Allon Shevut	1,310	215
R Kefar 'Ezyon	361	63
R Rosh Zurim	196	42
R El'azar	158	27
M Teqo'a	241	62
R Migdal 'Oz	132	25
R Ma'ale 'Amos	20	30
M El-David	57	15
R Daniyyel	90	20
R Karme Zur	no data	15
R Asfar	87	25
NR Ne'ot Adummim	41	15
R Efrat	820	180
R Qiryat Arba'	no data	500

CSO: 4400/90

ISRAEL

SAMARIA TOWN DECLARED INDEPENDENT LOCAL COUNCIL

TA181839 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1705 GMT 18 Feb 85

[Text] 'Immanu'el, the town set up in Samaria by Orthodox Jews, was today declared an independent local council. There are now 14 local authorities in Judaea and Samaria, comprising 108 settlements. The number of settlers in 'Immanu'el is growing daily. Our correspondent Elihu Ben-On visited 'Immanu'el today.

[Begin recording] [Ben-On] This is an Orthodox Jewish town located in the heart of Samaria, overlooking the tomb of Joshua, the son of Nun, in the area where the prophets of Israel were active and led the Israeli people until the destruction of the second Temple. This is the historic angle. Today, this town has about 4,500 people, all Orthodox Jews. The ultimate plan envisages 70,000 people there. Interior Minister Yitzhaq Peretz visited the town and declared: I am calling on King Husayn to conduct peace negotiations.

[Peretz] As peace-seeking and peace-loving people we are receptive to any real call for peace. It is for this reason that I uphold negotiations and no more at this stage.

[Ben-On] So far about 1,000 housing units have been set up in 'Immanu'el and underway are about 1,000 more units. Two schools, kindergartens, public and community institutions, magnificent synagogues, and yeshivas, have also been built. [end recording]

CSO: 4400/90

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

NAVAL COMMANDER APPOINTED--Commodore Avraham Ben-Shoshan has been named the new commander of the Israeli Navy to replace Rear Admiral Ze'ev Almog. The appointment becomes effective today, when he will also be promoted to rear admiral. Ben-Shoshan, 38, was born in Turkey. He joined the Israel Defence Forces in 1959 and has served in the Navy ever since. Most recently he served as commander of the Navy's training base and officers' school, before going on to command a missile boat unit and serve as OC [officer commanding] Haifa naval base. In 1982 he was appointed deputy OC of the Navy. He has a B.A. in history from Tel Aviv University. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 31 Jan 85 p 3 TA]

DECLINE IN SALES--During the last 3 months of 1984 sales in the large marketing networks and in the large department stores declined by 10 percent. Data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics today indicate that a steep decline was registered in the purchase of both nonperishable and perishable items. Sales declined by 5 percent during the whole of 1984, the largest decline registered in Israel in the last 10 years. [Summary] [Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 6 Feb 85 TA]

JANUARY EXPORTS DROP--Exports dropped by 4 per cent in January compared with the monthly average established during the preceding three months, the Central Bureau of Statistics reported yesterday. The decline, to \$450 million for the month, continued a downward trend that began last summer. The biggest drop in overseas sales--by 22 per cent--was registered by the metal products-machinery-electronics sector. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Feb 85 p 2 TA]

IMMIGRATION STATISTICS--'Aliya [Immigration] rose by 17 per cent to about 20,000 in 1984, over 1983 despite a decrease in the number of newcomers from western countries, Absorption Minister Ya'qov Tzur told the Engineers' Club on Friday. Tzur disclosed that the figures showed that in 1984, 24 per cent fewer olim came from North America than came in 1983; 33 per cent fewer from South America; and 31 per cent fewer from Western Europe. Tzur noted that some 300,000 Israelis are estimated to be living abroad, two thirds of them in the U.S. Some of these are working in high-technology, an area in which Israel lacks some 15,000 engineers and technicians. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 10 Feb 85 TA]

1984 EMIGRATION STATISTICS--Preliminary data compiled by the Central Bureau of Statistics for 1984 indicate a serious trend emerging in emigration. In the first 10 months of 1984, approximately 15,000 Israelis emigrated, compared to only 2,600 who emigrated in 1983, and 865 who left the country in 1982. [Excerpt] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 12 Feb 85 p 2 TA]

EMIGRATION FROM USSR--Only 61 Jews were let out of the Soviet Union last month, constituting the lowest level of the past year. In December, 91 Jews left the Soviet Union and, in all of last year, only 908 were allowed out. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 12 Feb 85 TA]

W. BANK EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS--Jerusalem, 11 Feb (ITIM)--The number of Judea and Samaria and Gaza Strip residents who were employed in Israel through the Employment Services totaled 45,824 in January 1985 against 44,335 in December 1984, that is, 1,489 more. They were mainly employed in construction, industry, services, and agriculture. In Jerusalem 6,522 workers were employed, in Haifa 2,129, and in Tel Aviv 10,702. [Summary] [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1620 GMT 11 Feb 85 TA]

BENEFITS TREATY WITH NETHERLANDS--The Netherlands and Israel have signed a reciprocal social-insurance treaty providing comprehensive coverage for citizens of either country who work in the other. The new treaty, which was ratified by the Cabinet on Sunday, includes virtually any social benefit provided in both countries, such as for old age, survivorship, disability, maternity, work accidents, children and unemployment payments. Labour and Social Affairs Minister Moshe Qatzav told the Cabinet that there is "no comparison" between this treaty and any other Israel has with another country. It applies not only to Dutch Jews settling in Israel but also to Israelis who lived in Holland temporarily either as post-World War II Jewish refugees en route to Israel or foreign workers, Qatzav noted. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Feb 85 p 3 TA]

ROADS PAVED IN JORDAN RIFT VALLEY--Over 20 km of dirt roads have been dug and paved by the Engineering Corps units of the Central Command over the last year along the border fence in Al-Ghawr in the Jordan Rift Valley. The new roads are part of the new road system decided on following the expansion of agricultural works in the Al-Ghawr region. [Text] [Tel Aviv BAMAHAANE in Hebrew 13 Feb 85 p 7 TA]

FUNDS FOR MA'ALE YA'IR POWER STATION--All works along the route of the Dead Sea-Mediterranean Canal will be stopped for the time being, and only the preparatory work for the establishment of a hydroelectric power station at Ma'ale Ya'ir will be continued. This power station is only one phase of the canal project, but it can also be turned into an independent station. The Cabinet today approved an additional \$2 million budget for continued work at the Ma'ale Ya'ir site. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 17 Feb 85 TA]

FUNDING FOR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS--The finance and religious affairs ministers decided that the total funds allocated to religious institutions will not exceed the sum allocated for this in the Religious Affairs Ministry's

budget, namely, \$9 million. This was the first decision made by the two during their meeting today in an attempt to work out a plan or criteria for state funding of religious institutions. The deliberations of the two ministers will continue, and our correspondent reports that the Knesset Public Audit Committee also discussed the matter today. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 18 Feb 85 TA]

NEW KNESSET MEMBER--A new Knesset member: Ya'aqov Shamay of Herut was sworn in in the Knesset this afternoon. He replaces Yitzhaq Seyger who died 2 weeks ago. Ya'aqov Shamay is the head of the Histadrut's Likud faction. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 18 Feb 85 TA]

POVERTY STATISTICS PUBLISHED--In Israel 330,000 people live on National Insurance Institute [NII] payments alone, and to these must be added another 220,000 workers who live below the poverty level. Nisim Barukh, director general of the NII, at a news conference in Jerusalem yesterday, said that a four-member family whose income this February is less than 233,600 shekels, including the NII payments, is living below the poverty level. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Feb 85 p 6 TA]

1984 UNEMPLOYMENT--At the end of 1984 unemployment increased. The number of unemployed reached a record high, 101,000. This was published by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Since 1983, unemployment has increased by about 60 percent. [Text] [Jerusalem Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 20 Feb 85 TA]

NEW SETTLEMENT IN NEGEV--There is a new settlement in the Negev, on the Egyptian-Israeli border; its name is Mizpe 'Izuz. The settlement has been established between Nizzana and 'Ayn al-Qusaymah. Eight buildings have already been erected on the spot. The founding nucleus is composed of former nature reserves supervisors who have joined the Gush Emunim Amana organization. They will be occupied in agriculture, small industry, and tourism. The settlement used to be an observation point. According to our correspondent Shalom Oren, it was a Hashomer Hatza'ir settlement prior to the 6-day war. It was, of course, disbanded, after it turned out that no settlement was needed with Sinai's incorporation [into Israel]. Now it has been reestablished. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1234 GMT 21 Feb 85 TA]

EGYPTIAN, LEBANESE TOURISTS--Last year 4,600 tourists from Egypt came to Israel. This emerges from Ministry of Tourism data. Last year 33,400 tourists came from Lebanon, about 50 percent less than in 1983. [By David Mosheyoff] [Excerpt] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 22 Feb 85 p 7 TA]

IDF PROMOTIONS--Avi'ezer Ya'ari, the commander of the National Defense College, has been promoted to the rank of major general. The IDF spokesman reported this, and added that the deputy adviser to the prime minister of terrorist affairs, Gid'on Mahanaymi, has been promoted to brigadier general. [Summary] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 22 Feb 85 TA]

CSO: 4400/90

JORDAN

BRIEFS

LOAN TO ARAB POTASH--Jordan's Arab Potash Company last week signed a 12mn Jordanian dinar loan to help pay off growing bank debts and to maintain liquidity. The seven-year facility is fixed at 10 per cent interest a year. Repayments are in eight instalments over 42 months. The loan was put together by the Amman-based Arab Bank and syndicated among Chase Manhattan, the Jordanian Ahli Bank, Citibank, Grindlays Bank and the BICC. The company lost JD13.8mn in 1983, the first full year of trading. Production in 1984 was expected to be 500,000 tonnes and to rise to 800,000 tonnes during 1985--both above previous estimates. Full capacity of 1.2mn tonnes is expected in 1986. [Text] [Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 4 Feb 85 p 12]

CSO: 4400/93

LEBANON

PARTY OFFICIALS DISCUSS FACTIONALISM, SOLUTIONS

Beirut AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 396, 3-9 Dec 84 pp 16-30

[Article by Zakariya Hamud: "AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI Examines Sectarian Turbulence in Lebanese Parties; 12 Party and Organization Officials Respond to 5 Questions"]

[Text] Saj'an Qazi: "The war allowed sects to triumph over faith; there can be no reform as long as sectarian restrictions continue."

George Hawi: "The purpose of making sectarian conflicts erupt is to cover up the essential facts about the class struggle and bring about a Fascist plan."

'Akif Haydar: "Our quarrel is with Maronite politicians, not with the Maronites themselves."

Anwar al-Fatayiri: "The conflict is political; most of us are Druze, but the makeup of our organization is non-sectarian."

'Isam al-Mahayiri: "A sectarian system cannot be eliminated by sectarian means."

'Asim Qansuwah: "The theory of a sectarian monster here opposite a sectarian monster there has been proven false."

'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i: "Not only political parties have a crisis; all the forces do."

Charles Justin: "The future of parties will reflect a true image of the people."

Abu Arz: "Sectarian practices are the means by which Lebanon can be partitioned, broken up or annexed."

Kamal Shatila: "[We advocate] faith and adherence to Lebanese patriotism, not sectarian fanaticism."

'Umar Harb: "The futility of sectarian and religious conflict will restore secular parties to their role."

The situation in which most Lebanese parties and organizations find themselves raises significant questions about the contradictions between what they proclaim and what they do, particularly with regard to their affiliation with, their orientation toward and their use of sectarianism.

When one reads the platform of any Lebanese party or examines its objectives and doctrines, one cannot help but wonder and marvel why one has not yet become a member. However, when one looks at these parties' political practices and what they actually do, one is usually stunned to discover that a sectarian reality triumphs over glowing theories and ideals that are beautiful and noble.

Where is the problem? Does it lie in the makeup of sectarian parties or in the makeup of a sectarian society?

Does the problem lie in the control exercised by regional and international powers? Does it lie in the pressure they are continuously applying to these parties, forcing them into this sectarian corner?

Does it lie in an oppressive sectarian establishment whose oppression becomes more impetuous and vehement in times of crises when one is driven by one's instincts and the light of reason is extinguished?

These questions are being raised to get rid of matters and errors that have been clouding the issue. They are being raised to remind people of self-evident facts that may prove to be useful.

The reader who reads this report and the parties' answers to the questions that were raised will notice that parties are declaring themselves untarnished by suspicions of sectarianism.

We notice that each Lebanese party has its own interpretation of the conflict that has been going on for 10 years. Some parties see it as a conspiracy against Lebanon; others see it as a political, social and class conflict; and still others see it as a national conflict.

There were those who thought that "The conflict in Lebanon is non-sectarian, even though it has depended on sectarianism. It was ultimately preyed upon by sectarianism as a result of sectarian provocation from the other side."

There were those who thought that "Self-proclaimed secular parties no longer have a proper place. Only those that declared a national Lebanese position from the very beginning are the ones that did not get trapped into making sectarian assumptions."

One of many different points of view states that "It would not be correct to say that the conflict in Lebanon is sectarian. This does not mean that the sectarian appearance which the conflict has assumed is being overlooked. Recently the sectarian appearance of the conflict in Lebanon, which is essentially a conflict between the classes, has become pervasive." Another opinion states: "The sectarian conflict that is going on in Lebanon is a product of the existing regime's sectarian makeup. The present course of events has had something to do with limiting the role of secularists."

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI asked questions and got answers from Mr Saj'an Qazi, director of Radio Free Lebanon; George Hawi, the secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party; 'Akif Haydar, director of Amal's Political Bureau; Anwar al-Fatayiri, permanent secretary of the Progressive Socialist Party; Engineer 'Asim Qansuwah, secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party; 'Isam al-Mahayiri, president of the Syrian Social National Party; Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i, the regional command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party; Charles Justin, for the National Liberal Party; Nihad Urfali, for al-Murabitun [the Independent Nasirite Organization]; Abu Arz, for the Guardians of the Cedars; Kamal Shatila, the secretary general of the Union of Working People's Forces; and 'Umar Harb, secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union.

These were the questions we asked:

1. Where do you think secular parties stand in relation to the sectarian conflict?
2. Ever since the onset of the war in Lebanon Lebanese parties and political movements appeared to be divided into two political movements. Each one of these two movements has been trying to implement its political program. And yet this situation has been changed and altered as sectarian conflicts preyed upon these parties. That is what made them appear as though they had abandoned their programs for change or reform. What do you think about that?
3. It is thought that the makeup of some political parties in Lebanon is clearly sectarian. This is an indication of their failure to move the conflict out of a sectarian plane and into a democratic, political one. What do you think about that?
4. What do you think of the opinion which states that the role of Lebanese parties that have a few secular and modern ideas and programs for reform would end up serving the interests of sectarian parties or being terminated?
5. Many people think that Lebanese parties do not adopt programs that are purely national and Lebanese. They think that these parties have been and are still being shackled by regional and international conflicts. They think that each independent political action taken by these parties could bring them to an end and terminate their role. It is for this reason that these parties have forfeited their roles and lost their effectiveness. What do you think about that?

Saj'an Qazi: Director of Radio Free Lebanon

First Question: Secular thought is something that intellectuals in all the countries of the Middle East dream about because two basic conditions are required for secularism.

First, religion and the state have to be separate; second, a certain cultural standard has to be reached. Neither one of these two conditions is available in this area which is laboring under its backwardness and suffering from the burden of its conflicts.

Therefore, secular parties in Lebanon--if there are any--don't seem to have an

advanced position. They are marginal to incidents. This is undoubtedly regrettable, for we are societies that are incapable of being as secular as civilized countries can be.

Second Question: That is true. Sectarianism has eroded all our public and private institutions. It has eroded our religious, political, activist and military institutions. We have all been contaminated by sectarianism: some of us are personally and directly responsible for our contamination, whereas others caught the fever! The war wiped out that idealistic tendency which had adorned our beliefs and our outlook on society and the country from the mid sixties to the mid seventies. Suddenly, after the war began, sectarianism triumphed over faith just as parties triumphed over the state.

A small group of people managed to preserve their ideological identity for reasons that have nothing to do with idealism. Money too is the opiate of ideologies. What I am saying is that parties and organizations which claim to have ideological roots are those that have been behind sectarian divisions. They have been adding fuel to the fires of these divisions and doing everything they could to intensify sectarian strife in Lebanon. It was the Communist Party, the Communist Labor Organization, the Syrian Nationalist Party and others that came up with the idea of kidnapping and murdering people because of who they were. These parties carried out such operations before the parties and organizations that are known to represent Lebanese sects did.

I am also saying that the vast majority of massacres and crimes that were committed during truce periods throughout these 10 years were committed by ideologues for the purpose of starting sectarian strife. Phalangists had warned Islamic sects about the danger of communists penetrating their circles. But these appeals went unanswered for reasons that have become known. Now that everyone has been unmasked and a set of facts has become evident, it is hoped that all the Lebanese can come together in a united society, far away from religious philosophies that are alien to our land, our heritage and our reality. Lebanon can barely cope with its own factions; how then can it cope with alien ideologies?

Third Question: Realism makes it imperative that we admit that the Lebanese--and I am not saying the parties only--failed to turn the sectarian conflict into a political conflict. This is because our parties are products of this nation. Indeed, some parties and leaders did turn a political conflict into a sectarian conflict. Without hurting the feelings of religious leaders, I will say that a number of them linked every demand, change, reform or solution with sectarianism. That complicated the Lebanese crisis and turned it into a conflict between religions instead of a conflict among citizens for a modern state and a responsible society in the East, a society that must liberate itself from its pre-occupation mentality.

The sectarian situation in Lebanon is not necessarily anti-democratic. Democracy may be compared to a liquid substance that takes the shape of the container in which it is placed. What is important is that the container be clean, sanitary and not contaminated. Democracy should not be contaminated the way advocates of sectarianism contaminated Lebanon's democracy.

Fourth Question: It is obvious that sectarian coalitions have prevailed over

those coalitions that presented themselves as secular movements. But the situation in Lebanon and in the East is such that distinctions have to be made between Islamic parties and coalitions and their Christian counterparts. Although there is no Islamic secular movement yet, there are Christian secular movements. Basically, Christianity has nothing to do with political affairs except inasmuch as Christians are exposed to danger and persecution because they are Christians. The problem that we have today is that we are moving backward instead of forward. A fanatic religious regression is sweeping societies in the area, and it has snuffed out the secular tendency. Christians have been affected by this; they've had to use the same weapons to preserve their existence. Campaigns have been waged against the Phalangist Party simply because the party tried to rise above sectarian divisiveness and reach a national consensus. Despite its Christian roots, which it is proud of and adheres to, the Phalangist Party tried to become a movement that could be responsive to the demands and aspirations of Lebanese citizens regardless of their religious affiliation. However, this experience has been painful and critical, and we do not know a way out of it. Maintaining momentum for national action requires that both parties take part in such national action, but this is something that cannot yet be done. However, the Phalangist Party will continue to be a leader in presenting its reform programs and progressive ideas in the scientific sense of these terms, not in the sectarian context that is being used today by many advocates of reform and secularism. It is regrettable that the demand for participation made by advocates of reform and secularism is tantamount to new sectarian roadblocks and barricades that consolidate the sectarian hierarchy in Lebanon. Getting out of this situation today makes it incumbent upon us to come face to face with the entire environment that has been created by these fanatic positions because gaining an understanding of the Lebanese question to bring about reform is to a certain extent linked with the sectarian reality of the Middle East.

Fifth Question: Independent Lebanese parties are a minority; most of them are subordinate to others. If we observe the obstacles that have been put in place in front of the security plan and a political solution in Lebanon, we can ascertain that there are restrictions binding these parties and organizations to the outside world. Independent Lebanese efforts to bring an end to this crisis have not yet succeeded. That is why Bashir al-Jumayyil was assassinated and why the interests of regional forces are converging against Amin al-Jumayyil's regime. This vehement war that has been waged against President al-Jumayyil's government may be attributed to his efforts to adopt a Lebanese option and establish independence without suggesting Lebanon's isolation and its rejection of any initiative or assistance from any neighboring or friendly country.

But none of this will dissuade us from continuing our efforts to free Lebanon from the captivity that has been imposed on it by the area and by international powers. The time has come for Lebanon to be free and to know that it has met its obligations. The time has come for Lebanon to preserve its own honor.

This is how we Phalangists are thinking. We will continue to think along those lines so that what we have been counting on can succeed in the context of a legitimate government that has recently succeeded in scoring noticeable positive gains. We will continue to think along those lines under a new Phalangist leadership that has proven its ability to manage this huge Phalangist institution. For us, Dr Eli Karamah is a new, successful experience. He underscores the

party's essence, namely democracy, and the party's image, namely youth. The success of Dr Eli Karamah's experience in the Phalangist Party will affect the course of political action in our party and our society. There can be no reform without democracy, without young people and without freedom from sectarian restrictions.

George Hawi, Secretary General of the Lebanese Communist Party

First Question: It is not true that the conflict in Lebanon is sectarian. That is, it is not true if we want to start out by looking at matters scientifically, that is, if we want to look at things as they are and not just as they appear to be. At the same time when I say the conflict in Lebanon is not sectarian, I am not ignoring the sectarian appearance that the conflict has assumed and that has become predominant recently.

The basis for the ongoing conflict in Lebanon is the fact that it is essentially, like every other conflict, a conflict between classes that has two basic concurrent manifestations: a national and a social aspect. In its national aspect the conflict is one over the national destiny of Lebanon and the Lebanese. It is a conflict over this country's identity, its national position and its very nature. On one side of this conflict are those forces that are going along with the Zionist, imperialist plan whose aim is to isolate Lebanon from the Arab world, do away with its Arab character, undermine its independence and its unity, partition it, and subjugate it to American and Israeli domination. On the other side are those forces that are opposed to this aggressive plan and fighting to preserve the independence, sovereignty, unity and Arab character of Lebanon. The latter forces want to guarantee the actual liberation of Lebanon; they want to achieve supremacy for its people so they can do their part for Arab liberation causes whose victory will ensure the future of Lebanon itself. The social aspect of the conflict involves, on the one hand, Fascist and reactionary forces seeking to consolidate sectarian privileges, which are basically class privileges, for the exploitative upper class bourgeoisie of all sects. They want to turn these privileges into total sectarian dominance, thereby eliminating all aspects and implications of democracy in Lebanon. They could thus rescue the political sectarian regime from its crisis and show their support for it. On the other side of the social aspect of the conflict are national, progressive and democratic forces striving to foil this Fascist plan and put an end to political sectarianism as well. These forces are trying to abolish sectarianism altogether; they are trying to introduce radical democratic reforms into the political system; and they are trying to bring about serious, socio-economic reform. In other words, the conflict in Lebanon is a conflict over fundamental and crucial questions that are related to each other. They may be summarized by saying that they have to do with questions of liberation, unification and democratic change. The conflict in Lebanon is a conflict between supporters and opponents of these objectives: full, unconditional liberation for Lebanon from Israeli occupation; the restoration of Lebanon's unity on sound principles; and the achievement of democratic change in that country.

The position of any party, organization or tendency, regardless of its declared identity, is basically determined in those terms. What is a party's real and actual position regarding these objectives and crucial, national issues? If there is, for example, one group that advocates secularism but assumes positions

that are incompatible with these national issues, that party's position and its role in the conflict cannot be better than those of another party which supports and works for these national goals even though its methods may be tarnished by sectarianism. It is also in those terms that parties' positions, especially secular parties, regarding the sectarian aspect of the conflict is determined. This means that the effectiveness of these parties' struggle against sectarianism is inseparable from the effectiveness of their struggle against the Israeli occupation and Fascism and their struggle for democratic change. On the basis of the same assumptions also we affirm that working for liberation, unification and change on the basis of sectarian and religious premises damages these national issues and undermines the general national struggle for them.

A position is truly secular and truly national inasmuch as these two aspects of that position are integrated. All aspects of the battle are integrated. We in the Lebanese Communist Party are fighting that battle on that basis. Inasmuch as secular parties and national, progressive parties fight their battle with that rationale, in unison, their position in the conflict will be strengthened, and they will be able to overcome powers of any kind that want to support sectarianism as a reactionary political regime. They will also be able to overcome all manifestations of sectarianism and religious factionalism.

Second Question: The image evoked by the question is only partially true. It does not show the situation as it is. Let me start out with a fact that is acknowledged by the first part of the question, namely that Lebanon's political parties and movements have been divided since the onset of the war in Lebanon into two political tendencies. That is true. To clarify matters let me mention that these two tendencies were manifested, on one side, in a reactionary, sectarian, Fascist tendency whose principal power was the Phalangist party. On the other side, there was a national democratic tendency, the National Movement's tendency. National and progressive parties and forces, including our party, make up the basic power of that movement. Regarding the first tendency, its premises have been sectarian since its inception. Consequently, it would not be true to say that the picture has changed regarding its parties, nor would it be true to say that these parties are being preyed upon by sectarian conflicts. Such a statement would only be true if the magic practiced by a magician were to turn against him. From the very beginning the parties to the sectarian, Fascist plan have deliberately inflamed and escalated sectarian conflicts. They contrived everything to help them do that, particularly the physical elimination of people and sectarian massacres. They knew these actions would provoke comparable reactions, and they have. The sponsors of this sectarian, Fascist plan have thus been instrumental in making Christians become primary targets for this sectarian conflict which they started under the pretext of protecting them.

But the real aim of creating sectarian conflict in this manner has been and still is to obfuscate the essence of the struggle as a political struggle among the classes over national, democratic and social issues. An alternative aim was to allow the sectarian aspect of the conflict to prevail so that popular forces could be mobilized under the influence of the sectarian factor; a Fascist, political plan could be implemented in the country; and imperialist, Zionist plans achieved in the region. The consequences of that have been grave: there was destruction; considerable sacrifices were made; and national forces were victimized. All this happened so that the regime of an exploiting class, the regime of a financial group could be rescued.

Therefore, regarding the national and progressive forces to which the question seems to be referring, it must be said that for them the change in the picture, as far as the predominance of the sectarian aspect of the conflict is concerned, is due primarily to that factor that we mentioned, namely, the sectarian, Fascist plan and the practices of extremely reactionary and extremely sectarian forces. Then there was the Israeli invasion and the imperialist intervention: that invasion dealt a severe blow to the National Movement. Israel's invasion subdued the National Movement, and that created opportunities for manifestations of sectarian and religious factionalism to grow and prevail. In addition, the Israeli occupation and the U.S-NATO intervention strengthened sectarian and religious Fascist forces. There were, of course, other reasons for the mistakes and transgressions that were made either by Lebanon's national and progressive forces, which made up the National Movement, or by the allies of the National Movement who were to be found in Lebanon. However, it would not be correct to say that Lebanon's national and progressive forces have abandoned their programs for change and reform. It is true that during some stages of the crisis they did temporarily freeze the interim democratic program to reform the political regime. They did that because the tasks of liberating Lebanon and restoring its unity had to have priority. But that did not mean, however, that they were abandoning demands for reform and change. In addition, there were major national accomplishments: U.S and NATO forces were expelled; the 17 May agreement was cancelled; and Fascist militias as well as the Israeli occupation were forced to retreat. Lebanon's national, progressive and democratic forces, which made up the National Rescue Front that is allied with the Amal Movement, played a fundamental role in bringing about these achievements which constitute a principal part of their program and a significant basis for continuing their struggle to bring about reform and democratic change. The things that have to be done to bring about liberation and change are interrelated and integrated. This fact is more evident today, and the various national, progressive and democratic forces are becoming more convinced of it. Furthermore, people are becoming more convinced of it also, and there are numerous signs that people's awareness in this regard is growing.

We can say with confidence that in this situation in particular we are facing a new phase in the struggle for reform and change. There are numerous indications and developments in this regard that are highly significant. The most important of these has been the establishment of the National Democratic Front which is allied with the Amal Movement. That stage links the tasks of supporting Lebanon's national resistance, the total liberation of occupied Lebanese territory and preserving the independence, national sovereignty and Arab identity of Lebanon with those of democratic change and radical political reform, which is based on the total elimination of political sectarianism. Other important indicators have been strengthening the national course of democracy, overcoming all aspects of sectarian, religious oppression and achieving serious socio-economic reform. This is the only program that can lead to change, bring about the required radical reforms and accomplish the principal national tasks, chief among which are those of liberating Lebanon and restoring its unity on new, sound principles, that is, non-sectarian principles. Accordingly, it is the only program that can deal with and overcome the present division and fragmentation; it is the only program that can foil plans for partitioning Lebanon, plans for setting up sectarian cantons or a federation, and other plans. Through their commitment to this program and their adherence to the stipulation that they work

in earnest for it, national and progressive forces have shown that they can restore momentum to their national, democratic role and they can get rid of sectarian blemishes that had tarnished that role. On the other side, the forces of the Fascist sectarian movement have shown that they cannot, not even partially, get rid of their sectarian ideas and practices, which are basic components of their very nature. Quite the contrary these forces are still trying to exacerbate the country's sectarian polarization. In an attempt to get out of their growing crisis, they are pushing the country into sharper and more destructive conflicts that are based on this polarization. Since the two conferences at Geneva and Lausanne and since the Damascus Summit, experience has shown that these extremely reactionary, sectarian forces refuse to make even a minimum number of simple concessions that would be required for the restoration of a sectarian balance. This was evident when the present government was formed and when it issued its statement, and subsequently in private ministers' meetings and in the course of sharp discussions in the Council of Ministers. Therefore, while this experience affirms the impossibility of achieving a serious solution to the crisis in Lebanon on the basis of renewing a sectarian settlement, we think that these forces are not qualified to play any positive role in fighting the sectarian epidemic. We think the elimination of sectarian conflict and the achievement of a national, democratic solution to the crisis in Lebanon would establish a real and lasting peace in Lebanon.

Third Question: It is necessary to distinguish here between parties that are sectarian in their makeup, their methods, their overall policies and their practices and those whose policies are basically national and democratic, even though sectarian factors were introduced into them, occasionally becoming dominant in their makeup. It must be said that this phenomenon is basically the product of the distorted socio-economic, political regime that exists in Lebanon: the regime of the present clique, a regime of political sectarianism. This is of course beside the fact that sectarianism in Lebanon has historical roots. The consolidation of sectarianism as a foundation for the political system in Lebanon goes back to the period when Lebanon was under the direct imperialist control of French colonialism. The bourgeoisie and its clique, which is now in power, have been trying to consolidate that sectarianism throughout the period after independence. Regarding what you called the failure to turn the sectarian conflict into a democratic, political conflict, I believe that the answer to the previous question has the answer to that one too. I would add two important points in that regard. First, if there was failure in that regard, that failure was primarily that of the present regime, its class and its political forces. To be specific, that failure exposes their claim of being democratic and shows them to be clearly bankrupt in this regard, particularly since it is this regime that produced these Fascist, sectarian forces which have been trying to turn a democratic, political conflict into a sectarian conflict. The second point I'd like to make is this: the growing crisis of the Fascist, sectarian plan that we are witnessing is at the same time the crisis of every sectarian, religious conflict. Therefore, the failure or success of any political party, regardless of its position, has to do with the extent to which it is restrained by sectarian, religious premises or the extent to which it stays away from these premises, adopts national, democratic methods and practices these methods.

Fourth Question: Despite all the manifestations that are being highlighted and all the indications that have now become apparent, I see quite the opposite.

What will most certainly come to an end, no matter how long it takes--and it may take much less time than many people thought--is the role of sectarian parties. The role of sectarian parties will come to an end in favor of not only those parties that have "a few" secular and modern ideas and programs for reform, but also those that have integrated programs for liberation, genuine reform, true secularism and real modernization. In other words, the role of sectarian parties will end in favor of parties that have an integrated, national, democratic program for liberation, unification and democratic change. I wonder how anyone who has been observing developments with a minimum amount of realism and objectivity can think that the role of national and progressive parties and forces has come to an end when the facts indicate that national and progressive forces have been playing a major political role in all stages of Lebanon's events. They also played a major role during the last stage of these events, and they had a hand in the national and historic achievements that were made during that stage. How can such an opinion be given serious credence when these were the forces that took the historic initiative and established Lebanon's National Resistance Front against the Israeli occupation? How can such an opinion be taken seriously when it was these forces that played a principal role in developing the actions of this resistance which placed the Israeli occupation in a tight spot that it could get out of only by withdrawing unconditionally. This resistance caused Israel to undergo the most serious crisis in its history. It must be emphasized here that the implications of this unique phenomenon, which is manifested by the Lebanese National Resistance, are not confined to confronting the Israeli occupation and creating new prospects for victory in the battle for liberation. They also have a positive effect on the total domestic situation in Lebanon. They strengthen the balance of power in favor of the national, democratic approach, and they reinforce the role of those forces that are guided by that approach.

I would like to add that all the significant political and popular activities that took place recently, especially those large popular rallies that were organized by various national and progressive forces, showed the extent to which the people are rallying around these forces and around the national, democratic program and the National Democratic Front as well, which is allied with Amal. I will say in all humility that the major successful actions that took place to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the founding of our Lebanese Communist Party constituted a real popular referendum that came out in favor of the national, democratic approach. It came out against the Fascist, sectarian plan and against sectarian and religious premises in general as well. People expressed support for the cause of liberation and socio-economic reform, and they opposed attempts that are being made to place the burdens of the socio-economic crisis on the working class and on other popular classes.

This affirms that the future belongs to this working class and to these popular groups. Accordingly, it also belongs to the progressive, national parties and forces that speak for them and work for the victory of the national, democratic revolution in Lebanon.

Fifth Question: In some respects these statements fumble for the truth and steer clear of it; in other bigger and more important respects they offend the truth. Putting all Lebanese parties without distinction in the same basket is, on the one hand, a mistake; on the other hand, it shows bias.

Reactionary parties, especially those that are Fascist and sectarian, are in fact subordinated and used by outside forces. They are held captive to their association with imperialist powers and their dealings with the Zionist enemy. We know that the Fascist, sectarian plan is the product of a larger plan--the imperialist, Zionist, reactionary plan--and a part of it. On the one hand, this plan is the result of the interests of reactionary forces inside the country and abroad converging together and, on the other hand, it is the result of the fact that the regime of the present clique in Lebanon and, accordingly, the reactionary forces inside the country are subordinate to their imperialist masters. This subordination has gone beyond the stage of giving up an independent position. The independence of Lebanon has been relinquished--and that is more serious--and the question of Lebanon's independence and its national cause have been betrayed. This subordination has gone so far as to ask for the Israeli invasion and the imperialist intervention by American and NATO forces.

This treacherous position--and it turned out to be devastating for Lebanon--cannot and may not be compared with the position of national and progressive forces which, most definitely, are supposed to take regional and international conditions and conflicts into consideration. These forces take these matters into consideration on the basis of principles that they always try to do their best to preserve. The fundamental principle here is that these forces are convinced that Lebanon is an Arab country and that its Arab character is the principal guarantee for its independence and development. These forces are convinced that that principle has to be demonstrated in every way, particularly by strengthening the alliance with fraternal Syria. The other aspect of that principle, which is denied by Fascist, isolationist forces, is that of the unity of the Arab national liberation movement. This movement is anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-reactionary; Lebanon's national movement is one of its progressive, activist chapters. It is indeed horrible or rather treacherous and gravely destructive for Lebanon, to make comparisons, as some people do, between an alliance with fraternal Syria and dealing with the Israeli enemy.

The second principle is this: it is necessary to strengthen the alliance between Lebanon's national forces and the progressive forces in the world, especially the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist bloc. This is required primarily because of Lebanon's interests and the evolution of the Lebanese people's national struggle. Recent events have shown how effective Syrian and Soviet support for our people has been in confronting the Israeli-U.S. aggression. The third principle is this: the ability of Lebanon's national and progressive forces to make and safeguard independent decisions and act accordingly and their ability to make this strengthen their independence and work for their liberation and their progress cannot be preserved unless there is a framework for strengthening the alliance. This framework must be based on sound principles that are determined by international revolutionary interests and the objectives of the struggle. This alliance, particularly with Syria and the Soviet Union, has to be strengthened and established on sound bases that strengthen mutual cooperation and reject subordination. This is an important and significant factor in developing our struggle until total victory is achieved in the battle for liberation, unification and democratic change in Lebanon.

'Akif Haydar: Chief of the Amal Movement's Political Bureau

First Question: There is no sectarian conflict in Lebanon even though this conflict has relied on sectarianism and has utilized its worst forms to achieve specific gains that are not necessarily useful in general to the members of any one sect. Our understanding of a sectarian conflict is that it is a conflict whose objective is sectarian. This means that one sect, one religion or one faith would replace another. But people are not thinking along these lines, nor are parties or their leaders--the secular as well as the non-secular--thinking about them. It is known that the general national trend is one that opposes the so-called political Maronites. I do not know the origin of this term, but the Maronite sect is an honorable sect, and it is not the subject of criticism. What we are fighting, however, is that policy that wants to dominate and make unilateral decisions. Senior leaders of the noble Maronite sect have rallied around this approach. They succeed each other in government and in institutions, and they function like a strong working team. They prevented nationalist Maronites, most Christians and the vast majority of Muslims from playing their normal role in the nation. They also confiscated and are still confiscating these people's legitimate and national rights.

The vast majority of the Lebanese of all sects have been looking for a solution to the Lebanese problem. They have been looking for a solution to the question of oppressed citizens and to the question of human rights and dignity. They formed parties, movements and coalitions. Some of these are old and some are new, and some have a new political and social outlook and a new affiliation. Political Maronites emerged on the scene and they were concentrated among the Lebanese Forces and their most important supporting organization, the Lebanese Phalangist Party. Thus, the country became divided politically into two fronts: the front of political Maronites and the National Front. The Lebanese Forces, described here in the first column, is both a sectarian and secular party. In the second column there were sectarian and secular parties, anti-secular sectarian parties and non-sectarian secular parties. The Amal Movement is a reform movement that has a sectarian form and non-sectarian demands; it is an anti-secular movement. The Socialist Party has a sectarian form, but it is a secular party and its demands are non-sectarian. The Communist Party has a non-sectarian form, a secular content, and non-sectarian demands. The Syrian Social National Party has a non-sectarian form, a secular content and non-sectarian demands. The same is true of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and many so-called national parties.

We can conclude from the foregoing that the common denominator between these parties and movements that oppose political Maronites is that of general and universal reform as well as justice in the proper democratic sense. That is, whether these parties have a sectarian or a non-sectarian form and whether they accept a secular approach or reject it because it contradicts religion-- Islam, in particular--they all want reform and justice.

This introduction explains that secular parties have no special position in the political conflict because it is not a conflict between sects. These parties are involved in the conflict since they are involved in the National Front which is opposed to political Maronites. To be more specific, there is no reason to wonder about the position of secular parties in this conflict because there is

no conflict between Maronites as Maronites and Shi'ites as Shi'ites. This is a conflict against domination, mastery and privileges. Shi'ites are involved in it because they are involved in the Amal Movement; Druze are involved in it because they are involved in the Socialist Progressive Party; Sunnis are involved because their national and traditional leaders are; and national Christians are involved through the secular parties they belong to or the private positions they assume. All those groups are opposed to political Maronites as we've described them.

Second Question: The fact is that the division into two tendencies is a division over the identity of the country. The choice is between an Arab or an anti-Arab identity; the anti-Arab choice sometimes favors Israel, sometimes the United States and sometimes Phoenicia. This division in principle over the most important and fundamental subject has overshadowed the private inclinations of all parties without exception; that is, it overshadowed their views on the regime, on matters that need reform and conditions for achieving that reform.

Nevertheless, each group had its own working paper on the regime and its form, on reform in general, and on democracy in its absolute sense. It would be normal to find discrepancies in these matters, but all the working papers in the national rank were based on the principle of justice and equality. Thus, an accord between them that was based on common denominators was possible. And here it must be affirmed that no fundamental changes were made in these forces' programs. Instead, a few details were modified to ensure a spirit of justice and equality that would not subject that position to fragmentation when it is attacked by that group which insists on maintaining that domination we have suffered from for over half a century. But that national position was countered by political Maronites' insistence that sectarianism be consolidated.

In this regard the following proposal was made: either political sectarianism was to be abolished, or sects were to be given their rights. Then we found ourselves preyed upon by sectarianism because of sectarian intransigence on the other side, and we hoped that at a later date we would be able to get rid of the evil of sectarianism which has been and still is the reason for our destruction and fragmentation. We are most certainly not satisfied with this solution. This is something that has not happened yet. Nevertheless, we are responsible for the country and its people, and the country needs a break from the fighting. I do believe that other national parties--secular and non-secular--have been as disappointed as we have been because of the government's intransigence and the obstinacy of political Maronites. The country will pay dearly for this attitude whose consequences we warn against.

Third Question: I've already said that the conflict is non-sectarian. However, the sectarian appearance that political Maronites wanted to give their political activity in the country caused the other side to adopt a sectarian appearance too. When Muslims were killed on Black Saturday, when their homes were destroyed in al-Maslakh, al-Karantina, al-Nab'ah, al-Fawarnah, Tall al-Za'tar and elsewhere and when people were killed because of who they are, people became frightened as a result of this experience, and a sectarian classification had to take place as a result of these massacres. Today a Lebanese citizen does not feel safe unless he is living among the members of his own sect with whom he shares a geographical and political proximity. It is certain that this violence

was more than national parties could contain. I would not attribute this phenomenon to the failure of parties. I would rather attribute it to the general situation that has been mentioned, a situation that the Israeli enemy played a major part in creating and developing. It is the Israeli army that is responsible for this horrible and uncontrollable situation. As I said, our party and all secular and non-secular national parties want a political, democratic conflict. This is what we have all been affirming since the onset of the war in Lebanon. It is something we are still insisting upon. What remains is for the dominant masters to become convinced that a policy of mastery and privileges is not consistent with the idea of democracy about which they talk a great deal.

Fourth Question: This is an offhanded statement that is irresponsible. Representatives of the National rank in government have adopted these ideas and programs for reform. We must modernize them so we can keep up with progress. I do feel, however, that this emphasis on secularism in all questions suggests that there can be no deliverance without it.

Except for the Personal Status Law which is directly related to the spiritual beliefs of families in the country, Lebanon is living today under a secular system in every sense of the word. Everyone believes that religions and beliefs have to be protected and respected. This is stipulated in the constitution, and the Lebanese people are in agreement about it. All Lebanese laws are man-made laws and are, therefore, secular. We do not believe that a Muslim's right to divorce or to marry or the fact that girls inherit half a boy's share should suspend the national political equation, keep us from understanding books on medicine and philosophy, or keep us from designing a rocket to explore space. This subject [of sectarianism] is disabling, embarrassing and overstated; its aim is to delay progress for the purpose of not giving up privileges and dominance.

Fifth Question: National parties' programs, at least those that have to do with domestic affairs, are not affected by the international or regional situation. But their political positions and their regional and international alliances are affected by the regional political situation and the interests of countries in the region. You may have wanted to refer to the Syrian role in Lebanon, but you may not have wanted to declare that for your own reasons. We in Lebanon were facing a single choice: the Arab choice. Others had other choices, but the Arab choice was not one of them. It makes no sense for us to ally ourselves with Israel, the absolute evil and the enemy of the Arab nation and Islam, at the expense of our brothers who speak our language and with whom we are related by ethnicity and by blood. Syrian "intervention" in Lebanon's affairs was a national necessity that we support and favor over the client relationship that has been and still is prevailing. Syria did not impose on us, for example, its system of a guided economy; nor did it interfere in our reforms or our political regime. Instead, Syria acted as a brother would: it stopped the blood bath, and it is working hard for the country's unity and independence. If its rejection of the 17 May agreement is considered intervention in our affairs, that is an intervention we would welcome because the Lebanese people who were forced into this agreement by their rulers needed someone to help them and rescue them from ruin. Therefore, we are not subjugated by regional and international conflicts. We are free in our country; we set our own policy in the light of our interests. Our regional and international interests do converge with the Syrian position, particularly since Damascus has fittingly become the Mecca for Lebanese politicians, whereas before they used to turn their backs on it.

Anwar al-Fatayiri: Permanent Secretary of the Socialist Progressive Party

First Question: To determine where secular parties stand on the sectarian conflict, the conflict has to be sectarian. In my judgment the conflict in Lebanon is not, nor has it ever been sectarian.

The conflict in Lebanon is a political conflict that in many cases has taken an economic direction. Lebanese separatists are trying to distort this political conflict and to portray it in sectarian terms. They are doing that for ideological and political reasons that have to do with the development of this conflict.

When Lebanese separatists succeed, as they have on many occasions, in showing that Christians are in danger, regional powers and major international powers are called upon to protect Christians. In the meantime, the role these separatists are playing has nothing to do with Christianity.

I cannot imagine that a history of 2,000 years and the work that the Christian Church did over a period of 2,000 years would ultimately depend on Fu'ad Afram al-Bustani, Abbot Nu'man and others. In addition to prodding countries in the region to act under the pretext that Christians are in danger, Lebanese separatists are trying to prod international forces into action in all areas. It is my judgment that secular parties, which are adopting a scientific approach as the basis for the change they are seeking, become like a compass when the conflict becomes intense and reaches the grave turning point that Lebanese separatists claim it has reached. The function of this compass is to put the conflict back on track. In this sense these parties did play their part in reformulating the conflict, and in many cases they gave it its real political significance.

Second Question: If we were to take our memory back to before 13 April 1975, we would find that there was some kind of general democratic struggle that was begun by democratic forces in Lebanon for several reasons. One of those reasons was the socio-economic crisis that was getting worse. The crisis was affecting everyone, and the protest movement even reached into the security forces. That was because a democratic climate was prevalent in Lebanon. The political movement and the trade union movement had helped create that climate. And let us not forget Lebanon's university students who did play a significant role in this regard.

Thus there was an economic crisis that put the conflict back on track. After the 1958 Revolution Prime Minister Fu'ad Shihab tried to find a way around the political subject. He made economic and social reforms, particularly those which were to protect some qualified scientists. He also established the Council of Social Service and Security. Although these reforms were important--and it is known that we had a hand in making these reforms, and I believe most of them were Kamal Junblatt's ideas--it was our judgment that any change in the balance of powers could destroy them in favor of Lebanese separatists. Reform must be political; it must begin with an agreement over the identity of Lebanon. Does Lebanon belong to the Arab world, or did it have to assume the identity of a few immigrants to the country? If matters were to continue as they have been and if Copts were to continue to become naturalized citizens of Lebanon as they have

been, Lebanon could become a Coptic country, or we may become subordinate to Hellenic or Pharaonic culture. In other words we can have a new Fu'ad Afram Bustani who would tell us that our ancestors came from Pharaonic Egypt!

Political reform is associated with the 1943 National Pact, that pact which formalized the agreement between the Maronite bourgeoisie and the Sunni bourgeoisie. Ever since then there have been economic, social, cultural and political changes. The pact survived, but it was no longer compatible with the current situation. This meant that "that unique agreement" between the two bourgeoisie groups no longer represented anything concrete. Since we are speaking in sectarian terms, let me say that Shi'ites, for example, were not the social, political and cultural force that they are today. Orthodox [Christians] had considerable cultural, economic and political power, but they no longer enjoy that much power now. The balances have changed. There are forces that developed and grew in all areas, and there are others whose share of power is still small. Therefore, political reform is crucial because other issues could develop into some kind of social conflict which could spare the country the possibility of any sectarian classification or action. This is being proposed publicly and openly for the first time in an interim program for political reform. The program was outlined during the 1975-76 war by the Central Political Council for Parties and by national and progressive forces. This program, which was proclaimed by Kamal Junblatt, culminated in the period of struggle in which the National Movement had fought against Lebanese separatists and against the regime in Lebanon.

As a result of that development there was a series of changes in the nature of the conflict in Lebanon. U.S. colonialism replaced French colonialism, and the Arab Awakening, which was founded by Jamal 'Abd-a-Nasir, developed. 'Abd-al-Nasir imposed his conditions on Lebanon and established the Arab League. On the other hand, the Lebanese economy prospered, and young Lebanese citizens were given employment opportunities because there were economic and professional institutions that were able to find new professional models. In addition, secondary and university education were stimulated, and the University of Lebanon was strengthened.

This need, together with the growing struggles of the popular movement and the existing political climate led to economic and cultural growth that lasted throughout the term of Shihabi's government. This growth period lasted until the 1966 crisis of Intra Bank and the 1967 crisis. Following these two crises Lebanon's bourgeoisie had an acute sense of their own crisis, which was also sensed by the ruling political establishment in Lebanon whose position is based on hostility for the Arabs as a result of the 1967 defeat which befell 'Abd-al-Nasir primarily. It was then that the Lebanese bourgeoisie began considering turning the tables on the 1943 Pact. That is why we used to notice that Bashir al-Jumayyil opposed this pact. We knew that he was opposed to it on that basis and not because it was bad for Lebanese society. Bashir al-Jumayyil felt that his partner, the Islamic bourgeoisie, had been weakened by the absence of Arab support which was in need of other support. But Bashir al-Jumayyil himself was relying on western powers whose interests were being looked after by Israel. Therefore, we considered the association that Lebanon's separatists and the Phalangist Party had with Israel to be an objective association and not merely a personal relationship. It was in fact a relationship based on the mutual

interests of the two parties. The Israelis consider themselves policemen for western colonialism, and the separatists consider themselves representatives of western culture and an extension of that culture. However, that pact was revived after 'Abd-al-Nasir's return to the political scene following Egypt's setback. 'Abd-al-Nasir was back on the scene representing for the Arabs what he had represented for them before the 1967 defeat, albeit in a lighter mode.

The Palestinian Resistance also appeared on the scene and gave the conflict another dimension. That induced the Lebanese separatists to sign the Cairo Agreement whose aim was to curb, contain and check the conflict while the regional and international balances of power changed. Conditions developed in this manner until the beginning of President Sulayman Franjiyyah's term. It was then that the problem grew bigger. The Palestinian Resistance was growing; the Arab role was growing; and the socio-economic crisis was also growing. We now have large numbers of unemployed people, especially graduates of the University of Lebanon. The question of Lebanese citizens' rights in technical education is being raised. The bourgeoisie and the sons of Lebanon's big families monopolized education in medicine and engineering. The question of education in Lebanon and what education was to be emphasized was being raised.

All these matters caused Lebanese separatists to create a military crisis on 13 April 1975. This was done to restrain this popular, democratic, public movement which was growing continuously, and to attack that movement by using the best defensive method, namely an offensive.

Motivated by his national commitment, Kamal Junblatt tried to set that conflict aside until preparations for it were completed. His aim in doing that was to allow this social and democratic conflict to take its course and its proportions in those circles that had been recently mobilized by Lebanese separatists, who were responsible for these circles becoming involved in this conflict and opposing the interests the separatists were supporting. A large segment of the Phalangist Party was not involved in the party's politics. Instead, a large number of Phalangists was supporting labor, trade union and students' struggles for democracy. Support for these struggles was usually interpreted as opposition to the programs, interests and tendencies of the Phalangist Party. That contradiction was obvious to some leaders like Karim Baqraduni, for example, and Mishal Samahah. These leaders were committed in name to the Phalangist Party, but their actual commitments were elsewhere.

I am reminding you of the well-known students' strike and the demonstration at the airport where President Amin al-Jumayyil was at the head of the student body. Ibrahim al-Najjar and Munir al-Hajj were also there, and they tried to do everything they could to prevent the strike and the students' activities. That brought about division in the Awareness Movement between the Democratic Tendency and Lebanon's Youth Front in the Awareness Movement, which was no longer influenced by parties and their programs. Instead, Lebanon's Youth Front adopted democratic struggle, democratic liberties, free cultural activities, [freedom for] the University of Lebanon, and development for official education. Lebanon's Youth Front championed the cause of tobacco farmers and the cause of workers in Ghandur. The other group in that movement adhered to these parties' programs and represented them.

Kamal Junblatt tried to preserve that purity during that period early in the conflict. Early on 13 April he proposed that the Phalangist Party be isolated as a party of killers. The party had attacked an unarmed bus and had confronted Palestinians with death. The question of isolating the Phalangists was proposed on that basis. It was proposed to give the conflict in Lebanon its pan-Arab and national character. Junblatt wanted to move the conflict away from the socio-economic plane, which was then prevalent, to a pan-Arab and national plane. At that time the Phalangist Party called upon its allies and tried to raise again the problem of Christians being in danger. Once again the Phalangist Party brought all this democratic and political progress to a standstill. Because we failed to do a good job of managing the conflict, we were the weaker party, particularly when the subject of a military conflict came up. The Palestinian Resistance became to a large extent the party that was decisive and taking action.

While Kamal Junblatt outlined the political course, the Palestinian Resistance took action, penetrated the other side and dragged us in many cases into positions we did not want to be in. If we were to take into consideration the position of the Palestinian Resistance at that time and the diversity of its tendencies, we would understand that that did not help us get a good grip on this matter. But in 1976 Kamal Junblatt was able to form a national movement with one unified political program. That unified program was able to bring all these forces together, and that caused all hostile forces to rally around the program because it set forth the question of democracy and the question of liberties. If these questions were to be applied in Lebanon, their effect would be considerable and decisive. Besides, any victory for the National Movement in Lebanon is essentially a victory for the Palestinian Revolution and, in the long run, a defeat for Israel. Israel was thus induced to increase its dealings with the Lebanese Front and to give it support and weapons. The outcome was that which we reached in 1976.

That was the nature of the conflict when the National Movement developed an economically and socially more advanced program. I believe it was the best program for getting Lebanon out of this cycle of conflict.

Using the Arab support that he was getting early in his term in office President Sarkis was trying to revive the 1943 Pact. If the Sunni bourgeoisie had been weakened, their strength ought to have been restored as a result of Arab support, and if the Shi'ite sect had picked up strength, it reverted to its former status as a result of the Arab situation. That was how things were during President Sarkis's term. The situation was used to take advantage of the Arab conflict and rearrange conditions in Lebanon on the basis of the 1943 Pact, a pact that would not survive for too long. It was then that Bashir al-Jumayyil came forward. His advent was based on the fact that this pact that Ilyas Sarkis was trying to refurbish would not succeed. Bashir al-Jumayyil and the powers he represented restored the conflict over Lebanon's identity: was Lebanon a natural ally for Israel or a natural ally for the Arabs?

Bashir al-Jumayyil's interests and Israel's interests converged in this agreement. After [trying to promote] the 1943 Pact, Ilyas Sarkis became the godfather of the Israeli invasion. As a result of that agreement Israel came into the picture with an illusion it shared with the Phalangists. Israel believed that it

could establish a pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon and that it could disregard the interests of Arab countries which constitute a majority on the scene in Lebanon. I can say here that the parties did not abandon their programs as a result of this situation and as a result of the fact that the Phalangists occupied most villages in Lebanon. The parties had received a serious blow, and they retreated. The Progressive Socialist Party was the only party that reinforced itself with the Druze position because of the position of its chief. This meant that because of Walid Junblatt's position as a Druze leader, the Progressive Socialist Party was able to throw the matter back at the Phalangists, considering the persecution that the Druze had endured. At first, Walid Junblatt asked that barricades in the villages of al-Jabal and Bayt al-Din be removed. But the Phalangists insisted on keeping their barricades in place, and they tried to propose to Walid Junblatt a pact similar to the 1943 Pact whereby a rescue committee would be established with five or six members representing the sects. This committee would meet and its members would share quotas under a Phalangist umbrella. Of course Walid Junblatt turned down that proposal. The demand he had made was primarily an expression of political opposition. He did not want the Phalangists to make that settlement unilaterally. He had requested the removal of Phalangists' barricades only to put into play the principle of democratic opposition. It was normal for the Phalangists to reject that principle and to try to drag him into that settlement which Israel, the United States and the Phalangist Party were preparing.

Thus, the parties did not abandon their programs; however, the democratic climate in which they could become engaged in their political activity was missing. Early in the summer of 1983 some forces that were somewhat free from Phalangist pressure, terrorism and repression were able to form the Rescue Front. Its program depended on the principle of canceling the 17 May Agreement. This meant that Lebanon would be brought closer to its Arab position and that ties with Israel would be broken. The war in al-Jabal ensued. We fought this war for two reasons. First, we wanted the 17 May Agreement canceled, and, second, we wanted dominance abolished. We also wanted to begin working for a political solution.

For these reasons and on the basis of all the foregoing I am affirming that the parties did not abandon their programs. They were not given an opportunity to take action and to express themselves in programs for change.

Third Question: Unlike right-wing parties, progressive parties are not structured on a sectarian basis. The vast majority of the Druze were drawn to the Progressive Socialist Party, but that party is not sectarian. But the war, the physical eliminations and the ghetto that the Phalangist Party set up in the other region denied these parties their effectiveness and their activities in the other section. In the Progressive Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Communist Labor Organization, the Ba'th Party and the Syrian Social National Party we have hundreds of partisan fighters who disappeared. Hundreds like them were forced to join the Phalangist Party and in many cases fight against us. This is because the Phalangist Party was forcing people to join. Many of these people fled to our ranks as a result of the pressure that the Phalangist Party was putting on them. This Israeli mode of dealing with people, such as setting up barricades around ghettos, enforcing an iron fist policy, stifling free speech, killing anyone who disobeys Phalangists' orders and forcing people to go

along with a semi-military Fascist system, denied us many resources in the other center. As a result of this policy association was prohibited. It is for this reason that a small number of Christians did join secular parties. This does not indicate that these parties have failed; it rather indicates what the future will hold for Lebanon if the Phalangist Party were to come to power and establish its control over all areas in Lebanon.

Fourth Question: Your questions suggest that you are detached from the conflict and that you are influenced by Phalangist propaganda and the propaganda of the Lebanese Front and some of its offshoots. When we talk about Lebanese separatists, we are not referring to Maronites in Lebanon. There are Lebanese separatists among the Druze, among Shi'ites, Sunnis and Maronites. Of course, the separatists stand out more among the Maronites because separatist leaders are Maronites. However, separatism is a deep-rooted Lebanese tendency; it is the product of Lebanon's political and ideological makeup. There are Druze, Sunni and Shi'ite separatists who could be much worse than Maronite separatists.

Although our party, the Communist Party and the other national parties in Lebanon were allied with Amal, and the position of these parties in relation to the national resistance in the south was like ours in relation to the Palestinian Resistance in 1975-1976, there were many operations that one of the parties or organizations, for example, would carry out that would be attributed to Amal or to another organization. That did not bother us. We grow too when any national movement or party grows. We are not involved in issuing bulletins as we were in 1975-1976 when the victories we scored were attributed to the Palestinian Resistance as a result of separatist propaganda whose aim was to turn public opinion against the Palestinian Resistance. Now many of these parties, which your question suggests have come to an end, are carrying out heroic operations in the south. It is not essential for these parties to have a public presence for one to say that they exist or not. When battles were being fought in al-Jabal in 1975 and 1976 the Progressive Socialist Party was not mentioned. Does this mean that the party did not exist, when statistics about casualties and sacrifices were far more than the figures mentioned in bulletins that were issued about the nature of the battles and the war during that period?

What is happening now is very much like what was happening in the 1975-1976 war. It is this that affirms that these parties still exist and that they have not dropped out of the picture. These parties have not and will not drop out of the picture. But it is my judgment--and I am being critical here--that parties must reconsider their analyses of matters. It is no longer permissible to generalize about the situation in Lebanon. The situation in Lebanon must be subjected to concrete analysis based on the nature of the situation. Details must be examined so that a specific way can be found to manage the conflict. Therefore, many of the statements that have been made must be reconsidered; the failure to do that will affect the ideological and political actions of these parties. Of course the existence of all these parties is not a satisfactory phenomenon; they provide quite an opportunity for counter-intelligence activities since many intelligence agents are "planted" into these organizations to get protection they cannot get from larger organizations. But one time we were able to bring together 37 organizations and parties through the interim program for parties. This was somehow done under a specific and unequivocal political program. But on the other side we have to go back to the book "The Misguided War" by the

Israeli author Ze'ev Schiff. In that book the author identified who was behind the liquidation of Camille Sham'un's party in al-Safra and who was behind the elimination of Tony Franjiyah. The author affirmed in his book that Camille Sham'un was eliminated by an Israeli decision and that that decision was carried out by Bashir al-Jumayyil. The same affirmation was made with regard to Tony Franjiyah.

Therefore it would be wrong, even in a national sense, to shut down these parties. Instead, they are to be brought under control. We began exercising this control after the 6th of February, but as a result of regional and political circumstances and because of our concern for our alliances we were unable to complete the plan. But I believe it has to be done.

Fifth Question: The pact in Lebanon is supported by the forces in Lebanon and by regional forces. Even in the 1943 Pact and when Greater Lebanon was established in 1920 it was not only the forces in Lebanon that were taken into consideration, but also regional forces. Regional forces were taken into account as a factor determining the nature of a country's geography and politics even before Israel was created. That is normal. Therefore, that Lebanese tendency that sees Lebanon as existing outside time and place, fenced in by boundaries and prohibited from interacting with its surroundings is false. Whatever the situation in Syria, that country is still an essential part of Lebanon, and Lebanon cannot survive without it. Also, Lebanon cannot ignore the fact that Israel exists. The present dispute in Lebanon is a dispute over whether Lebanon should be with Israel or against it. This is one of the aspects of the conflict in Lebanon. There are those calling for Lebanon to side with Israel. These people speak of an eternal and an everlasting Lebanon as though the country had nothing to do with anything else. And there are others who see the matter differently. For example, I read what Ibrahim al-Najjar wrote when he sounded the alarm at the height of Lebanon's dealings with Israel. Mr al-Najjar said, "Do not forget that Lebanon receives 125 million dollars every day from the Arab world. These are the proceeds from the business and employment of Lebanese citizens there." Mr al-Najjar added a statement which implied that the Lebanese would lose that money if they became involved in closer relations with Israel.

It is obvious that our conflict can only be seen in terms of the regional and international conflict. Since 1975 we have been hearing about neutralizing the Lebanese regime and isolating it from the Palestinian cause. How can we isolate it from the Palestinian cause when there are about 500,000 Palestinians in Lebanon? Let's say there are 200,000 Palestinians; that figure is close to that of the 50,000 Copts who are being naturalized by the Lebanese Front. They have almost the same role in Lebanon. Furthermore, we cannot neutralize Lebanon and make it like Switzerland. Are we to confront Israel's plan to divert the waters of the Litani River with our positive neutrality? Are we to think that we have nothing to do with that plan? If we do not become involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, we would be only kidding ourselves. I am for having a quiet front with Israel because we do not have the means with which we can confront it and stand up against its military machinery. I am not calling for an armed struggle launched from Lebanon's borders to liberate Palestine. Our resources would not allow us to do this. But at least I do not want to become an Israeli or an appendage to Israel either.

Let's take, for example, the Ba'th Party in Lebanon. That party's program does not talk about the nature of the Syrian economy. Instead, it talks about how Lebanon's economy can be dealt with, and it talks about the question of democracy. The party adopts the Syrian point of view in terms of its general policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. That point of view surfaces only when a subject like that of convening the Palestine National Council in Amman or elsewhere comes up. That is when the party shows it has a Syrian point of view. Therefore, and on that basis, Lebanon's parties have not and will not lose their role. The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party Organization in Lebanon has not become the first party in Lebanon even though Syria does play a fundamental role in it. If Syria were to be defeated, God forbid, that party too would not lose its role in Lebanon. It would continue to exist just like the other parties in Lebanon. Of course, we agree with you, and this is a fundamental point of difference in national action between the democratic tendency and the national tendency. People have been pushing for Palestinian action and propping it up at the expense of national action. And there were others who considered the victory of the national question to be a victory for the Palestinian cause. The more achievements the Resistance has and the more it is deployed in Beirut, the more power and progress is realized for national action.

Kamal Junblatt, however, looks at the matter from a different point of view. He thought that the more disciplined Palestinian action in Lebanon comes, the more it will help national action make progress. The power of national action here also means the power of the Palestinian Resistance, which carries out its role independently.

An independent national decision cannot be unrelated to the Syrian situation. I cannot consider it to be unrelated to the subject of Israeli influence in Lebanon because we are now unable to fight a battle in the region of al-Kharub. This is because Israel is protecting the Phalangists. When I am destined to become engaged in a battle with the Phalangists, that means I will be facing Israel, and I cannot face Israel because all our forces can be wiped out by one Israeli military airplane.

'Isam Mahayiri, President of the Syrian Social National Party

First Question: It is certain that some stages of the civil war in Lebanon did take on a sectarian course that almost shaped the course of the entire war and obliterated its political, national and social causes. However, curtailing the nature of the war or condensing its reasons by citing the sectarian course it assumed in certain stages means that we are ignoring the truth about the war and that we are being influenced by only one aspect of its consequences.

We believe that the nature of civil war is primarily political. The parties to the conflict have two conflicting political ideas on Lebanon's identity and Lebanon's regime. Everyone knows that the inception of the war involved plans by the Zionist enemy as well as American settlement plans that were made to achieve specific objectives. These objectives included ratification of the Sinai Treaty and a war against the PLO in preparation for ruling it out of the conflict altogether.

It is no longer a secret that the plan to partition Lebanon, which was devised

by the U.S.-Israeli alliance, sought to induce an outbreak of sectarian and religious conflict in the area. The Israeli-U.S. plan could then establish its control over the area and subject it to its domination and control.

This enemy found that Lebanon with its sectarian conflicts could become the starting point for all his plans. This was particularly true after this enemy found a Fascist, sectarian group that would go along with his plans.

The conflict began, developed and assumed the proportions it did assume essentially because its roots lie in fundamental and profound differences that have to do with Lebanon's national identity and its social, economic and cultural system.

Therefore you see us, the Syrian Social National Party, keeping ourselves above the sectarian conflict. We reject and condemn it. We hope to stay away from it and not get involved in it, and we are trying hard to stop it because its continuation and augmentation challenges the truth about the conflict and obfuscates it. The growing sectarian conflict is leading the country to further division and fragmentation. At best, it does nothing but consolidate the sectarian regime which the Lebanese people have opposed and tried to change. The Lebanese have tried to replace the sectarian regime with a new one that is free of sectarian blemishes and ailments.

Second Question: There is no doubt that the Lebanese people were drawn into the war in its early stages. In general, they were divided into two principal tendencies, and each tendency had its program, its plans and its objectives.

This realistic picture became evident to everyone, and it dominated the course of events at certain points during the war until the Israeli invasion took place in the summer of 1982. Here we can notice that the Israeli invasion and its consequences forced sectarian conditions into the headlines. Sectarian contradictions and the conflicts and disputes that accompanied them peaked after the invasion. These conflicts peaked after Israel's invasion changed the status of Phalangists from that of a party to the conflict to that of the party in power in Lebanon. That situation had its indications and effects, particularly since the Phalangist Party did not give up its sectarian plans for domination and control. Its approach to government was purely Fascist, manifesting itself in attempts to use military force to subjugate areas of Lebanon like al-Jabal, al-Dahiyah and Beirut. That caused broad sectors of people to feel that they were being subjected to a plan for their dependency and domination. Sectarian contradictions are a fact of Lebanese life. But the Israeli enemy revived, fostered and exacerbated them to the maximum. And yet, this fact of life that was happening did not cause secular ideological parties to fall prey to those explosive contradictions. It did not force them to abandon their programs for change or reform.

Sectarian and religious contradictions have been such as to affect the effectiveness of ideological and secular parties at a certain stage. But these parties did not forfeit their role and did not assume any color other than their own normal color.

It would be all right for us, as the Syrian Social National Party, to affirm that sectarian conflicts have only increased our faith in our convictions and

given us a new opportunity to affirm that the sectarian connection is not only backward, corrupt and racist, but that it has turned into a reserve force after the invasion for the Zionist enemy's plans. It has become part of the plan to penetrate the structures of our society and to set up sectarian mini-states upon which are based the enemy's plans to divide and fragment us and rob us of our will one group and one sect after another.

Therefore, the outbreak of sectarian conflict has only strengthened our adherence to the national social model that is more powerful than all sectarian tendencies and their momentum. We see this model as the means for the unity and progress of the Lebanese people; it is their means for overcoming, warding off and countering the Zionist enemy's plans.

Third Question: It is sectarian principles that are responsible for the survival of these parties. The regime's sectarian principles produce sectarian parties that seek out and utilize sects in their makeup to bring about a sectarian balance. This is done to gain sectarian benefits and rights. In this regard sectarian parties have two divisions: one supports the rules upon which the regime is based to preserve its privileges and its interests in it, and the other tries to improve sectarian conditions and create a balance in which the interests and rights of that sect are taken into account.

We believe that the problem lies basically with the sectarian system. We do not think at all that reform can be achieved by sectarian parties. Those parties that make use of sectarianism to bring about reform or those that are founded as a reaction to the sectarian system will not be able to do anything. A sectarian regime cannot be abolished by sectarian means. It is rather strengthened and consolidated by those means which after a while cause another outbreak of conflict in that regime.

Therefore, our party and all other ideological and secular parties devised a system to counter the sectarian system. It is based on having the citizenship bond replace all other bonds as the foundation for exercising our national and social rights.

There is no doubt that the makeup of some sectarian parties is placing additional pressure on the shoulders of ideological and secular parties to correct the odds in the ongoing conflict in Lebanon.

Fourth Question: Let's not draw any conclusions. Secular parties that have ideas for change, reform and modernization have not and will not abandon those ideas or sign them over to one or another sectarian party.

These parties are not involved in the conflict to affirm their existence--they do in fact exist. They are involved in the conflict to change it to a conflict over their programs and methods for reform and development. At the height of the sectarian and religious tendencies' momentum these parties proved themselves to be steadfast in their faith, solid and pure in their principles. They continued to uphold the model that the vast majority of Lebanese long for. The Lebanese people have endured the worst from sectarianism and its horrors. No other nation has endured what they did.

Fifth Question: It is not possible to separate the situation in Lebanon from

Arab, regional and international situations. To one extent or another Arab, regional and international factors struggle with each other in Lebanon and in many countries. These factors have their weight and their role.

However, the presence of these factors does not lead us to imagine the subordination of one or another party. The views of one party or another may narrowly or broadly agree with regional or international strategies. But we do not believe--and this is our opinion--that regional strategies can constitute an alternative to our plans and our points of view. Independence is a relative matter in a climate of conflict between regional and international wills. Compatible strategies at a certain point or within certain limits do not rule out independence.

Therefore, the programs, plans and courses we are coming up with stem from our understanding of reality and of the needs of the Lebanese people. Pursuing an alliance or an agreement with Arab and international parties does not mean we are abandoning objectives that would be useful to the Lebanese people and their interests. We are building those alliances for Lebanon and its people. For example, we found that the 17 May Agreement would be fatal to Lebanon, and we found that rejecting that agreement on the basis of our position and the position of our national alliances would certainly be in the interests of Lebanon and its people. That was actually shown when that agreement was canceled and Lebanon was restored to its national affiliation.

Engineer 'Asim Qansuwah, Regional Secretary of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party Organization

First Question: Actually, the principal parties that are leading national action continued to set forth their intellectual, organizational and political ideology as one opposed to all sectarian and religious tendencies and ideas. I will not explain this ideology, but I will say that its position in the course of the war in Lebanon and in the developments and consequences of that war remained unchanged. These parties continued to oppose everything religious and sectarian.

Actually, we in the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party Organization, along with our allies in the principal secular parties, were opposed to the sectarian conflict. We did not hesitate for one minute to expose the proportions of the sectarian conflict and condemn it. Although at one point in time we were unable to restrain those sectarian beasts that were unleashed against each other, that was only because some parties to the sectarian conflict were playing their game to the hilt. They were relying on the power of Israel, the United States and NATO countries to implement the objectives of that conflict, namely to break up Lebanon into sectarian entities. In a country like Lebanon where religious and sectarian roots are deep-seated, that game reached a point where resistance became difficult. Nevertheless, we did not yield. We continued to tell everybody that sectarianism and the continued sectarian conflict in Lebanon would be fatal to Lebanon.

Our constant insistence that a national democratic front be established; our tireless efforts to arouse the nation; and our constant emphasis on declaring our conviction that nothing protects our territory but the national, political decision constituted a significant turning point in the course of the sectarian

conflict. The establishment of the National Front and its various institutions was extremely significant; it caused the sectarian tide to go out. This is our program for national action, the one whose mastery and supremacy on the scene we want.

Second Question: There is no doubt that there has been and still is sharp division between Lebanon's political parties and movements. Their premises and programs are significantly far apart from each other because of the makeup of some of these parties and movements, a makeup that is most certainly sectarian and religious.

There was a common saying which asserted that the sectarian beast which was unleashed by the Lebanese Front and by the Phalangist Party, to be specific, can only be resisted by unleashing a similar beast to foil the objectives of the dominant, Fascist Phalangists, thwart their plans for Lebanon and put an end to the original Israeli plan to dominate it. This statement has to be discounted now. It will inevitably be discounted after the 17 May Agreement collapsed and the Phalangists' sectarian class plan was defeated. In the course of this conflict not one party or movement abandoned its program for change or reform. The Amal Movement, for example, proposed in Geneva and Lausanne and in the government as well that political sectarianism be abolished. Is this considered abandoning a reform program? It is true that Amal has its specific characteristics, but as a political tendency led by Mr Nabih Barri, its outlook on reform has to be formulated and polished under such terms that would help achieve the national objectives. The same is true with regard to the Progressive Socialist Party. Our alliance with that party is based on a program for reform and change that was set forth under the terms of the National Democratic Front. This program does exist, and it has been truthfully proclaimed. Therefore, I personally do not see any movements and parties abandoning their programs for reform and change. But on the opposite side I do see that the forces opposed to us are abandoning such programs. These forces are still insisting on their sectarian premises; and they are holding on to the privileges of their group and their sect. I can say emphatically that if the Progressive Party or Amal had abandoned their programs, we and the other political parties that make up the front would have had a relationship completely different from that which we have today with Amal and the Progressive Socialist Party.

Third Question: This opinion was prevalent for a period of time. It implies existing assumptions some of which are still valid. I spoke about the sectarian beasts that were unleashed against each other. And here the question of course would be, what can a hunter do? When guns and missile launchers are being deployed, there can be no political and democratic action. We were concerned about the continuing sectarian conflict, and we spoke up and said there was no alternative to dialogue and understanding. Syria supported us in this; it urged dialogue and insisted on it because the ongoing fighting was serving the enemy's purposes. Some parties had to reconsider their options and positions. The Phalangist Party in particular had to do that. I believe that we are now on our way to restoring the conflict to its original reality, namely that of being a political conflict in a democratic context. If the government continues to make Arab choices that are favorable to Lebanon's national interests--choices that consolidate and manifest the reality of Lebanon as an Arab country and provide for its continuing interaction with its world and its surroundings--the

objective fact that Lebanon and Syria are distinguished by their relationship to each other as twin sisters will be understood.

Fourth Question: This opinion does not reflect the facts as they are. Our secular parties, and we are of course part of them, did not for one moment abandon their roles or give up their ideas and positions. We held several rallies and celebrations in Beirut and in other areas. You must have noticed how the people rallied around us. It has been established how anxious our people are for national progress. Contrary to that opinion [you mentioned in your question] our party has been and is still striving to attract all other forces, movements and parties to its positions of struggling on the basis of a declared political program which consists of five principal articles. This is like a national program of action that would put an end to the sectarian conflict and devote itself to the reconstruction of Lebanon. These efforts would be based on solid rules and a future outlook that would ensure a better future for our people.

Fifth Question: If what is meant here are the national parties that are members of the National Democratic Front, that is not true at all. Their political program is not one that is purely Lebanese. It is a program that deals with the various political, economic, social and educational aspects of the Lebanese system. It is a program for making reforms and changes in all these areas. It is quite unfair to say that it is restrained by international and regional conflicts. These parties have a national outlook; they propose ideas for unity that are not at all incompatible with the unequivocal Lebanese fact which states that Lebanon is an Arab country that has ties with one Arab heritage and a common Arab history. Does having ties with the Arab heritage and history mean that these parties are under the influence of a regional and international reality? The other side of this coin is that these parties' seclusion and isolation from the Arab world is as fatal to them as Lebanon's isolation and seclusion from the Arab world would be fatal to it and fatal to its role and to the components of its existence and survival.

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-Rafi'i, Permanent Secretary of the Regional Command for the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party

First Question: Sectarianism is a form of backwardness that afflicts societies. The sectarian conflict is nothing more than a product of the prevailing sectarianism. When a nation is divided into sectarian groups that cannot coexist with each other, that means that sectarianism is the antithesis of democracy and unity. Accordingly, it is the antithesis of progress. Therefore, those parties that wish to be progressive and secular have to oppose sectarianism, and they have to work for its abolishment since sectarianism impedes the process by which social groups become a nation. It delays the progress of society in political, economic and social areas. When a conflict assumes sectarian proportions and when it is set in motion by sectarian tools, that means that those societies which are afflicted with these conflicts have not yet completed the components of their progress and development, or they are still far away from establishing a system of constitutional and political institutions. In this case the elements of social conflict are effaced and those of a sectarian conflict are emphasized. In such societies relationships are governed by concepts and systems that take into account the interests of sectarian institutions at the expense of national interests and the people's interests as well. It is on that basis that progressive and secular parties have to give priority to the matter of abolishing

sectarianism from political life. Societies must not be moved by appeals to people's instincts. Parties must assume a firm position in their opposition to sectarianism and sectarian positions. Secular parties must not be dragged into the throes of sectarian conflict because involvement in such a conflict would abort their political programs and cause them to fail as an objective alternative.

If some people think that climbing on the sectarian bandwagon could help them achieve a few gains, experience has shown otherwise.

We believe that a position based on principle is still called for because it constitutes a practical basis for formulating a political plan that can confront sectarianism. Such a position is necessary because it will constitute the situation on whose basis continuous activist action will be undertaken to change the existing situation to one that is more conducive to giving the conflict its normal proportions, particularly since progressive parties are the parties for the future as much as they are parties for the present.

Second Question: There is no doubt that the development of events in Lebanon caused the political role of national and progressive parties and forces to decline. If you think that these parties seemed to have abandoned their programs for change or reform, the truth is that these programs were dropped for several factors.

The first factor was the Zionist invasion of Lebanon. Vast areas of Lebanon's territory were occupied, and that had political effects on those forces that linked their future with the enemy and his plan. The purpose of the enemy's plan was to divide Lebanon and reshape it on religious and sectarian bases.

The second factor was the strong blow that was aimed at the Palestinian Resistance. That had a negative effect on the political position which was held by national forces on the political map. These forces lost a principal ally of theirs in their confrontation with the Zionist enemy. A basic part of the national struggle was concerned with escalating the confrontation with the enemy who had been indirectly occupying a section of Lebanon for a long period of time. Today, that enemy is occupying parts of Lebanon directly.

The third factor consisted of attempts to apply pressure. To eliminate their political role national parties were subjected to such pressure separately and collectively. Forces with sectarian tendencies were embraced and supported as alternatives to national action. This led to major complications in the national parties' principal field of activity, particularly since there was a sharp, sectarian isolationism that has prevented and is preventing normal activity for national forces.

Therefore, the political classification that was taking place between the National Movement and the Lebanese Front when the incidents began ended in favor of a sectarian classification. This is what made the parties actually go through an acute national action crisis that resulted from their inability to control the course of events. Furthermore, these parties had been ruled out of the domestic political equation. Although they did regain a role in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy, that role is still generally under siege throughout the nation. The fact that few of these parties manage to get out of this

siege through some sectarian formulas means nothing because their emergence outside that siege is not based on a situation that has actually been approved, authorized and formulated into a political decision.

Third Question: The fact that there are parties with a sectarian makeup does not mean that national parties have failed. Failure would be indicated if a sectarian plan becomes predominant at the expense of a national, democratic plan. We are saying quite clearly that what made the sectarian plan prevail is the fact that at the present time the scales are in its favor. Also Israel is attempting to enter the scene as a party that can make decisions about drawing the political map of Lebanon. We also would not conceal an existing situation in Lebanon, namely that sectarianism, which has historical roots, has provided an appropriate climate for the activities of sectarian forces. But the danger here lies in the fact that the conspiracy to make sectarian boundaries regional is ongoing, and that would actually spell the end for Lebanon. The unity of the territory and people of Lebanon would have thus been dropped in favor of sects, regardless of the formula that will be decided on. Thus, the sectarian federation that existed in the regime and its institutions would turn into a federation of districts. Some would call that system cantons, and others would call it broad decentralization with political and security powers. Whatever it is, it would be a step backward, not a step forward. Returning to the situation that was prevalent before 1975 with all its blemishes--if that were possible--would constitute a major gain for a variety of reasons. The most important of these reasons is that the Popular Movement had an actual effect on Lebanon's political life. Also, the Palestinian Resistance as a principal ingredient in the national struggle equation had a significant effect. Besides, Israel was not a party to the settlement which was formulated in 1943 and dredged up in 1958. We believe that the Lebanese and Arabs stand to make significant gains if a political settlement for the crisis in Lebanon were to be achieved and Israel were not an influential party to it.

Fourth Question: It is our opinion that the existing facts speak for themselves. However, this does not mean that these facts will remain unchanged. These facts are basically due to the balances of power; they will be changed when the balances of power are changed. We believe that changing the balances of power requires a domestic factor and an Arab factor. The domestic factor consists of developing Resistance action against the Zionist enemy; turning the Resistance into a universal popular movement; ensuring national support for it; and relieving the domestic scene from penetrations and disturbances that paralyze its movement and impede political and popular communications between the Resistance and the Lebanese People's Movement. The Arab factor requires the restoration of Arab solidarity on its national bases and hardening the position against the Israeli enemy. It is here that stopping the Iraq-Iran war becomes especially important. Egypt is also to be restored to Arab solidarity now that it is free from the consequences of the Camp David Accords. And cohesion in the PLO is to be restored.

Fifth Question: Those who promote such statements are staunch political separatists. They are people who subscribe to Lebanese theories and who advocate the separation of Lebanon from its ethnic, Arab environment. Events have shown that ethnic, progressive and national parties are more concerned about the unity, freedom and sovereignty of Lebanon. First of all, they are concerned

because Lebanon is part of the great Arab homeland. Second, because the ongoing conflict in Lebanon is basically a national conflict against the Zionist enemy. Anyone who is trying to unite the nation can only be at the forefront of these forces that are trying to reunite and liberate Lebanon.

What proposals did the progressive national and ethnic parties set forth, those parties whose political and intellectual premises go beyond an identifying framework for Lebanon? Did they not propose liberation and unification as two basic objectives for their present and future struggle? Did they not consider the unity, Arab character and democracy of Lebanon to be the principal components of the country?

We are absolutely certain that the parties which some people claim do not espouse Lebanese national programs are more concerned about Lebanon and more concerned about the unity of its land, people and institutions. They are the ones who can speak about the national reality of this nation from first-hand experience. Patriotism is the antithesis of division; it is the antithesis of domination, limited sovereignty and yielding to the will of the occupation.

But if Lebanon has become the scene of what is being called a regional and international conflict, then that would confirm the statement which states that Lebanon has ties to its Arab nation in its peaceful as well as its military conflict with its enemies. Every attempt made to isolate Lebanon from its ethnic environment is one that does not take existing reality into account.

If the magnitude of regional and international influence has reduced the ability of local parties to determine the course of events, national parties have not been similarly affected. Regional and international conflict has affected, however, all the forces that are playing various political and military roles whose influence may vary. Thus everyone is in a crisis, although the degrees of that crisis will also vary. The reason for that is that the predominant power is unable to lead a national plan for unification and liberation.

Charles Justin, the National Liberal Party

First Question: Before delving into the subject of parties in Lebanon, I think it would be helpful to pause briefly when we define our terms so we can avoid confusion and digression.

Briefly, my understanding of the word, party, is that it is a group of people who believe completely in one creed (totalitarian parties) or in a set of integrated principles (democratic parties). A party has a formal organization (a command and a pyramid-shaped regional organization, that is divisions, branches and cells). A party is founded to advocate its principles. It defends and promotes those principles, and it tries to get its leaders to the parliamentary council and government. In most cases major parties try to come to power to make their partisan choices nationwide choices.

Parties grow basically out of the societies in which they develop. One cannot just "make up" a party, ignoring the background in which one wants that party to grow and the people one will be dealing with. If one ignores people's sociological origins and their national heritage and traditions, they would soon ignore the party too.

Consequently, the political plan that each party worthy of that name has consists of a clear, continuous and an integrated view of the proposed society and its systems; the relationship between the people and the state; the relationship between the state and its environment and the world; and on the domestic front, the economy, society and education.

Therefore, a distinction must be made between this modern notion of parties and the incidental movements we are seeing today. These movements, which are basically reactions based on religious fanaticism, are trying hard to infiltrate civilian life, having failed to establish for themselves a position in religious life with a political mask. Their logic collides with the logic of the times which is substantially and fundamentally different. That has always been how civil wars started.

By their very nature parties are reluctant to turn the clock backward. Therefore, I cannot imagine a serious party supporting the principle of sectarianism, that is, fanning the fires of religious fanaticism. To do that is to demonstrate ignorance of religion that is matched only by heresy; it is the product of repressed political action.

Those parties that recognize the characteristics of their society, respect the religious and cultural affiliations of that society's citizens. They make an effort to strengthen those characteristics and particulars and preserve the people's heritage. These are the parties that will succeed because they've reached a level of political maturity that frees them from all complexes and raises them to that level at which they can undertake universal national action.

Second Question: If this evaluation were true, Lebanon would not be where it is today. This optimistic view is not realistic. Ever since its independence and until war broke out in 1975, Lebanon had succeeded in establishing only the principle for a coexistence formula between Christianity and Islam. Outside that major principle, a few greedy people who divided the spoils of the state among each other continued to prey upon political life in Lebanon. A mercenary mentality penetrated all sectors of the state and nation; public facilities were worn out; no military power was built; and the national cause became confused with other causes. It is known that party representation remained weak in the Chamber of Deputies where feudalists continued to be in control. Hence, the domestic situation was vulnerable, and it could not withstand for long the vicious attack and the conspiracy which were underway to settle Palestinians in Lebanon.

We regret to say here that it was the Palestinians themselves who were the first to fan the fires of sectarianism. They did that for reasons known to everyone, not the least of which was to turn the Lebanese people against each other so they could control both government and land and serve the requirements of their armed revolution. These were totally incompatible with the rationale for a state, any state.

Since parties' responsibilities grow under difficult circumstances, parties were forced to switch their activities from those that were reform oriented to others that were activist oriented in the field of national resistance. They had to ward off the danger of being contained and diluted. Thus, the parties of the

Lebanese Front were not at all preyed upon by the sectarian conflict. Quite the contrary, if they were attacked by a sect they knew that the target of that attack was the end of Lebanon as a state, as the country and civilization we know. Their response was an appropriate Lebanese response: they strengthened their internal ranks. It is that dynamic quality of their response that may have upset enemies whose accusations and insults were hurled in a manner unprecedented in the modern history of the entire world.

Third Question: Two points must be clarified here.

First, to say that only ideological and totalitarian parties have a secular structure is true but misleading. These small parties do not derive their power from within; they get their power from abroad. They continued to be marginal in national life, and they demonstrated their inability to free themselves and associate themselves with the national political heritage. They fell victim to outside enticements, and that caused them to lose every sense of permanent harmony and sound credibility.

Second, partisan life in Lebanon, in the political and sociological sense of the term, was not so rich as to allow a final evaluation to be conducted on the spot. And yet, ever since their birth traditional parties have not conducted their affairs for a single day on a sectarian basis to serve religious objectives, even though most of their members are also members of the same sect. The Lebanese Pact is basically a blueprint for a homeland. Has that blueprint been actually completed and realized to allow tests [for its efficacy] to be classified under meaningless titles? It is certain that when the state's authority is strengthened and the law is supreme, Lebanese parties show themselves to be capable of attracting citizens of any religion from any district.

But, given what we are going through today, does it make sense to talk about political conflict and democratic competition when Lebanon has become a battleground where other people's wars are being fought and where the Lebanese are being slaughtered like sheep every day by the thousands?

Fourth Question: The surge in religious movements that call themselves parties should not give us any illusions. They will not last long because they have no political thought, and they do not have a national plan. The horizons of their religious message are narrow because these movements do not concern themselves with the truth about religion or the state. They confuse both, and they have no scientific or even religious methodology. In addition, the leaders of these groups today are more like puppets than actual leaders.

The role of major parties has actually begun to take on a universal, national direction. I do not believe that our situation today accurately mirrors our situation in the future. The future of parties will be a reflection of the people as they are, with their political heritage and democratic aspirations. Partisan life will undoubtedly bear the imprint of the political regime that the Lebanese themselves will choose.

Fifth Question: There is no doubt that the parties which played the role of ambassadors to foreigners in Lebanon were the victims of regional and international conflicts. Being obligated to outsiders causes one to lose the ability

to take national action, and it impedes any plan that does not have the approval and satisfaction of "those financial backers." These are parties that are quite simply called client parties. Because the state is unable to punish them legally, they are punished by the damage they themselves cause the country. Independent political practice, although it may sometimes err and other times flounder, will eventually produce good results as long as its source of inspiration, its principles and its plans are all derived from Lebanon, from its history, and its geographical, cultural and humanitarian position.

Nihad Urfali, the Independent Nasirite Movement, al-Murabitun

First Question: Naturally, organizational and partisan actions under current conditions are the subject of considerable discussion and debate. In this context secular parties find themselves compelled to deal with reality. But this does not mean at all that they are not striving to restore the role they used to play before 1982, a role they hope to play after the current stage.

It is certain that these parties are trying, but to what extent will they be successful? That depends on how dynamic they are. And here one must suggest that a party's dynamic quality depends on the lengths to which it must go. One of these lengths to which a party must go is national. One must also affirm that the masses have to be dealt with effectively. Dealings with the masses are not to be restricted to the view of a select elite in that regard and more reliance on theory. Thus, the conflict in Lebanon could be turned from a sectarian conflict to a conflict against the domination of sectarian politicians.

Second Question: First, let me begin with the latter part of the question and say that there are organizations and parties that did not abandon their basic programs at all. They did not make any change in their programs, not even a tactical change. But reality turned this stage into a springboard for aspirations that essentially strayed away from the fundamentals which action programs must be based on. Among these programs, for example, is the reform program that was approved by the National Movement during President Sulayman Franjiyyah's term. Unfortunately, even that program no longer exists. What one sees today may be unrelated to that program's origins. In addition, there is the matter of structure. There is no longer, for example, a national movement that looks at matters from a more comprehensive perspective which does not depend on sectarianism. Despite some drawbacks in the political activity within the former National Movement, one of its most important positive features was that it looked at the future of the country from an overall, not a sectarian, perspective. On the basis of that view we support the notion that the political division when the war began was purely political, and the parties adopted two political movements. It is self-evident that political programs would play their part in such a framework. Now, however, it cannot be said that the same parties fell victim to sectarian conflicts. And yet it is worth noting that the same parties did not set forth a single idea for overcoming that situation. This is the result of either these parties' incompetence or their tactical retreat. It seems more likely now that it was the result of incompetence.

Third Question: Yes, there are political parties whose makeup is clearly sectarian, and that sectarian makeup may be the reason for current conditions. And yet there are parties, movements and organizations that have deep religious,

national and ethnic roots. Today, these parties, movements and organizations are not considered to be in a powerless position. They are trying to affirm that change in the proper framework which they think would be safe. However, the failure to turn the sectarian conflict into a political, democratic conflict does not apply to everyone. Some people did fail to do that, but others succeeded in preserving the integrity of their course. In general, it is more accurate to say now that we are not pessimistic in the sense that we don't think we've reached a dead end. The future still lies ahead, and we are optimistic about it.

Fourth Question: I think the answer to this question was mentioned in my answer to the previous question. I will reaffirm here that we are optimistic about the future. It would be a mistake to say that a proper role for proper programs has come to an end.

With regard to programs for reform, these may be linked with a stage; if they have no roots, they will end when that stage ends. This applies to everyone except those who quietly and genuinely believe in their methods and ideas.

Fifth Question: It would be unreasonable to think that ethnic affiliation is not a national issue. Actually, the national problem can only be a part of the ethnic problem. This does not mean that we are avoiding specifics. Each national problem has its characteristics which have to be given serious consideration in any national program. The solution to that problem also has to depend on circumstances. We think that this applies to many people whose roles cannot come to an end even though, as we mentioned, the stage has imposed a few conditions that in the future will have to be placed in another framework.

Abu Arz, Guardians of the Cedars

First Question: It is generally assumed that every secular party rejects sectarian premises and practices. If it doesn't, then how can it be called secular?

Actually, sectarian practices were never an end in themselves; they were rather a means to an end. That is, they have been and still are a means for partitioning Lebanon, breaking it apart and annexing all or parts of it.

It is known that all those who have been seeking the partitioning or annexation of Lebanon have been trying to weaken the country and have used sectarianism as a weapon. They portrayed the war as a war among the Lebanese when it is in fact the war of those who are foreigners to the people and territory of Lebanon. Therefore, there is no proper position for those parties that describe themselves as secular, but there is a proper position for those parties that did declare from the outset a national Lebanese position. They are the only parties that did not stumble in the sectarian pitfall. Quite frankly, the Guardians of the Cedars Party is one of them.

Second Question: If you are referring to the National Reform Program that was proclaimed by the so-called National Movement, that plan was stillborn because it was and still is based on two hostile attitudes.

It is based on a hostile attitude toward a fully independent Lebanon and on a hostile attitude to the historical, geographical and cultural reality of the Lebanese nation.

All blocs, coalitions, parties or movements that called for this program have tried from the very beginning, and they are still trying, to divest Lebanon of its identity and ethnicity. They are hiding behind a screen they themselves set up to call for secularism even while they were engaged in sectarian practices whose aim is to make their plans go through.

Third Question: Before 1975 and, accordingly, before Palestinians and Arabs established control over a large number of Lebanese people, the democratic, political conflict was on its way to resolution. When the war began in Lebanon and Palestinians tried to set up their mini-state in Lebanon and Arab supporters tried to annex Lebanon, they found sectarianism to be an effective tool by means of which they could achieve their dreams. They aborted the democratic political struggle and fostered a sectarian struggle. To prove that, the only thing we have to do is observe those centers where these religious movements and parties grew. We would find that they are the same centers where Palestinian terrorism and an Arabist ideology grew. They are like all the other centers that grew outside this context and came into being as a reaction to it.

Fourth Question: All the Lebanese are becoming increasingly more aware every day of the dangers of sectarianism. Resettlement and counter-resettlement activities, as well as what preceded and what followed those activities, only served to convince the people further about the dangers of sectarianism.

If sectarianism were merely an emotional affiliation, its danger would be minimal. But when it becomes something concrete and real, its danger is exposed. This is what happened in Lebanon. Therefore, one can see that sectarianism will inevitably and ultimately be defeated, and secular parties that believe in Lebanese nationalism will win their victory. Lebanese nationalism is a historical, geographical and cultural fact; it was established particularly after attempts by parties and movements to wipe it out failed. These parties and movements had called for imaginary nationalities such as Arab nationalism, Syrian nationalism and sectarian and religious nationalism.

It is assumed that every reform program that is based on Lebanese nationalism repudiates emotional sectarianism, political sectarianism and social sectarianism. Therefore, we re-affirm that the defeat of sectarianism in Lebanon is inevitable.

Fifth Question: The names of those parties attest to the truth of that question. How can one or another party not be restrained by regional and international conflicts when it is associated with those conflicts, when it is named after them, when it is fostered by them and when it receives orders from them? These parties forfeit their roles and lose their effectiveness because their soldiers are weak. Therefore, parties that do believe in Lebanese nationalism must promptly sever the connections between these parties and their outside roots. Then these parties that have affiliations with parties outside Lebanon would be weakened and would be on their way to extinction.

What is important is that Lebanon prevent parties that are not loyal to Lebanon from growing among the people's ranks, not out of a glorified sense of Lebanese nationalism, but out of a sense of Lebanese nationalism that has a social, educational, cultural, economic, political and military approach and works for the interests of the Lebanese nation.

But if, God forbid, the Lebanese were to remain divided between a Syrian direction, an Arabist direction, a hollow nationalism and deceptive divisive dreams, sectarianism will continue to be a spear in the hands of Lebanon's enemies.

Kamal Shatila, Secretary General of the Union of Working People's Forces

First Question: If the secular parties you are referring to are those parties that disavow religion, assume a neutral posture toward it or reject sectarianism by rejecting religion, I would prefer for these parties to speak for themselves because we have nothing to do with them.

But if you are referring to those political forces that did not get involved in bigoted, sectarian conflicts or join political entities that were shaped on a sectarian basis, then I can say that the Union of Working People's Forces is an organization that is affiliated with the faithful National Tendency. Its ethics may most certainly be described in terms of faith without sectarian bigotry, a sense of commitment to Lebanese nationalism without regional bigotry and a sense of affiliation with a cultural democratic Arabism without chauvinism. It is on that basis that we consider ourselves to be outside the framework of religious bigotry which is generating divisive entities. We are being hurt by the grave process of classifying the population; it is posing a serious threat to Lebanon's unifying geographical makeup.

Although Lebanon's political makeup has been taking shape since 1840, its constitution, which was written under the French mandate in 1926, planted the seed of political sectarianism in the country. Although the 1943 National Pact made no major changes in that, the actual sectarian geography of Lebanon reveals that there are sects scattered all over Lebanon in accordance with the historical happenings in that country. The existence of Arabism was subjected to crushing Byzantine wars; Christian sects were subjected to Christian Byzantine oppression; and many were hurt by the old colonialism and by Ottoman injustice. Then a few groups were exploited by colonialists who wanted to separate these groups from their Arab roots. That forced the national struggle to work tirelessly to establish the Arab identity of Lebanon firmly, and it induced Muslims to adhere to their national Arab character in the face of all westernization attempts.

Significant forces among secularists were able to bypass this Lebanese makeup. In the sixties they proposed a plan for a socialist Lebanon instead of an Arab Lebanon. That was an effort on their part to attract classes of toiling Christians. But they did not win the Christians' confidence, and they lost the confidence of Muslims and democratic Arabists. Then they proposed secularism from a clearly sectarian position, so they lost their credibility outside that which they had among their traditional supporters.

In 1976 leaders of the National Movement's Political Council proposed a program

that had positive political reforms and secular proposals. That program created a split between the movement and the faithful national masses. When the movement clashed with Muslims, leftists within the movement were indecisive in their diagnosis of the nature and characteristics of each stage.

These are a few of the reasons why secularists have a crisis in the face of the negative overwhelming sectarianism which Lebanon is experiencing today. They reacted in a variety of ways to that situation. After the Israeli invasion they intensified their presence in traditional and rising sectarian institutions because they feared the sectarian tide, and they hoped they could turn these institutions around in a secular direction. They were shocked, however, by the war in al-Jabal and by the sectarian classification and evacuation which accompanied that war. So they concentrated on taking advantage of the 10-years' war or the movement of 6 February 1984. But they were surprised when others did the same thing. Their surprise was manifested in a statement that was issued by three secular parties. These parties announced they were rejecting a sectarian settlement and were forming a consultative body. The net result of that was the revelation that secular parties were neither completely secular nor completely sectarian. In addition, there were outside reasons that all together caused the role of secularists to diminish at this stage.

We studied the Zionist plan to partition Lebanon in depth. We stuck to our opinion on the unity of Lebanon and we fought against the Fascist, divisive approach in 1975-1976. Then we had conflicts with adventurous leftist tendencies that proposed more than one plan on the national scene. These plans contained the seeds of separatism: the civilian administration plan of 1976 and the local councils plan of 1982. We proposed an alternative to these plans, namely a unified front to defend the unity of Lebanon against partition, to defend the Arab character of Lebanon against Zionism and westernization, and to defend justice by confronting the sectarian political monopoly and insisting on a coexistence formula.

Regarding our attitude toward the sectarian conflict today, there is an important point that has to be made. The sectarian geography of Lebanon was such as to make some residents of some areas demand rights that were being denied to them because of the system of privileges. Despite attempts to attribute a regional or sectarian character to these demands, these demands did not pose a problem at the time. All that changed, however, after the Israeli invasion in 1982. There were several changes in Lebanon's political geography. People were classified and separated on a sectarian basis. The Zionists have been active in drawing sectarian geographic borders; they had a hand in starting a process by means of which political, economic and security entities were being shaped on a sectarian basis.

The problem then does not lie in people's faith, but rather in a process of classifying and separating people on the basis of their sect and religion.

There is no doubt that the lack of balance in the scales of justice and the awesome challenge that the Fascist and racist political Maronites posed to all Muslims in Lebanon and to some Christians as well are responsible for creating the problem. Reactions to that were different. There was a religious, military reaction; people were classified and separated; an appeal was made to establish

an Islamic republic; an appeal was made to abolish political sectarianism; a comprehensive secular program was proposed; and an appeal was made for a united Islamic rank to join Christians in a regional front for unity.

We, however, confronted the Fascist tide in Lebanon after the invasion with our own bodies. We were harassed and besieged, but we withstood. We are still maintaining our position for unity, and we are rejecting the process of classifying and separating Beirut residents on the basis of their religion because Beirut is the last unifying stronghold for coexistence. We declared that a response to the Maronites' racist Fascism was to be based on freedom; a response to the sectarian classification and separation of the population would be made by insisting on coexistence; and a response to building bridges to Israel would be made by reaffirming the independent Arab identity of Lebanon.

A party passes a loyalty test for a unified Lebanon when it accepts liberation from Zionism, respects religious and political liberties, dissolves all militias and allows all those who were forced to leave their homes since 1975 to return. A party that is loyal to a unified Lebanon will make no political settlements against the democratic wishes of the people. It will not consider itself "the sole legitimate representative of its sect or religion."

Second Question: The question suggests that the war in Lebanon was a war between two secular parties. In my judgment this simplifies the issue and avoids accuracy in defining the identity of the fighting forces. Today, the Lebanese Front is united under the cross; its secretary general is always declaring "a struggle" for the establishment of a Maronite national homeland in Lebanon. The Central Political Council of Parties used to have a high ratio of sectarian parties and forces. We took part in establishing the National Front, and we served as its secretary general from 1976 to 1980. The Amal Movement joined the front under instructions from Imam Musa al-Sadr. The Islamic Council and the Alliance of Beirut Families were with us. Also with us were the Kaslik Front, the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council, the Islamic Coalition and the Coalition of Independent Maronite Deputies. All these were political forces that reflected the geographical sectarian makeup of Lebanon.

The Lebanese Front fought its battle under the slogan of "liberating Lebanon from foreigners." It proclaimed its affiliation with the western camp, and it said that it was fighting the battle of the world's right-wing against the world's left-wing. The Political Council of Parties regarded its battle as the climax of the class struggle. It saw itself as fighting the battle of all the left against all the right. Both fronts tried to exclude others from their scene of action, but the National Front thought that priority had to be given to the destruction of Israel's divisive plan. It was its opinion that neither progress nor justice could be accomplished while Lebanon was being divided into separatist, sectarian entities.

This review makes it evident that the conflict was not only a conflict between two political tendencies. The nature of the struggle showed that the conflict was a conflict between separatists and proponents of unity.

Third Question: Curtailing political liberties in each canton that is ruled by a sectarian military establishment has naturally diminished the party's ability to

turn the sectarian conflict into a political conflict. But the future will not be like this because organizing a sectarian army to defend one's existence causes a sectarian group to form a bloc. Matters do change, however, in times of peace. Each sect and religion has its large political groups whose objectives and premises are contradictory. No sectarian military establishment has so far been able to claim in a popular and democratic manner that it is the sole representative of its sect or religion.

If we could have a relatively democratic climate in Lebanon, each political group will be restored to the normal size of its popular support.

Fourth Question: Anyone who says that change can only be achieved in the context of secularism is like him who says that progress can only be accomplished by Marxists. Or he is like one who says that any change in Lebanon's system threatens to destroy the country. This is not quite true. There are numerous Arab and foreign countries that did change without Marxism. Most countries underwent changes without having their national entity infringed upon. Secular Turkey did not achieve technological progress; it has continued to be a Third World country, and it is growing and going through what Third World countries go through. Although secularism has been well established in Europe, no Protestant has been elected president in France and no Catholic has become the prime minister of Britain.

The problem in Lebanon lies with political sectarianism, not with religion. The solution to that problem is to abolish sectarianism, not religion.

The natural prerequisite to the achievement of any political reform ought to manifest itself in accepting the notion that liberating Lebanon from the Israeli enemy is a matter of priority. Lebanon must be unified against the enemy's divisive plan and its independent Arabism must be accepted as its constant identity.

Fifth Question: One can make basic observations about the circumstances under which Lebanese parties were founded and the influencing factors that played a role in their formation and survival. Political thought cannot be confined geographically to a state. Political thought is a mobile, human product that may be crossed with other ideas and affected by them. In turn, it may also influence other ideas. The question about the significance of national loyalty in Lebanon and the extent to which it is related to any party's political thought is one that deserves to be discussed and talked about before any other question. Other questions for discussion include the effect of Lebanon's sectarian geographical makeup on parties and the effect of the interaction between Lebanon and the Arab region on the reality of the partisan movement in Lebanon.

According to its founders, the Phalangist Party was founded "to serve Lebanon exclusively" on the basis of a "purely Lebanese patriotism." But the party adopted western economic thought, which calls for a free economy, and formed a militia that adopted the Spanish Fascist methods of the thirties. The Lebanese Communist Party devoted considerable efforts to the task of establishing the idea of an independent Lebanon firmly. However, it proposed Marxist economic thought as a social framework for Lebanese nationalism. While some Lebanese Muslims considered themselves extensions of the Arab world, the Kaslik Front

formulated a Christian intellectual outlook that was based on loyalty to the western camp. It instilled in its Christian supporters vestiges of Christian thought that have been abandoned by the Vatican.

Lebanese parties were founded on purely sectarian bases, and they were ruled by a rationale of political geography that was consistent with the "normal" distribution of these parties' public. Even secular parties, such as the Syrian Social National Party, were inadvertently affected by this sectarian geography. Although members of that party were scattered throughout the governorates, the fact that this party was started by its leaders in al-Matn and al-Kurah, for example, made these geographical locations more accepting than others of national thought.

When we talk about circumstances surrounding the founding of parties in Lebanon, we make the following observation that has to do with what may be called a sectarian environment and its political characteristics. We notice, for example, that orthodox intellectuals are interested in the Arab cause. They joined national parties and were not ruled by "the mental attitude of a minority." This may be due to the fact that these orthodox intellectuals can be found in most of the Arab region. We also notice that there are separatist sentiments among Maronites who are extremely reserved toward Arabism and are so smitten with the West from an "inferior" position, they almost run themselves down. We also notice that Muslims are becoming open because they feel they are not a minority in the Arab world. Accordingly, they are proclaiming their Arab and Islamic character. One also notices that throughout the past 4 decades in Lebanon's political history no fanatic, Islamic movement, universal or denominational, has been able to form a tendency.

The political outlook of each group was affected by factors that included regional variables in the area over a period of 50 years; the tribal problem in each sect; and conflicting political proposals vying with each other over which road ought to be taken in the interests of the sect. Israel has its clients in more than one sect, and matters are relative, albeit quite limited. This is what we find among all the nations of the earth without exception.

There are Sunnis who became political Maronites, and there are Christians who became so Arabized, they gave up their lives fighting against the Israeli enemy. There are Druze who are more concerned with the present state of Lebanon than they are with the affairs of the Arab region. Most Shi'ites consider Arabism to be more important than a commitment to all or some of the causes of the Islamic world.

We in the Union of Working People's Forces have grown up in Lebanon. When our union was established in 1965, it was not established by government decree or by the decision of an Arab party. We were not influenced by foreigners in that regard. We have never been an extension of any Arab or international regime. That may explain the reasons why a siege has been set around us.

We are committed to Lebanese nationalism. We think that Arab national action does not succeed when it tends to make one nationalism subordinate to another. The Arab nation with its vast territories and its dense population cannot be ruled by a central government.

We belong to the school of faithful democratic Arabism, and we believe that Lebanese nationalism complements Arabism. That complementary relationship is the product of a historic, geographical, spiritual interaction between Lebanon and its Arab surroundings.

Lebanon's relationship to the Arab world entails obligations as well as rights. The conflict over Lebanon's identity has been one of the most salient conflicts among the Lebanese. It characterized the decade of the fifties, and it has continued to have an effect on us today.

Local programs must always be formulated by the Lebanese. The saying about the people of Mecca knowing best what their people want is true.

I am saddened by the condition of some parties that forfeited their ability to make decisions. It is true that there are no independent decisions in the absolute sense, and that when one makes a decision one ought to understand surrounding political points of view and the circumstances and possibilities that constitute the reasons for that political decision. We in the Union of Working People's Forces wish to go on record as not having competed with anyone anxious to find a position and a role in religious entities. We did not establish a militia that would help break up Lebanon's unity. Nor did we put our public and our principles on the negotiating table to join a non-democratic settlement.

'Umar Harb, Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Union

First Question: The ongoing sectarian conflict in Lebanon is one of the products of the existing regime's sectarian makeup. Secularism would isolate the existing regime from the religious influences that are exercised on it. The existing situation only shows that secular forces are weak and that their influence on the course of events is marginal. This is the result of numerous outside and internal factors. It seems that the present course of events has helped to diminish the role of secularists. However, the futility of sectarian and religious conflicts and the dead end that proponents of sectarian plans have reached will restore secular parties to the scene where they will again play an effective role.

Second Question: It is certain that every religious or sectarian proposal requires its hostile counterpart which it can oppose and build its glorious achievements on. During the previous stage the separatist, sectarian, right-wing Lebanese Front tendency was directly opposed to the Lebanese National Movement tendency. This was embarrassing to sectarian forces because the National Movement was not the adversary that could coexist for a long period of time with the sectarianism of the Lebanese Front. Instead, it was an alternative to that front and to other sectarian forces.

Although the Lebanese Front's determination to hold on to its sectarian positions, and other domestic and outside factors as well, forced the National Movement backward, the emergence of such a forceful opposite sectarian tendency among Muslims made everyone aware that it would be impossible for any sect to achieve a victory over the other party. Consequently, going back to the national programs for change and reform that have nothing to do with sectarianism is a

basic condition for turning the bloody conflict into a democratic one. Going back to those programs for change and reform is required so that victories that serve the people's interests and the country can be achieved, not those that serve the interests of a particular sect.

Third Question: The fact that there are political parties that have a clearly sectarian makeup means that these parties failed to get out of the narrow sectarian interests that are confining them and into the vast prospects of the country. It is here that we have to look into the personal and class interests of these parties' leaders and activists. Are their interests served by maintaining a sectarian method and exploiting sectarian sentiments and passions which they themselves arouse and on whose bases they build their leadership and their political positions?

Fourth Question: We see the opposite. What we are seeing today is a surge of the passions. In a national sense this surge is a reaction to the poignant sectarian prodding of separatists. Religion is innocent of all that. Religion bears a message of unity and unification; sectarianism is both seditious and divisive. It would be natural if people and all political, religious and national activists were to learn a lesson from the prevailing sectarian climate and its destructive consequences. That would inevitably serve the interests of ethnic, progressive and national forces who proclaim the cause of modernization and advocate it.

Fifth Question: The main reasons for the existing crisis in Lebanon are that country's isolation from its Arab surroundings and the backward sectarian makeup upon which its regime is based. We believe that an ethnic Arab proposal would be a proper alternative and an effective palliative for Lebanon's crises, sectarian conflicts and that isolation which has generated within the country local and regional conflicts that can develop in one of two directions only. These conflicts can either prolong Lebanon's division and fragmentation, or they can cause it to develop a national affiliation that would be satisfactory to all parties. Everyone would be reassured about his security, his rights and his full identity.

We also think that sectarian, regional and separatist forces, that is, those that are calling for breaking Lebanon's relations with its surroundings, are those that would lose their roles and their effectiveness if they were to give up their sectarian sedition and their hostility to the Arab world to which they belong.

8592

CSO: 4404/189

AFGHANISTAN

OFFICIAL DESCRIBES SOVIET AID ON ENERGY SOURCES

LD271750 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0415 GMT 27 Feb 85

[Text] Kabul, 6 Feb (OANA-BAKHTAR)--Two billion and 400 million cubic meters of nature gas has been exported to the USSR in the current year from the gasfields of Jowzjan Province, north of the DRA. This was stated by a representative of the Ministry of Mines and Industries in an interview to a BTA correspondent.

The agreement of the export of natural gas from the DRA to the USSR was concluded here between the Ministry of Mines and Industries of the DRA and the Union of the Soizgasexport of the USSR.

The fraternal country of USSR besides rendering (?one sided) economic and technical assistance since 1924 to the DRA in the prospection and exploration of natural gas has also trained a large number of Afghan experts and professionals in this field.

As a result on the joint Afghan-Soviet cooperation, seven petroleum and seven natural gas deposits have been discovered and their reserves were determined.

The representative added that two of the said deposits, i.e. Khwaja Gogirdak and Jarqodoq [BAKHTAR spelling] started production since 1967, and 1979 respectively.

The revenue from the export of the natural gas to the Soviet Union constitutes the major part of the national income of the DRA, and plays a significant role in upgrading the national economy, financing economic projects, purchasing of materials and equipment for industrial establishments in Afghanistan.

Despite the shameless undeclared war waged by the imperialism and reaction construction work of a petroleum refinery is undertaken and studied by the Ministry of Mines and Industries.

The tireless efforts of the Afghan workers in collaboration with the Soviet explorers have lead to the discovery to two new gasfields, i.e., Bashikor

and Jangal-e-Kalan [both names BAKHTAR spelling] region of Sheberghan capital of Jowzjan Province.

He pointed out that despite the hues and cries of imperialist circles regarding the export price of Afghan natural gas to USSR, it is worth mentioning that its price is equivalent to international rates and is in the interest of both countries.

CSO: 4600/304

AFGHANISTAN

BAKHTAR CITES KABUL DAILY ON SOVIET FRIENDSHIP

LD041009 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0448 GMT 4 Mar 85

[Text] Kabul, 3 Mar BAKHTAR--Sixty four years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Afghan-Soviet mutual agreement on good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation which has had bright and prolific results. It has further strengthened the ties founded in a very crucial period in the history of the two countries. This agreement was signed on February 1921.

The conclusion of the agreement, KABUL NEW TIMES writes, was the prelude of a great friendship between our two peoples, which enjoys a particular historic significance. The agreement and exchange of the delegations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Russia compelled the British colonialists to officially recognize the independence of Afghanistan.

The agreement which was assessed highly by Lenin not only for the peoples of the two countries but for all peoples of the East, was considered a preamble for official recognition of Afghanistan by the countries of the world.

Soviet Russia which itself passed a hard course extended the hand of friendship towards newly independent Afghanistan. It dispatched one million golden rubles and a number of experts for the reconstruction of our country. This was the beginning of the work. The signs of this friendship is observed in all projects in our country even in the far flung parts of the country. The irrigational establishments, gigantic industrial projects, transport routes, transport means, bridges, projects of power generation etc, are all examples of this friendship.

With the victory of the April revolution in 1978, the newspaper goes on to say, the basis of this friendship was further strengthened. After that the all-sided Soviet assistance to the Afghan people was considerably increased in all spheres of life.

It played a valuable role in the growth and development of Afghan society as well as in the cause of defense of her revolution, independence and territorial integrity. Ninety important economic projects enjoying special value in improving the living standards of the working people of our country have so far been built with the assistance of the Soviet Union, while 90 more are under construction.

CSO: 4600/304

AFGHANISTAN

WOMEN FINDING LARGER ROLE IN FULFILLING IDEALS OF REVOLUTION

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3 Feb 85 p 4

[Text] A few days ago, our working people witnessed a great and historical event in the life of our society, the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the foundation of the PDPA.

The speech of Comrade Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of PDPA CC, at the gala meeting on the occasion of the 20th founding anniversary, while containing a brief analysis of the path traversed by the party, laid out in all explicitness the current tasks of the revolution.

A part of the speech read: "The mass and social organizations are playing an ever greater role in extensively attracting the working people of the country to participate in the life of the country."

The women and their vanguard organization, i.e., the WDOA, which was established a little later than the foundation of the PDPA, also have great and important tasks to tackle.

The WDOA and all other social organizations, as being the links in the PDPA's ties with the working people of the country have responsibilities to ever more extensively mobilize the working people around the PDPA.

The WDOA is stepping up its work amidst the women belonging to different strata and mobilizing them for fulfilling the ideals of the revolution.

It is very important to train working women in the spirit of love with work. It is necessary to encourage the working women to increase the level of production and ready themselves to perform greater tasks so that they could play an active role in strengthening the economic pillars of the revolution. To mobilize the working women of the country for the construction of a better society is one of the most urgent tasks of the WDOA.

The WDOA also organizes the women of the country in the self-defence groups and in groups of defenders of revolution.

The experiments of the revolutionary years shows that the women of our country heroically defend their revolution shoulder to shoulder with their brothers, husband, and sons.

The names of tens of brave women are written in the history of the revolutionary struggles of our country.

Another important task of the WDOA is to struggle for widening internationalistic friendship and solidarity among the women of our country and the progressive women all over the world.

The WDOA enjoys a special prestige among the organizations of other countries.

CSO: 4600/291

AFGHANISTAN

PROGRESS OF LITERACY CAMPAIGN REPORTED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Feb 85 p 1

[Text] Kabul (BIA)--After the victory of the new and evolutionary phase of the April Revolution and due to the principled policy pursued by the party and the revolutionary state, over one million of our countrymen have become literate.

President of the Literacy Campaign Department stating this said that right now around 400 thousand people including male and female are enrolled in 19,536 literacy courses situated in productive industrial and agricultural institutions as well as units and detachments of the Armed Forces. They are taught by 21,000 official and voluntary teachers.

Likewise, during the current Afghan year, over 100,000 people were graduated from the literacy courses throughout the country. As a result of the literacy campaign, launched in the honor of the 20th founding anniversary of the PDPA, 20,000 inhabitants of Kabul city and its suburbs were graduated after learning literacy from the literacy courses.

On the same occasion, 60 literacy courses for women, 60 courses for pre-school children, four creches in adults' schools, two adults' schools in Gul Khana and Aho Shoe Factory have been set up.

Presently, he went on, nine Educational Complementary Centres (adults' schools) have been opened in Kabul city where a number of women difficulties could not continued their study are enrolled. Such centres have also been opened in Baghlan and Jauzjan Provinces. It is decided to open such centres in other provinces of the country as well.

The president added that 122 courses for pre-school children are run in Kabul city wherein 2,200 children following their study.

At the conclusion he added that three million volume books have been published by the Department in Dari and Pashto languages, for literacy courses as well as in other fields during the current year.

CSO: 4600/292

AFGHANISTAN

ARTICLE REPORTS FAIR DISTRIBUTION OF WATER BY RURAL COMMITTEES

Kabul DEHQAN in Dari 11 Jan 85 p 10

[Text] The Sawr national and democratic revolution has achieved victory in our society in order to provide the prosperity, welfare and happiness of the country's vast mass of toilers, to provide social guidance and to democratize political and social life in our society. If its lofty and progressive goals are achieved, the great hopes of the millions of farmers in this country will be realized one after another.

The PDPA and the DRA government has a great respect for customs and traditions of the country's noble people. As an example, in the Water Law and Regulations for Water Use in Agriculture, the Village Water Users Committee (VWUC) has been given specific duties and a great deal of authority so that through its use the country's noble farmers will be able to legally utilize the revolutionary government's assistance and distribute water fairly. Above all else it must be noted that after the implementation of the Water Law and Regulations for Water Use in Agriculture, the VWUCs explained the responsibility, authority and means of creating these committees as set out in the Water Law and Regulations for Water Use in Agriculture.

The VWUCs are completely different than the Village Councils, meaning that the VWUC is elected by the users of an irrigation system for an appointed time and in a democratic and free way in a public meeting of the users of that system of irrigation. At its head is a water monitor or chief water monitor. They must examine matters relating to irrigation which really include the cleaning of the canals, the repair of gates and canals, organizing meetings of canal water users, and solving problems of fair water distribution among the irrigation system's uses. Of course the water monitor or chief water monitor and other VWUC members are members of the Village Farmers Council. The VWUC is a link in the chain between water users and the government's irrigation and agricultural departments concerned with the fair distribution of water and the provision of assistance. These committees have been a social organization and represent the water users. According to Article 23 of the Committee Water Law, it must meet at least once a month and examine the matters mentioned above.

These committees are not connected with administrative divisions such as districts and sub-districts. They are related to the canal or canals, and the number of VWUC members relates to the extent of the area under cultivation by

the canal, the length of the canal, the density of the population, the tribes, and the customs and movement of the villages along the canal. The number of members on the VWUC varies but the most appropriate number of members for a VWUC is between five and fifteen.

The good condition of the irrigation system and the satisfactoriness of the solutions to the complexities of repair, cleaning, renovation and water distribution will be proportional to the suitability and fairness of the VWUC members and water monitor elected from the users of the irrigation system.

The chief water monitor and water monitor and the VWUC members must be persons who can fulfill their obligations and in whom the users of the irrigation system can put their trust.

We must note that persons who do not use the water from the irrigation system (canal) cannot be VWUC members, water monitor or chief water monitor, meaning that save water users no one can have the honor of VWUC membership.

The VWUC members receive no compensation except for the water monitor or chief water monitor who receive remuneration which is specified in a public meeting of the water users and which is paid by all the water users. Only if the water monitor or chief water monitor systematically fulfill their responsibility will the Office of Provincial Irrigation, Irrigation and Water Resources reward them in accordance with Article 22 of the Agricultural Water Law. When VWUCs distribute water fairly and use the assistance of the province's irrigation and agricultural offices, they truly play an important role as a connecting link.

9597

CSO: 4665/29

AFGHANISTAN

IMPROVEMENT OF MEDICAL SERVICES FOR ALL DRA GOAL

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3 Feb 85 pp 1-2

[Text] Assessing the state of medical services in the DRA, Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC and President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, said, "Prior to April Revolution, owing to the policy of reactionary feudal regimes ruling the society, the state of medical service and the level of medical knowledge just like other spheres of socio-economic and culture in the country was regrettable. The mortality rate of mothers at that time was 67 out of every 10 thousand, mortality rate of children at the age of less than one year was 184 out of one thousand. Thirty per cent of the children were dying before they reached the age of five. Medicine and medical services met the need of only 10-15 per cent of the people in large cities. No comprehensive programme existed for improving health affairs, the production, import and the distribution of medicines. All these bitter facts indicate the oppressive conduct of feudal and semi-feudal ruling regimes towards the health of our people."

The taking over of the political power by the working masses, under the leadership of the PDPA, provided objective possibilities for the solution of the social problems and abolition of social and national inequalities. The policy of the PDPA is focussed on providing for a whole set of foundations for social development. One of these foundations is the improvement of medical services and raising the level of knowledge of the medical personnel in the country. No attention was paid to them by the reactionary feudal regimes before the revolution. It was as a result of non-observance of the principles of environmental hygiene, inadequate supply of medicines, malnutrition and tens of other shortcomings that communicable diseases spread and caused the death of our compatriots.

After the revolution and the establishment of the power of the working people, for the first time the question of health care as being an inseparable right of every citizen of our society, without any discrimination laid down in the Programme of Action of our party and laws, decrees and regulations. The revolutionary government set forth the following tasks before the party and state organs for the health and well-being of our countrymen and rendering to them medical assistance.

--Contribution to the growth and all round expansion of state networks of hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, first aid medical centers as well as to provide for the free treatment of the working people in cities and villages.

--Establishment of a countrywide state health insurance system for the working people, enhancement of state system of social security, system of mother and child care as well as expansion of the system of kindergartens and nurseries.

During the recent years despite the stubborn imperialist attacks and mean efforts of the enemies, steady steps have been taken in the sphere of medical services, enhancing the level of knowledge of medical personnel of the Ministry of Public Health and making medical care available to all.

The network of health institutions in the country is expanding and the number of beds in the hospitals has increased by 80 per cent. Practical measures have been taken for training medical cadres especially the local medical cadres and paramedical personnel. But, surely all the measures have not been implemented to the extent as is demanded by the people and the party. Babrak Karmal emphasized at the recent session of the Politburo of the PDPA CC that the creation of a confident atmosphere of coordination and cooperation in work, balanced distribution of medical cadres throughout the country, equipping more fully the health institutions as regards personnel and necessary equipment and instruments and further expansion of the medical services in the country are among the undelayable tasks of the Ministry of Public Health.

Now, our people are more confident that the policy of the PDPA is really aimed at solving the socio-economic and cultural problems and is a stable guarantor of their interests. It has been proved that the policy of our party is the only correct one reflecting the main requirements and ideals of our people.

The realisation of these tasks not only changes the material and spiritual living condition of the classes, strata, social groups, nationalities, tribes and clans of the country but tangibly strengthens the existing ties between them. It contributes to the cause of general progress, enhancement of the level of well-being and consolidation of the defence might of the country.

CSO: 4600/291

AFGHANISTAN

INSTRUCTION THROUGH TELEVISION EXPANDING

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in Dari 7 Jan 85 p 4

[Text] Recently the first educational program production studio was inaugurated in order to provide our citizens help in the fields of training, health and social affairs.

In providing this information, the supervisor of the television-radio Educational and Training Division gave these details: From the start of the current year [21 March 1984] the educational and training programs of the division have expanded from a half-hour radio program (consisting of educational radio and radio classes for schools) to 6 programs, which is an increase compared to last year. The division also, parallel with educational programs for the public and short literacy programs, is continuing to record programs relating to "brother" nationalities and programs for peasants.

It should be mentioned that in years of 1362 and 1363 [21 March 1983-20 March 1985] 9 radio-television technicians underwent short-term one-month courses in how to handle technical facilities.

They are now working as technicians and are helping familiarize the training-educational radio-television personnel even more in the preparation of vocational programs.

Of course these programs have been started with the cooperation and help of UNICEF in Kabul and the intention is to set up, in the near future, courses aimed at better familiarization of personnel in production, the preparation of radio-television programs, video editing and lighting. He continued: All engineers of this division are taking part in the editing, montage and technical facilities of the division. It was as a result of their efforts that the montage and editing of all technical facilities of the studio were completed and were ready for use in a month.

5854
CSO: 4665/23

AFGHANISTAN

TELEVISION BROADCASTING REPORTEDLY EXPANDING

Kabul ANIS in Dari 9 Jan 85 p 1

[Text] Following the victory of the Sawr Revolution and particularly its evolutionary phase, positive transformations have generally taken place in the economic, social and educational fields. One of these changes has been in the public information and enlightenment media through the expansion of radio-television broadcasting in the country, and is specially valuable in the healthy education of our citizens.

As our respected readers are aware television broadcasts have now started in the three provinces of Kandahar, Herat and Nangarhar and preparations are now under way for the start of television broadcasts in three other provinces in the near future. Mohammad Zarrin Karimi, technical deputy in the Ministry of Communications, commented in this connection during an interview with the correspondent of ANIS, saying: Since television affects the lives of the people of a society in a positive and real fashion and shows achievements and backwardness of society through pictures, our revolutionary party and government decided that, in addition to local radio stations, to set up television stations in the country's provinces.

He said: The television projects of Kandahar, Herat and Nangarhar which were started in honor of the 20th founding anniversary of the PDPA were completed before the deadlines. In the near future television broadcasts will start in the provinces of Ghazni, Farah, Badakhshan and Khost Subprovince. The buildings of the television stations in Ghazni and Khost are about ready. These stations will begin work by the end of the year [20 March 1985]. Sixty percent of the construction of the Badakhshan television station has been completed up to now.

The deputy of the Ministry of Communications said in response to a question: The seven television facilities which are under the control of the Ministry of Communications have been purchased from the Soviet Union at a price of 794,000 dollars and 6 million afghani has been spent from the government development budget generally in construction projects and adjustments in the seven provincial television stations.

~~In response to a question regarding the technical details of the~~
provincial stations he said: The country's provincial television facilities operate on the PAL system. Each facility is capable of broadcasting up to 15 kilometers in color and 25 kilometers in black-and-white. The stations can also broadcast via satellite and directly record and broadcast programs at the stations. Thus these television facilities have receivers and transmitters with a capacity of 100 kilowatts and other equipment and with their 3-meter high antennas can receive programs via satellite.

He added: Parallel with the start of provincial television projects, the necessary technical personnel has been readied for them by the Ministry of Communication. Even so, if a need should arise, Soviet experts are ready to actively cooperate with us regarding technical matters.

The technical deputy of the Ministry of Communication discussed at length the educational and the public awareness values of the public information media and added: Alongside the start of television broadcasting in a number of provinces, the Ministry of Communication has also set up local radio broadcasting facilities in a number of the country's provinces and as far as we gather from border provinces of the country, such radio broadcasts have been enjoyable and play an active role in the enlightenment of our citizens and the publication and promotion of the progressive ideals of the Sawr Revolution.

5854

CSO: 4665/23

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

LAND DEEDS DISTRIBUTION--Maimana (BIA)--In continuation of implementation of the second phase of the land and water reforms, 112 landless and petty land holding peasants received landownership documents during separate functions held at Shordaryah village of Dawlate Abad district of Fariab Province. The functions held on this occasion were attended by a large number of peasants and toilers of the villages. Addressing the functions two peasants on behalf of others expressed gratitude to the revolutionary state and pledged readiness to ensure peace in their village. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Feb 85 p 4]

PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION EXPANDS--Kabul (BIA)--More than 302,000 tons of various goods were transported within the country by the Ministry of Transport of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan during the last nine months of the current Afghan year (begun 20 March 1984). This shows an increase of more than 25,000 tons over the target plan. This was stated by Shirjan Mazdooryar, Minister of Transport of the DRA, in an interview published by the daily HEYWAD. Meanwhile, more than 97 million persons travelled by Millie Bus, a state-run enterprise, during the same period. This number of passengers is 13 percent more as compared with the same period of the last Afghan year. Talking about the development plan of this ministry, the Minister of Transport said: "In order to overcome the shortage of transportation the Ministry of Transport has in view to establish two another transportation enterprises, to set up a technical service centres, educational centres, residential places for the workers of the Ministry of Transport and building many bus stations in the different parts of the DRA." [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Feb 85 p 4]

CSO: 4600/292

BANGLADESH

REPORTAGE ON VISIT OF NEPALESE ECONOMIC DELEGATION

Nepalese Finance Minister's Remarks

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 23 Jan 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] The Finance Minister of Nepal, Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani, said in Dhaka on Tuesday that there had been no change in his country's avowed position on cooperative development of the water resources in the Ganges by the co-basin countries for common benefit, reports BSS.

Asked at a Press conference whether there had been any change in Nepal's declared position for cooperative development of the waters in the Ganges system by Nepal India and Bangladesh for common benefits, Dr Lohani said if we had taken that position there is no need to change it.

Replying to another question he said the proposal for building storage dams on the Ganges system in Nepal for development of the system's waters for common benefit has not yet formally come to us.

He added when it (the proposal) comes to us we will see our interests as well as the interests of other countries.

The Press conference also addressed by Finance Adviser Mr M. Sayeduzzaman took place at the end of the fifth session of Nepal-Bangladesh joint economic commission.

The commission set up four working groups to consider different areas of co-operation and one of the groups has been entrusted with the responsibility of the water resources development sector.

The minutes said that the two sides recognised that multiple benefits in the fields of irrigation flood control power and river navigation would be derived by the countries of the region through the cooperative development of water resources.

Over 75 per cent of the dry season Ganges flows come from Nepal.

The minutes said both the sides expressed satisfaction that exchange of data on water resources had taken place as decided by the commission earlier. It added that both the sides agreed to continue with the process.

The Nepalese Minister leaves for home today (Wednesday).

Details of Accord

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 23 Jan 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] The fifth meeting of Bangladesh-Nepal Joint Economic Commission concluded in Dhaka on Tuesday with the identification of some specific areas of joint ventures and also of potential areas where the modalities of cooperation would soon be worked out.

The specific joint venture projects which the two sides agreed upon include projects in areas like quarrying crushing and transporting boulders from Nepal to Bangladesh and setting up a pharmaceutical plant in Nepal. The potential areas where feasibility studies and other follow-up action will be carried out cover projects in areas like clinker factory, small and cottage industries jute carpet mill (in Nepal).

A team of industrialists from Nepal the joint commission agreed will visit Bangladesh to identify the areas of more possible joint ventures.

Bangladesh and Nepal will have specific co-operation in the form of training and other technical facilities in the fields of paper and pulp industry, improvement of the performance of jute mills in Nepal handloom industry forest-based industries, metal handicrafts and hand-knit woolen carpet.

Addressing a Press conference at the state guest house at the close of the four-day meeting of the ministerial level joint economic commission Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani, Nepalese Minister of Finance, noted with satisfaction that a substantial progress was made in strengthening bilateral economic cooperation during the meeting of the commission in Dhaka. He observed that economic cooperation between the two countries was a continuing process and felt that the bilateral trade relations would assume a steady and balanced character while the over all trade volume would increase over time.

Mr. M Syeduzzaman Finance Adviser to the President and Principal Finance Secretary also attended the Press conference. He observed that the trade relations between Nepal and Bangladesh would expand with availability of more exportable surpluses in the two countries. He stated that more investments in trade-creating sectors would alone ensure the availability of more exportable surpluses.

In the trade sector the Joint Economic Commission reviewed the list of exportable commodities from either country and stressed the need for dissemination of trade information between the two countries. It noted with satisfaction that conclusion of a long-term trading agreement between Trading Corporation of Bangladesh and National Trading Limited of Nepal was at the final stage.

The two sides identified fertilizer from Bangladesh and wheat from Nepal as two prospective items to be included under long term trading arrangement for expanding the flow of two-way trade on a sustained and regular basis. Ten thousand metric tons of wheat will thus be imported by Bangladesh from Nepal at a price to be negotiated as early as possible.

In the field of movement of transit traffic Bangladesh suggested routing Nepal's third country exports through Bangladesh to ensure fuller utilisation of return wagons. Nepal agreed to accord the suggestion a favourable consideration for early implementation.

Both sides also agreed to continue with the efforts for further cooperation between the two countries for the promotion of group tours and the exchange of trainees in each other's tourism training institutes.

In response to the request by Nepal Bangladesh agreed to provide 15 seats on fellowship and 20 seats on self-financing basis for different courses in the educational institutions of Bangladesh for the Nepalese students.

Meanwhile the two sides recognised that multiple benefits in such fields as irrigation flood control power and river navigation could be derived by the countries of the region through cooperative development of water resources.

CSO: 4600/1321

BANGLADESH

DHAKA MEETS WITH EEC ON EXPORTS TO EUROPE

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 24 Jan 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Monowar Hossain]

[Text]

Bangladesh has substantially progressed to avert an imminent choking on the export of shirt to the U.K. and France in the latest consultation with the EEC (European Economic Community) in Brussels that concluded on January 18.

The four day long consultation which was third in the series and held at the request of the EEC ended with common understanding to have another round of talk to fix a quantitative level on the export of shirt to the U.K. and France upto the satisfaction of both the parties during the later part of next month. The consultation began on January 15.

It is gathered that the consultations between Bangladesh and the EEC were held in a spirit of goodwill and cooperation and two sides exchanged statistical data and other information with a view to grasping each other's point better. The 16-member team which represented Bangladesh in the consultation is learnt to have convinced EEC of the position of Bangladesh and persuaded it to soften its stand as regards Bangladesh's export of shirt to EEC markets. At the end of the consultation, vital and important in the context of Bangladesh export, both the sides agreed to further consider the data and the proposal of

quantitative limit on the export of shirt to France and the U.K. made by the EEC.

Earlier the EEC requested Bangladesh under the provision of the agreement on textile trade between the two parties for consultations to fix a quantitative limit on the export of shirt to EEC countries U.K. and France. The EEC maintained that the increasing flow of export of shirt to France and the UK was creating disruption in the domestic markets there. The EEC also introduced provincial limits on the export of shirt to U.K. and France for the period of December 1984 to March 1985 pending the outcome of the consultations. The provisional limits were introduced by the EEC in accordance with the provisions of the existing agreement between the two parties.

During the consultations from January 15 to 18 the community delegation presented the reasons and circumstance justifying EEC's request for consultation with a view to reaching agreement with Bangladesh on the introduction of quantitative limits on export of shirts to UK and France, it is gathered. Bangladesh is learnt to have not accepted the position taken by EEC to impose quota restriction or whatsoever on the

export of the item (category 8) to France and the UK. It persistently highlighted its position as a new entrant in textile trade, small supplier and as a least developed country. Bangladesh is also learnt to have reiterated its position that the causes of market disruption in the U.K. and France as stated had not been satisfactorily established and regretted that Bangladesh's L. D. C. status, position of late entrant in textile market and small supplier had not received adequate recognition in operating the agreement. Furthermore, Bangladesh was equated with the exporters having higher level of development. Bangladesh also expressed disappointment over the introduction of provisional restraint level pending satisfactory conclusion of the agreement.

CSO: 4600/1322

BANGLADESH

YEAR'S EXPENDITURES TO EXCEED BUDGET ESTIMATES

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 18 Jan 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] The expenditures of the government in the fiscal year 1984-85 will exceed the original budget estimate by about Taka 123 crore. The Resources Committee of the government in its recent meeting made a mid-year assessment of the budgetary prospects for the current financial year. The assessment showed that the current revenue expenditures known as public consumption would be around Taka 2925 crore in 1984-85 as against the original budget estimate for the same at Taka 2802.80 crore.

Sources close to the Ministry of Finance told this correspondent that additional expenditures on account of wages and salaries for public employees following the introduction of time-scale benefits for public employees and also on other heads of current expenditures would require additional involvement of funds for meeting the government's revenue expenditure in 1984-85.

While public consumption is now expected to increase, the tax receipts of the government during the first six months of the current financial year have shown some shortfalls. Tax revenue collections through the agencies under National Board of Revenue stood at about Taka 1150 crore during July-December period of 1984-85 against the annual target of such collections at Taka 2675 crore (inclusive of new taxes) in the current financial year.

Shortfall in Tax Receipts

Notwithstanding this shortfall in major tax receipts the overall revenue earnings have been kept unchanged at the original level at Taka 3465 crore in the revised budget with the expectation that earnings from non-tax sources such as nationalised banks and financial institutions public sector enterprises railways, T&T sale proceeds under disinvestment of industrial units interest receipts, fees and miscellaneous receipts of various government agencies would be higher than the originally estimated level of Taka 682 crore. Receipt of taxes and duties from land revenue, stamps motor vehicles, etc are also expected now at the original level of about Taka 174 crore.

Meanwhile trends in public consumption over the Second Five-Year Plan (1980-85) period Reflect a sharp acceleration in revenue expenditure of the government. Such expenditures of the government will thus increase from Taka 1395.9

crore in 1980-81 to Taka 2925 crore in 1984-85 reflecting a rise by about 110 per cent over the plan period. Government revenue earnings (both taxes and non-taxes) will grow during this period from Taka 1755 crore in 1980-81 to Taka 3568 crore in 1984-85, showing a growth of about 100 per cent.

Fiscal analysts maintain that fast expanding public consumption not only in nominal terms (current prices) but also in real terms (constant prices) has reduced the government's development finance to a mere residual claimant on public resources which the government has been mobilising through additional tax measures in particular over the years in the name of "conserving resources" for development purposes. Additional tax effort in the country has largely been expenditure-induced purported to foot the government's ever-increasing revenue expenditure bill, they observe.

CSO: 4600/1322

BANGLADESH

ERSHAD DISCUSSES ELECTIONS IN 15 JAN SPEECHES

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 16 Jan 85 pp 1, 10

[Text] CHANDPUR, Jan. 15--The President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Lt. Gen. H. M. Ershad, said today that the people were ready to go for polls to establish an elected representative government in the country, reports BSS.

Addressing two mammoth public meetings at Chandpur and Kachua, the President said the people were the sovereign source of power and it was only through ballots that their opinion could be judged for any party or programme.

He referred to the forthcoming parliamentary elections and reiterated that the polls would be free and fair. The election results or for that matter the verdict of the people would be honoured at all costs, he added.

The President said the Government was determined to establish democracy in the country from the grassroots level to bring welfare of the common man. The announcement of two election dates previously were the manifestation of his government's sincerity to fulfil this pledge, he said adding: but these election dates had to be postponed to accommodate the viewpoints of some opposition political parties.

President Ershad said the negative attitude of these political parties toward election had proved that they were afraid to face the people because of their past failures when they were in power. He said hartals and politics of destruction could never be the yardstick of popularity of any political party rather it proved their political bankruptcy.

He said now time has come when the political parties should address themselves to the will of the people and participate in the polls seeking their mandate. He reiterated that power would be transferred to an elected government as per the provision of the suspended constitution.

Referring to the non-cooperation movement launched by the two alliances he said this had failed to make any impact because the people had already rejected it. The existence of this movement could be felt only in their Press statements and speeches and not in reality he said and pointed out that on the other hand the whole or rural masses were now engaged in nation building task with the availability of Government's support services within their reach through the creation of Upazila.

Faridpur Incident

President Ershad spoke of the incident that took place in Farid pur recently involving two rival factions of a political party and said the leader of that party had tried to shift the responsibility of this incident on the shoulder of the Government. He said all that had happened there was the culmination of a inner-conflict and division in that party and outsider had any role in that "I am a soldier and I do not believe in any dirty game he added.

He referred to the bagey of unfair means in elections raised by certain political parties and said they had been doing this because they were haunted by their wrong-doings when they themselves held national elections while in power in the past

The President recalled the sequence which forced his government to accept the responsibility of running the administration and said on the very first day he had pledged to establish real democracy of the people from the grassroot level and also to bring about some basic reforms in the socio-economic sectors conducive to progressive march of an independent country.

President Ershad said that the reforms and changes that had been brought about in administration, judiciary, drug policy land system and industrial policy had already started yielding beneficial results from the people. The Upazila system had not only integrated the hitherto neglected rural people in the national development process but at the same time had generated a new enthusiasm in the rural areas for development activities, he added

Upazila Polls

In this context, he said that the election of Upazila Chairman would be held some time after the holding of the national elections. He said he had set the date of Upazila Chairman election earlier but to accommodate the viewpoints of the opposition it had been postponed. He said election of Upazila Chairman would vest the local development jurisdiction to the Upazila Parishad.

Turning to the recent unprecedented floods, the President said the situation arising out of the floods was successfully tackled as a result of the combined efforts of the people administration and members of the armed force. He said because of timely distribution of relief, none suffered from starvation, although in floods of much lesser magnitude in 1974 thousands of people died for want of food.

He advised the students to devote to the pursuit of knowledge and build themselves as worthy citizens to shoulder the responsibility lying ahead of them. He asked them not to be used by the politicians and said it was the politicians who always used them to earn their selfish ends. He urged the guardians and educated section of the society to lead their children to the path of religion. Reflection of Islamic values and ideals could check the erosion of moral values in the society, he added.

President Ershad called for united efforts of the people from all walks of life to increase production in fields and factories to create more resources for development and achieve self-sufficiency.

The President announced financial grants for schools and colleges at Kashua and Chandpur and said the Kachua Girls' High School would be taken over by the Government. In this context he said that the womenfolk had to be brought to the equal footings with men and that was why the Government had laid special emphasis on female education.

Amidst applause he announced that the Kachua-Gouripur Road would be built. He also announced grants for Chandpur Pourashava and assured that an auditorium at Chandpur would be built.

The President was presented with the Golden Key of Chandpur town by the Chairman of Chandpur Pourashava at a civic reception.

Mr. Ismail Hossain Bengal of Bangladesh Muktiyoddah, Sangsad also spoke at the Chandpur meeting.

Earlier, President Ershad addressed the Union Parishad Chairmen and members of Chandpur district at District Council Hall. He also addressed the Kachua Upazila UP chairmen and members separately at Kachua.

On arrival, the President was given standing ovations at both the places. People from all walks of life greeted the President with welcome slogans and applause.

The Zonal Martial Law Administrator, 'D'. Major General Sufi Ahmed Chowdhury accompanied the President during the visit.

CSO: 4600/1323

BANGLADESH

ELECTION COMMISSION APPOINTS POLLING OFFICERS

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 18 Jan 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] The Election Commission has appointed 64 Returning Officers and 476 Assistant Returning Officers throughout the country for the Jatiya Sangsad Elections scheduled to be held on April 6 this year says an Election Commission Press release.

The Commission in a gazette notification, issued on Wednesday has notified these appointments of the Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers.

The appointments have been made from various tiers of administration. All the Returning Officers are the Deputy Commissioners of the 64 districts. Amongst the Assistant Returning Officers, there are 460 Upazila Nirbahi Officers, 15 District Election Officers and one Thana Education Officer.

It may be mentioned here that the Election Commission, in another gazette notification issued on January 15. called upon the electors to elect a Member of the Jatiya Sangsad from each of the 300 constituencies along with the election schedule. According to the schedule, nomination papers for candidature shall have to be filed on February 24 (Sunday), scrutiny will be held on the following day, i.e. on February 25 (Monday). The last date for withdrawal of candidature is March 4 (Monday). Polls shall be taken on April 6 (Saturday).

CSO: 4600/1322

BANGLADESH

PAPERS REPORT ON PARTIAL RESTORATION OF RIGHTS

OBSERVER Commentator

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 18 Jan 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] The government has restored seven innocuous articles of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the country leaving such vital articles which provide equality before law, right to protection of law right to life and personal liberty safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention still under suspension. The fundamental rights were suspended on March 24, 1982 the day Martial Law was promulgated

The government has not acted upon the articles having political bearing and also agitating the minds of the people. The articles which have been revived have never been violated by the administration. The articles which provided freedom and liberty to the people according to the Opposition parties have been kept under suspension.

The government has restored only seven clauses of the fundamental rights out of 21 clauses enunciated in the Constitution of the country which has been partially revived on Tuesday (Jan 15) last. The provisions of the articles which have been restored are 28, 29, 30 34 40 41 and 102.

The Article 28 of the fundamental rights relates to non-discrimination against any citizen on grounds of religion, sex or race. Article 29 relates to equality of opportunity of public employment, Article 30 relates to abolition of title; honours and decorations: Article 34 relates to prohibition of forced labour: Article 40 gives citizens the right of freedom of occupation and profession and Article 41 provides freedom of religion to every citizen.

Equality Before Law

Such other articles not revived like Article 27 provides equality before law, Article 31 provides right to protection of law (and to enjoy the protection of the law and to be treated in accordance with law and only in accordance with law which is inalienable right of every citizen) Article 32 provides protection of right to life and personal liberty Article 33 provides safeguards against arrest and detention without being informed and the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice, Article 35 provides

for protection in respect of trial and punishment. Article 36 provides for freedom of movement Article 37 provides freedom of assembly, Article 38 freedom of association and Article 39 freedom of thought and speech.

Right to Property

The Article 42 which has not also been revived provides rights to property and says that no property shall be compulsorily acquired, nationalised or requisitioned save by the authority of law. Article 43 provides for protection of home and correspondence, Article 44 enforcement of fundamental rights. Article 45 modification of rights in respect of disciplinary law, Article 46 provides power to provide indemnity.

Article 102 which has also been partially revived relates to the High Court Division to issue certain orders and directions to restrain the government or any of its agencies from acting arbitrarily and thus infringing fundamental rights of citizens.

The partial revival of the Article 102 of the Constitution is only for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Article 28, 29, 30 34 40 and 41 of the Constitution and for no other purpose.

Article 102

Nothing of the Article 102 of the Constitution shall empower the High Court Division to make any order or declaration or give and direction or issue any writ or process in respect of (i) any act or thing done or omitted to be done or any action or proceeding taken by the Government or by any person or authority, including any person performing any function in connection with the affairs of the republic or of a local authority at any time before the commencement of this order (ii) a person in custody or purported to be in custody under any Martial Law Regulation or order and (iii) any matter relating to election to parliament or to the office of the President.

These amendments were made public by an Extraordinary Gazette of the Government dated January 15, 1985. This order is called the Constitution (Partial Revival) (Second) order 1985. This is in supersession to the Proclamation of March 24, 1982 by the CMLA.

NATION Staff Reporter

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 24 Jan 85 pp 1, 8

[Text] Articles 28, 29, 30, 34, 40 and 41 relating to fundamental rights of the suspended constitution have been fully revived by the Constitution (partial revival) (Second) Order 1985.

An extraordinary gazette published by the government on January 15 said Article 102 relating to powers of the High Court Division under writ jurisdiction to issue certain orders and directions had also been revived subject to certain conditions.

Article 28 relates to discrimination on grounds of religion etc. 29 equality of opportunity in public employment, 30-abolition of titles, honours and decorations, 34-prohibition of forced labour, 40-freedom of profession or occupation and 41-freedom of religion.

Clause (5) of Article 102 was substituted with "in this Article, unless the context otherwise requires, 'person' includes a statutory public authority and any court or tribunal, other than -

(a) a court or tribunal established under a martial law regulation or order;

(b) a court or tribunal established under a law relating to the defence services of Bangladesh or any disciplined force, or

(c) an administrative tribunal, but does not include a person performing or purporting to perform any function in exercise of any power derived or purported to have been derived from the proclamation of the 24th March 1982, or from any martial law regulation or order or instruction or notification or in execution of or in compliance with any order made or sentence passed by any court, tribunal or authority in the exercise of purported exercise of such power".

The order further said the High Court Division shall have jurisdiction and may give any direction or order, under Clause (1) of Article 102 of the Constitution only for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 28, 29, 30, 34, 40 and 41 and for no other purpose.

Nothing in Article 102 (this has reference to Clause (2) of Article 102) shall empower the High Court Division to make any order or declaration or give any direction or issue any writ or process in respect of--i) any act or thing done or omitted to be done or any action or proceeding taken by the government or by any person or authority, including any person performing any function in connection with the affairs of the Republic or of a local authority, at any time before the commencement of this order;

ii) a person in custody or purported to be in custody under any martial law regulation or order.

iii) any matter relating to elections to parliament or to the Office of President.

CSO: 4600/1322

BANGLADESH

ESCAP SECRETARY SPEAKS AT COOPERATION CONFERENCE

Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in English 22 Jan 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] ESCAP Executive Secretary S A M S. Kibria said in Dhaka on Monday that his organisation was ready to extend its "fullest support" to promote cooperation in South Asia if the countries of the region desired such assistance, reports BSS.

He was speaking as the chief guest at the inaugural session of the international conference on South Asian regional economic cooperation.

Mr Kibria said that with its sizeable pool of development experience and technical expertise ESCAP was in a position to assist and facilitate cooperative activities in South Asia if an agreed request from the countries concerned was received.

Organised by Bangladesh economic Association the inaugural session was presided over by the President of the Conference Prof. Rehman Sobhan. The session was addressed by Adviser for Finance Mr. M. Syeduzzaman and the Nepalese Finance Minister Mr Prakash Chandra Lohant.

Mr Kibria, as a former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, was closely involved with the initial initiatives to form a South Asian forum for cooperation after the late President Ziaur Rahman had mooted the idea.

He stressed that the hopes for a new international economic order would never materialise unless the countries of the South were able to redress the fundamental economic imbalance by consolidating their own economic strength.

The increasing extent of inter dependence in today's world, he said could be gauged from the facts that between 1979 and 1980 there was nearly a nine-fold increase in developing countries, exports to the world, a sevenfold rise in their imports and a quintupling increase in their outstanding external debt, apart from debts with maturities of less than a year.

The recent prolonged recession also demonstrated, he said that no nation or group of nations can continue to prosper while others stagnate or go downhill.

There had been a greater international acceptance of the fact he said that the pattern of interdependence that emerged through a constellation of historical political and economic forces had not been unambiguously beneficial" to the developing countries.

While retreat into isolationism was neither feasible nor desirable he said the need to restructure international economic relationships could hardly be over emphasised.

Earlier Principal Finance Secretary and Finance Adviser Mr M. Syeduzzaman said regional economic cooperation is increasingly.

M. Syeduzzaman being considered as one of the policy options available to developing countries as a part of their over-all strategy for economic development.

Wide Variation of Cooperation

Addressing the inaugural session of the international conference of South Asian regional economic cooperation organised by the Bangladesh Economic Association the Adviser said there were wide variations of such cooperation ranging from virtual integration, through customs union to loose cooperation.

The balance of the benefits and costs of regional integration or cooperation in a particular situation will depend on the circumstances of the situation including market size, resource endowment geographical location of countries and historical patterns of foreign trade, the Adviser said.

In other parts of the world, particularly between economically less developed countries, Mr. Syeduzzaman said attempts at various regional cooperation had met with varying degrees of success like the East African community with their extremely modest success and the Andean and ASEAN groups with more pronounced success stories.

Milestone in History of Development

Speaking on the occasion the Adviser for Foreign Affairs Mr. Humayun Rasheed Chowdhury visualised a milestone in the history of the development of South Asian Regional Cooperation (SARC) in the near future.

He said the proposed first ever SARC summit of heads of state and government to be held in Dhaka by the end of this year would surely generate necessary political will and galvanise imagination and efforts of this region for further development of the cause of South Asian regional cooperation.

Mr. Chowdhury recalled that Bangladesh had launched an initiative for setting up of a forum for regional cooperation among the South Asian nations in May 1980.

He noted that a considerable progress had already been made in this direction. Regional meetings both at official and technical level were held in Colombo, Kathmondu Islamabad and Dhaka.

He said an integrated programme of action in nine identified areas--agriculture meteorology rural development to lecommunications health and population control transport arts and culture was drawn up

The success of cooperation in the South Asia would largely depend on the continuing unity of purpose among the regional countries he observed.

Mr Chowdhury reiterated Bangladesh's commitment to the development and promotion of Economic Cooperation for Developing Countries (ECDC) and Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC).

He said Bangladesh played an active part in the UN conference on TCDC held in Buenos aires in September 1978 the Caracas conference on ECDC in Buenos Aires in September 1978 the Caracas conference on ECDC in May 1981 and other regional conferences on ECDC.

He expressed his belief that the corrent conference would serve useful purpose for identifying solutions and harmonise "our position with a view to overcoming the temporary impediment we may face in the short run".

Addressing the session the visiting Nepalese Finance Minister Dr. Prakash Chandra Lohani who is also a distinguished economist of his country said the SARC was an exciting idea and the forum could greatly help the people of the countries of the region to achieve a better standard of living and provide them an opportunity to live in peace and harmony.

Difficult to Live in Isolation

Dr. Lohani said in the present day world it was very difficult to live in isolation and the level of state to state interaction was increasing particularly among the countries of the south.

He pointed out that success and effectivity of the forum would depend on two pre-conditions desire and willingness to cooperate with each other.

In his address of welcome the President of Bangladesh Economists Association Dr. Rehman Sobhan said the Association had decided to hold the conference to take stock of the body research and of the ideas which had accumulated in recent years on the them of South Asian cooperation.

He said it was time to see where we stand what are outstanding problems and prospects for cooperation and where we might move ahead.

Dr. Sobhan said exchange of ideas that would take place in the conference would provide guidance to researchers and policy makers whilst providing an opportunity for the community of economists in Bangladesh to understand the nature of the issues associated with the concept of SARC.

CSO: 4600/1337

18 March 1985

BANGLADESH

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM RESOURCES TO FALL SHORT THIS YEAR

Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English 25 Jan 85 pp 1, 8

[Article by Syed Badiuzzaman]

[Text] The resources for the Annual Development Programme (ADP) of the current financial year will fall short by Taka 227.37 crore from the actual estimate in the national budget.

After a mid-year review of the position of both domestic and external resources, the officials have now re-estimated the total available resources for the ADP at Taka 3668.63 crore against the original estimate of Taka 3896.00 crore.

A setback in the flow of foreign aid is the main reason for shortfall in the ADP fund. The position of domestic resource is apparently better this year despite a fall in the revenue surplus. Under the revised estimate, the external resource will decline by Taka 407.15 crore while the domestic resource will increase by Taka 179.78 crore.

Of Taka 3668.63 crore now estimated for the ADP, the external resources will provide Taka 2722.85 crore while the total domestic resource will account for Taka 945.78 crore. In the budget estimate, an amount of Taka 3130.00 crore was expected from the external resource while the projection from domestic resource was Taka 766.00 crore.

The fall in external resources has been attributed to an adverse climate of project aid and poor generation of counterpart fund from the commodity aid this year. The officials now estimate the project aid at Taka 1560.00 crore and counterpart fund from the commodity aid at Taka 1069.85 crore against their original estimates of Taka 1847.00 crore and Taka 1190.00 crore respectively.

On the other hand, the rise in the domestic resource this year has resulted from an earning of net revenue of Taka 234.18 crore from food account against a deficit of Taka 30.00 crore on this head in the original budget and contribution of Taka 113.76 crore from the sale of debentures by some autonomous bodies against the original estimate of Taka 30.00 crore from this source.

The revenue surplus by Taka 766.00 crore as shown in the current year's budget will, according to the Government financial analysts, now decline to Taka 661.75 crore because of a fall in the revenue earning and rise in the current expenditure. The current expenditure is now estimated at Taka 2867.37 crore against the budget estimate of Taka 2802.80 crore and the total revenue at Taka 3529.12 crore against its original estimate of Taka 3568.80 crore.

INDIA

GANDHI REVIEW OF FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 17 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Inder Malhotra]

[Text]

NEARLY three weeks after the formation of the new government, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi's attention remains focussed primarily on domestic problems. But the world does not leave a country of India's size, potential, weight and strategic location alone. Nor can the leaders of 700 million Indians be impervious to the explosions and irritations right at the country's doorsteps, to say nothing of those further afield.

No wonder then that the Prime Minister has found time, despite his other preoccupations, to undertake a prolonged review of India's major foreign policy concerns with his top foreign policy advisers, headed by Mr. G. Parthasarathi whose contribution to the conduct of India's foreign relations is much greater than might be indicated by his official title, chairman of the committee on policy planning. Others who joined the consultations were the minister of state for external affairs, Mr. Khurshed Alam Khan, the principal secretary to the Prime Minister, Dr. P. C. Alexander, the foreign secretary, Mr. M. K. Rasgotra, and the secretary in the external affairs ministry, Mr. Romesh Bhandari, who will succeed Mr. Rasgotra as foreign secretary at the beginning of next month.

The discussion was in the nature of what the French call a *tour d'horizon* but attention was inevitably focussed on those security and foreign policy concerns which have of late been to the fore for obvious reasons.

For instance, Sri Lanka figured prominently in the review because of the sheer immediacy and seriousness of the consequences to this country of Colombo's hand-

ing of the explosive ethnic problem in the island republic. But this does not mean that wider questions such as relations with the two superpowers or with the neighbours, including China, took a back seat. They did not.

Similarly, Punjab, though basically an internal issue, has acquired serious international dimensions, thanks to the covert support and overt sympathy extended to the separatists and secessionists by Pakistan as well as other foreign or foreign-based elements.

Foreign Support

Mr. Ganga Singh Dhillon, the Washington-based promoter of secession in this country, has received succour and support from Pakistan over the years. Now there is evidence to show that he is becoming a darling also of the South African intelligence agency, called the bureau of state security or BOSS, with deep links with the CIA and the British secret service.

Indeed in this connection, a source of great dismay to New Delhi has been what is seen here as extraordinary indulgence being shown to Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan and other so-called Khalistanis by Britain. Not only have they been given asylum in that country but they are also allowed to carry on their nefarious activities directed against the unity and integrity of India with impunity. What is more, Dr. Chauhan has been permitted to use the BBC and other British media to gloat over Mrs. Gandhi's assassination and incite the murder of other Indian leaders, including the present Prime Minister.

Inevitably, this painful subject figured during the top-level review. Notice was taken of the explanation that the British High Commission here has been giving to senior officials of the external affairs ministry. Basically, the explanation boils down to the plea that while the British government is extremely anxious to take action against Dr. Chauhan it is unable to do so under the British law.

In New Delhi's view, however, the apology is lame and unacceptable and accentuates the British insensitivity to Indian sentiment.

On the subject of a country's obligation not to allow its soil to be used for hostile activity against another the international law is crystal clear. What is more, contrary to what the British diplomats have been saying, there is the 1881 case in Britain itself in which Johann Most, an anti-monarchist, was indicted for applauding the murder of the Russian emperor, Czar Alexander II, in terms much less objectionable than those used by Dr. Chauhan in his unspeakable utterances over the BBC and Channel 4 repeatedly on the day of Mrs. Gandhi's dastardly assassination.

To cap it all, Dr. Chauhan, who lives under round-the-clock protection of the British police, is allowed to fly, indeed flaunt, the flag of so-called Khalistan on his house.

Continuous Process

Other subjects which have been reviewed include India's role as chairman of the non-aligned movement and arms control, especially in the context of the Geneva talks on the one hand and the six-nation non-aligned summit on nuclear disarmament to be held in New Delhi on January 28 on the other.

By its very nature, the kind of review Mr. Gandhi and his principal foreign policy aides have carried out can only be a part of a continuous process, not a conclusive act in itself. There is no question, therefore, of any hard and fast decisions being taken. What emerges from such discussions is a line of action, in pursuance of the basic tenets of Indian foreign policy, to cope with multiple problems and challenges in a fast-changing situation.

Thus it is that on Sri Lanka, the present Indian position that given the appallingly tragic stalemate in the negotiations for some kind of a political settlement between the two sides in that country, there is nothing that

India can do. Any Indian initiative at this stage would be counter-productive. However, if President Jayewardene resumes his efforts to promote a formal or informal dialogue with the TULF or with the Tamil terrorists, for that matter, and seeks India's help in making the talks fruitful, such help would be available as readily as in the past.

This is the key issue in Sri Lanka, not the future of the Sri Lankan gunboat seized by this country after it had intimidated Indian fishermen in Indian territorial waters. Colombo's plea that Sri Lankan state vessels have "immunity" to violate Indian sovereignty is of course specious and cannot be countenanced. But there is no inclination to detain the offending gunboat and its audacious crew for good. If proper amends are made and an assurance is forthcoming that such conduct would not be repeated the gunboat would surely be let off.

The future of the 17 Indian fishermen in custody in Sri Lanka is not directly linked with the offending Sri Lankan boat detained by this country. But then it stands to reason that if the slate is to be wiped clean the fishermen should also be set free.

Pak Role

On Pakistan, the Indian government's stand has been made clear in public by the Prime Minister. It is that the prospects of the resumption of the Delhi-Islamabad dialogue would improve in direct proportion to the speed with which the gap between Pakistani words and deeds over the issue of separatism and extremism in Punjab disappears.

Unfortunately training camps in Pakistan for Akali extremists continue. Indeed, the training period in these camps has been reduced from three months to 30 days with a view to increasing the turnover of potential saboteurs and terrorists. On the other hand, there has been an abatement in the virulently anti-Indian propaganda in Pakistan. Also, Jasbir Singh, when disallowed entry into Dubai after deportation from Britain, was not allowed to deplane in Karachi either.

This is understandably appreciated. But the litmus test of Pakistani sincerity over Punjab remains the future of the two sets of hijackers of Indian aircraft. They must either be tried under the Pakistani law without any further delay or returned to India. The present prevarication has only one meaning, especially after

the secret, year-long trial of four hijackers of a Pakistani aircraft who have been sentenced to death.

India's relations with the two superpowers can be dealt with only in a separate, full-length article. For the present, it would suffice to say that New Delhi's policy continues to be what it has always been — to maintain the time-tested Indo-Soviet friendship and to improve to the extent possible relations with the U.S., and where such improvement is not feasible to avert avoidable deterioration in the relationship.

It is reasonably certain that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi would visit Moscow before he goes to Washington via Paris in June. However, the Soviet Union will not be the first country to be visited by him as Prime Minister. That honour belongs, almost by right, to Bhutan than which there is no neighbour closer or friendlier than India. Mr. Gandhi will go to Bhutan well before leaving for Moscow.

The King of Bhutan will be in New Delhi on February 1 in pursuance of his own desire, conveyed to Mr. Rajiv Gandhi early in November, that he would want to be the first foreign head of state to visit India under Mr. Gandhi's new reign. He was requested to come at any time between January 10 and January 20. But these dates were not considered auspicious by the royal advisers and the king has chosen the first propitious day in the calendar to pay a visit to India.

CSO: 4600/1338

INDIA

IMPLEMENTATION OF SILICON COOPERATION PROJECT URGED

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 16-17 Jan 85

[Article by L. K. Sharma]

[16 Jan 85 pp 1, 9]

[Text] ANOTHER last-minute review of the silicon collaboration project with an American company is a sad commentary on the government's decision-making process.

The proposed project had won the approval of the concerned top civil servants and ministers and the former and the present prime ministers, to go by the massive recorded evidence on the subject. Indeed, it is one of those ventures that have been subjected to an extensive and repeated scrutiny. And silicon is the critical raw material on which the edifice of electronics is built. India is dependent entirely on imports for the hyper-pure silicon needed in increasing quantities by solar cell and semi-conductor manufacturers.

Even a cursory look at the country's programmes in the field of electronics, defence, space and photovoltaic system will suffice to convince even a layman of the importance of uninterrupted and assured supply of hyper-pure silicon in which impurity levels have to be kept down to a few parts in a billion.

An expert committee headed by an IIT professor suggested in the early seventies the vital need for manufacturing capacity in this field. At that time it was not envisaged that the OECD countries would one day classify silicon as a strategic material and impose an embargo on its exports to COMECON. The export to India too depends on the concerned OECD country supplier getting an export licence from his government. The export licence is, of course, conditional to the Indian importer submitting an end-use certificate.

The supply of silicon is also not always available. Often it attracts a premium and as the electronics department was informed last year, almost all major suppliers had stopped booking orders for the year. Some companies had stopped booking orders even for 1985. The interested Japanese and U.S. firms have entered into interlocking arrangements with supplies committee to user units--all amounting to the formation of a cartel.

Few Sources

The following extract from the statement by the chairman of a private company, Siltronics, speaks for itself: "There are only a few sources in the world from which we can buy polysilicon. Your company has the industrial license to make polysilicon which is the input material for the growing of monocrystalline ingots, currently made by your company. Polysilicon is a strategic material and its availability is prone to be affected by political and strategic factors.

"While for this reason, it is important that polysilicon is made in India, for reasons of scale and fluidity of technology and the considerable investment needed, it is not advisable for your company to undertake its manufacture."

It goes on to say, "We welcome the government's decision to set up the national silicon facility as it insulates us from the uncertainties of supplies. I also believe that the indigenous availability of polysilicon on this scale will tend to accelerate the growth of the electronics industry even more."

Research and development work was assigned to some institutions in the sixties, but the efforts did not achieve success even a decade later. So it was decided in 1976 that the country should have silicon manufacturing capacity. Then Mrs. Indira Gandhi went out of power in 1977 and the project was forgotten. She came back to power in 1980 and soon inquired after the fate of the project. This led to the appointment of a task force in 1981 which submitted its report in 1982.

Voluminous Report

A negotiating team worked through 1983 and came up with a voluminous report by the end of the year. The project was cleared in early 1984 by the cabinet committee on political affairs, with Mrs. Gandhi as the minister for electronics. The negotiating committee was able to secure satisfactory terms with the U.S. firm Hemlock, the second largest manufacturer in the world.

The project could not get going even after the technical collaboration agreement was signed with Hemlock early last year since the U.S. government would not allow the transfer of this sensitive technology without an export license. Negotiations with the U.S. administration followed within the framework of the comprehensive memorandum of understanding on transfer of high technology.

This involved hard bargaining and discussions at the level of the U.S. secretary of state, Mr. George Shultz. The memorandum was ultimately finalised and initialled at the official level after its approval by the cabinet committee on political affairs.

Examined Again

Once the way was cleared for the project, one of the user agencies, the department of non-conventional sources of energy, reiterated its opposition to the selected technology. The issue was examined again by a group and the

secretary, department of electronics, submitted a fresh brief note. It was only after this that the approval was given in the last week of December, 1984. Then came the second thoughts within a couple of days.

The legal and financial aspects of the Hemlock deal were examined by senior representatives of the ministries concerned. The foreign secretary examined it from a different angle, especially since this was the very first high-technology project under the memorandum of undertaking.

As far as the technical aspect was concerned, the experts who assessed the entire issue including the make-or-buy options were drawn from these organisations: Engineers India Ltd, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Central Electronics Ltd., IPCL, Semiconductor Complex htd., electronics department and the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research.

Behind all this massive effort was the government's will to make the country achieve not just self-reliance but self-sufficiency in this strategic material. Curiously, some of the project's critics raised the issue of self-reliance to shoot down the project in its present form. They claimed that there existed adequate indigenous capacity of the required kind.

But experts associated with technology assessment had examined the work being done by the National Chemical Laboratory (NCL) in Pune as well as the production pattern of Mettur Chemicals which has set up a two-tonne polystilicon plant.

Regarding the results achieved by NCL, its director is on record as saying that there should be no impression that NCL is in a position to deliver the goods.

Mettur Chemicals, which benefitted from the work done by the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, uses a feedstock which was earlier being used by some American companies. The experts assessed the capabilities of the plant with a two-tonne capacity.

The company claimed that its material could meet the required standards and presented the results of a test by a U.S. company. The BARC and BEL also tested the samples of the material and found these to be below the required standards.

Quality testing requires not just imported equipment but a special know-how and the experts examining the issue did not consider it advisable to depend on the Mettur plant and its further upgradation. While deciding to import the technology the government did give an assurance that all the supplies of the Mettur plant would be brought if the material came up to the required standards.

Status Reassessed

The negotiating committee reassessed the status of the indigenous R and D on polysilicon at NCL laboratory, the Indian Institute of Science and Mettur

Chemicals. This reassessment involved visits and detailed technical discussions with the scientists and engineers there. Specialists from Engineers India Ltd. were associated with the members of the negotiating committee in this task.

It was found that several years of work would be needed to develop process know-how and plant engineering adequate for building a large-sized plant of the kind the national silicon facility had to set up at the earliest.

A sum of Rs. 2 crores was set apart for indigenous R and D in this area so that the existing efforts were strengthened.

Some critics blame the government for rejecting the other foreign technologies. There is a demand for scrapping the Hemlock deal irrespective of the outcome of yet another review. But when the issue has been prejudged, why resort to a review?

Apparently, nothing has been learnt from the past experience that often a review has killed a vital project or delayed it by another few years when it was about to be finalised.

There are any number of crucial defence R and D projects that so got bogged down that a decade later the country continued to depend on imports of hardware. The consumer electronics projects of TV tube glass shell, now being implemented by BEL after more than a decade of debate, is a classic case worth studying.

Many projects are multi-disciplinary and multi-user ventures. One single user agency is not always able to evaluate the overall situation and thus cannot be allowed a decisive say. Even so, in the case of the polysilicon project, one big user is the public sector Central Electronics Ltd. (CEL), whose expert has been associated with the evaluation work. The top executive of another user, Semiconductor Complex, was the chairman of the task force.

The administrative department of non-conventional energy, which had earlier tried to get the project transferred from the electronics department, has had strong reservations about the project with the Hemlock technology. It had conveyed these reservations to Mrs. Gandhi early last year. She asked questions, consulted the scientists and ministers involved, made up her mind, convened a meeting of the political affairs committee of the cabinet with one-point agenda and the collaboration was approved.

Whatever the outcome of the review, India's credibility in the world high technology market is unlikely to be enhanced. Questions are already being asked by the U.S. government and the U.S. company.

[17 Jan 85 pp 1, 11]

[Text] NEW DELHI, January 16--THE decision-making process for the silicon project, as established in the first part of this report yesterday, involved a step-by-step elaborate administrative procedure with expert reports and notes on files.

It also took into account the status of indigenous research and development which is a vital issue in any decision to import technology. Is there a viable alternative to the proposed project?

There is a view that amorphous silicon technology may soon become viable and so no investment need be made in polysilicon technology. This is like asking India to abandon its fission nuclear power generation programme on the ground that the fusion process breakthrough is only a decade away.

The total worldwide shipment of solar PV modules during 1983 was 22 Megawatts peak. Of this about 3 MWP of amorphous silicon solar cells were produced in Japan for indoor applications such as pocket calculators, electronic watches and games. These cells do not require polysilicon as feedstock but they still have problems to overcome. They work indoors but are unsuitable for outdoor uses where, because of ultraviolet radiation, they start degrading.

Solar Voltaics

One of the reviews by a Japanese scientific institute confirms that the single crystalline silicon wafers (for which polysilicon is the basic feedstock) will continue to dominate the field.

An international conference of photovoltaic specialists held in the U.S. last year also concluded that for the next five to ten years, polysilicon-based single crystalline silicon technology would rule supreme in the international photovoltaic market. India has a very large and growing market for the solar photovoltaics currently being explored by foreign manufacturers.

The international photovoltaic market is growing at the rate of 100 per cent every year. India has been able to establish in this field a technology base which has been recognised internationally.

On the ground that India's demand for silicon will remain small, critics have arrived at a very high per tonne cost and are, therefore, opposed to the "large" proposed capacity of the plant. The demand will clearly depend on the government's policy and the vigour with which the programme for non-conventional energy systems is implemented. Tax benefits and increased subsidies could lead to an explosion in demand as has happened in the case of the TV industry.

It is not true that 200 tonnes will be excess capacity when the plant goes on stream. At least 20 tonnes of polysilicon is needed to produce one MWP of solar PV modules and CEL and BHEL alone plan to reach a capacity of ten MW by 1990. In addition, semiconductor requirements need to be met and some more users may come up in the intervening period.

Those who are predicting the death of the Indian photovoltaic industry because of the costlier indigenous polysilicon as compared to the cheaper imports need not harbour such fears. Available literature shows that the impact of any change in the unit cost of polysilicon on each peak watt of solar PV modules or systems is to the magnitude of only two per cent of the change.

In search of potential collaborators, India cast its net wide. The largest manufacturer, a West German company, as well as the third largest, an Italian company, showed no interest. Negotiations were held with Hemlock of the U.S., Siemens of West Germany and Komatsu of Japan and the U.S. company, the second largest manufacturer, was selected.

There was also an offer from a GDR company through its Indian representative. The GDR has only one operating plant of about 50 tonnes capacity set up more than a decade ago on the same process as used by the U.S. company. This GDR firm has not yet transferred its polysilicon technology to any other country.

In fact, because of some problems this plant itself had to take the help of Hemlock for commissioning part of the equipment in an important section. The polysilicon specifications indicated by the local representative of the GDR firm were found to be inferior to those guaranteed by Hemlock. The negotiating team considered the purity and specifications of polysilicon too critical to compromise on standards.

Incomplete Offers

The department of electronics also got incomplete offers from some other parties. They did not own any manufacturing unit nor had they set up any polysilicon plant anywhere in the world. These were mostly one man or a group of consultants offering technology transfers based only on their working experience.

An unproven and discarded pilot plant (which failed to result into a commercial plant) on "as is where is" basis, without any guarantee whatsoever, was also offered to an Indian private sector party and the department was asked to consider the proposal seriously.

All such offers were incomplete with regard to the process know-how and know-why, guarantees on product specifications, material and utility consumption and plant capacity, training of manpower and cost estimates. All these offers lacked the minimum required credibility and therefore, were not seriously considered.

The technical experts hunting for the right technology also examined the commercial polysilicon plant using silane--that of Komatsu of Japan whose plant capacity is 60 tonnes per annum. A detailed technical collaboration offer was indeed considered by the negotiating committee but it was found that the process would be much costlier than the one based on the trichlorosilane process for which there were other offers.

Basic Feedstock

Union Carbide is working on another process beginning from the basic feedstock of trichlorosilane which is then converted to silane. After some setbacks, the company has made progress but even if its commercial plant is successful, trichlorosilane will still remain the basic feedstock for commercial polysilicon production for all, except one, manufacturers in the world. This should

allay the fears of early obsolescence of the proposed technology for the national silicon facility.

About 98 per cent of the world production of polysilicon is based on this trichlorosilane process, originally developed by Siemens of West Germany. It is significant that the top three producers--Wacker, Hemlock and Smiel of Italy--have either expanded or are in the process of expanding their capacities using the same basic technology.

The Hemlock offer, as Parliament was informed by the government, met the silicon requirements, including those in more sensitive areas. The collaboration offer also included guarantees regarding costs, capacity and quality and a commitment to transfer improvements in technology in the U.S. plant to ensure that technology does not remain static here.

Negotiating Panel

Seventy per cent of the plant equipment is to be manufactured in the country, thus minimising the outgo of foreign exchange. Drawings will be given of the 30 per cent proprietary equipment to enable any future expansion.

The negotiating committee took note of the fact that Hemlock is supplying a whole range of polysilicon--from that needed for solar photovoltaic cells to those required for power devices and LSI and VLSI chips.

The recommendations of the negotiating committee headed by Mr. V. Mohan, chairman and managing director of Semiconductor Complex Ltd., were unanimous. The committee includes Mr. V. K. Beri, chairman and managing director of Engineers India Ltd., Dr. T. K. Bhattacharya, head of the solar photovoltaic programme in Central Electronics Ltd., Dr. N. S. K. Prasad, head of the silicon division of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (who incidentally is known as Mr. Silicon), Mr. S. B. Seth, EIL's project manager for the national silicon facility, a financial expert and Dr. S. G. Patil of the department of electronics. The committee was assisted by some six financial, legal and technical experts of EIL during negotiations.

CSO: 4600/1338

IRAN

PAPER COMMENTS ON IRAN, LIBYA, SYRIA ALLIANCE AGAINST ZIONISM

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 29 Jan 85 pp 1, 12

[Text] In the Name of the Merciful, the Compassionate
The talks between the foreign ministers of the three countries of Iran, Syria and Libya, which was the most significant event in our country during the first days of the current week, caused an extensive reaction in the region's countries and also attracted the attention of the world's political circles. These discussions, that were held in order to follow up the decisions adopted in the talks between our country's president and the heads of the regions' progressive countries based on the necessity of the greatest possible solidarity between the progressive Muslim countries for the earnest struggle against the enemies of the Muslim nations, particularly Israel, and also the necessity of cultural cooperation between these countries, can be considered another step towards helping solve the problems of the Islamic world.

The foreign ministers from Syria and Libya had meetings with the president, the speaker of the Majlis and the prime minister during their stay in Tehran. In all of these meetings officials of the Islamic republic stressed the necessity of joint efforts in order to confront the plots by the enemies of the region's nations, particularly those of international Zionism. In the meetings Hojjat ol-Eslam va ol-Moslemin Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Majlis, made a point that can serve as very interesting guidance in an analysis of the week's issues. In the meeting he said: "The depth of the friendship and cooperation between Iran, Libya and Syria has engendered the rage of the arrogant and Zionist forces".

The very subtle point connected with the statement by the speaker of the Majlis is that Zionism is terrified by the unity of the Islamic countries and the solidarity of the Muslim nations and considers them lethal poison to its existence. In parallel with this, the Zionists have always felt joy over the division in the Islamic world and have made and are making the greatest possible use out of it. The extreme sensitivity of the news agencies of the regime occupying Jerusalem concerning the visit of Hojjat ol-Eslam va ol-Moslemin Khamene'i to Syria, Libya and Algeria is an indicator of this reality that the Zionists and their allies are frightened of and cannot tolerate any step taken towards the solidarity of the Muslim nations. Therefore it is natural, as the speaker of the Majlis said, that the depth of the friendship and cooperation between Iran, Libya and Syria has engendered the rage of the arrogant and Zionist forces.

Muslims must be aware of the bitter truth that the advance of the regime occupying Jerusalem in seizing Palestine and the fact that this illegal racist regime can continue its existence in the heart of the Islamic countries is in no way due to the strength of Zionism but instead purely the result of the weakness in the Islamic world. That which is taking place in the south of Lebanon these days can prove the truth of this claim.

The revolutionary Muslims in southern Lebanon, while they are surrounded on two sides by the bloodthirsty Israeli and Phalangist armies, have been able to make the regime occupying Jerusalem retreat from the south of Lebanon. This extraordinary historical truth shows that the Muslim nations, through cooperation and coordination, stand up against all the arrogant powers and cause them to surrender.

The world's current situation is such that all the military equipment of the satanic powers can be put out of action by the strong, iron will of the nations and that the course of history can be altered. The transformations which occurred in the world as a result of the victory of the Islamic revolution more than anything else shattered the spirit and will of the satanic powers led by the great satan, the world-devouring United States. The Islamic countries must make the greatest possible use of these conditions and not lose any opportunity to transform the great Muslim force into a true power to suppress the enemies of Islam.

9597

CSO: 4640/369

IRAN

LIBYAN MINISTER LAUDS IRAN AS SOLE SUPPORTER OF ISLAMIC STATES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 29 Jan 85 p 3

[Text] The Secretary of the People's Committee of the Libyan Foreign Liaison Office left Tehran yesterday morning, seen off by Dr Velayati, our country's minister of foreign affairs. The secretary had stayed three days in Tehran and participated in the trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers from Iran, Syria and Libya.

In an interview as he was leaving Tehran, 'Ali 'Abd al-Salamal-Turayki called this meeting completely successful and said: The three countries of Iran, Syria, and Libya are drawing together a shared and united line of struggle, and the views of all three countries are in harmony on Islamic and international issues.

At the time of the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Syria and Libya realized that this revolution is their good ally and support in the liberation of the occupied Arab and Islamic lands, and that it is their companion in the struggles against imperialism and Zionism.

He added: During the shah's time Libya had no tie with the regime. Now however, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the only true support for the progressive Islamic Arab states.

'Abd al-Salamal-Turayki then described plots of imperialism-Zionism and the reactionary countries against the progressive countries. While expressing his appreciation of the positions and efforts of the Islamic republic he said: From the beginning of the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran our solidarity with this revolution expanded in every area.

Support for Lebanon's people due to the shameful agreements that were imposed on them and the defeat handed U.S. imperialism and the multi-national force encouraged us to greater coordination.

'Abd al-Salamal-Turayki added: During the past several days we were able to examine interesting problems and not only did we come to a unified analysis of our shared problems but we were also able to adopt united decisions. We have joint positions on issues of the Arab and Islamic worlds.

This meeting also gave us the opportunity to reach agreements on bilateral issues and technical cooperation. He also said: I have no doubt that what we can accomplish and the victory that we can attain will encourage other brothers having the same orientation to join us.

"Abd al-Salamal-Turayki then expressed hope for the continuation of these contacts and stated: I hope that these contacts will continue not only at the level of foreign ministers but at other levels. We agreed to hold these meetings on a regular basis in our countries and also to meet during international conferences so that we can expand the dimension of this cooperation.

He then said: I am sure that the plots that are being planned against us and the Palestinian people are new Camp Davids. This can be sensed from the plots that are being planned against the Islamic countries of Iran, Syria and Libya. I believe that the defeat of imperialism was due to the resistance and strength that our nations showed. We not only possess the support of our million-strong nations, but we also hold the responsibility of representing the world's millions of Muslim people who want to rise up against systems that are reactionary and affiliated with imperialism.

Dr Turayki said: We should not suppose that the enemy is weak. Even though they suffer a defeat they continue their effort. We should not fear pressure, because victory is ours.

Our cooperation has a positive effect on the coordination of our countries and it gives us a chance to fight against the hostility directed against our nations and the Islamic Arab nations.

As Dr Velayati, the minister of foreign affairs, saw the Libyan foreign minister off, he commented on the trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran, Syria, and Libya, and stated: In light of the discussions that Hojjat ol-Eslam va ol-Moslemin Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, the president, had with authorities from the three countries of Syria, Libya and Algeria during his trip, it was decided to actualize the decisions that had been made. To this end meetings were held with the foreign ministers of Iran, Syria, Libya, and Algeria during the annual sessions of the U.N. General Assembly. Deputy foreign ministers also held a meeting in Tripoli. Useful meetings were also held with the foreign ministers of Iran, Syria, Libya, Algeria, and Democratic Yemen during the spare time of the conference of foreign ministers from the Islamic countries held in Sana'a.

He added: The effect of these meetings was noticable in the form of joint cooperation in the Islamic conference, and the enemies were not able to make any headway against the unity between the Muslim and progressive countries in the conference. Through the cooperation of these countries useful plans were approved in the Islamic conference.

He then said: After preparations were made it was decided to hold a meeting of the foreign ministers in Tehran, and this was done. We had complete understanding in this area. Sessions were also held at the level of experts and the results of their work were proposed to the aforementioned meeting and approved.

Dr Velayati added: Iran, Syria, and Libya have joint and close positions against the common enemy, meaning imperialism and Zionism and reactionism.

We are hopeful that in the future, through the efforts taking place, other progressive countries such as Algeria and Democratic Yemen will take their place at our sides.

Concerning the topics discussed in the meeting of the foreign ministers from the three countries, the foreign minister said: The situation in the region and the rapid transformations occurring convince us that we need to take a serious attitude in order to jointly confront the developments against the interests of Muslims and Islam. This means that we must line up all the potential forces of the Islamic countries.

As he continued his speech the minister of foreign affairs expressed hope: The movement that has begun will gain a broader dimension in the future. He said: God willing, other Muslim countries will join us when they see the effects of the cooperation of these several countries, and will join our ranks in the struggle that the enemy is making against Islam and Muslims.

He then pointed to the plots and problems that the struggling, progressive and Muslim countries are facing, and said: The main goal in holding such a meeting is closer cooperation between the progressive Islamic countries in order to confront Zionism.

Concerning the results of the meeting of the foreign ministers from Iran, Libya and Syria, Dr Velayati said: Very positive results came out of this meeting. We hope that in the future these meetings will continue at higher levels and on a broader dimension and that the decisions of the meeting will be put into effect.

Concerning the recent joint plot of Sudan and the regime occupying Jerusalem, the minister of foreign affairs said: In my opinion this was a U.S. and Israeli plot that took place due to Sudan's affiliation with imperialism.

The Sudan regime accepted the Camp David treaty from the beginning and it is not unexpected that such a regime would commit such non-Islamic acts. Iran, along with Syria and Libya, has confronted this plot. We sent a joint letter to the general secretary of the Islamic conference requesting that he intervene in this matter and that he persuade the Sudan regime to implement the resolutions of the Islamic conference. These resolutions stipulate that Islamic countries must refrain from any sort of help to the aggressor Israeli regime or any action that would strengthen that regime. The Sudanese regime has departed from these resolutions.

In this regard Libya has also requested holding a conference of Arab countries.

IRAN

RAFSANJANI OUTLINES TACTICS FOR IRNA OFFICIALS SERVING ABROAD

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 12 Jan 85 p 12

[Text] IRNA representatives serving abroad attending a coordination seminar in Tehran met yesterday afternoon with Hojjat ol-Eslam val Moslemin Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the speaker of the Majlis. In this meeting the speaker of the Majlis said in a lengthy speech: "One thing which is invisible to the public but perceived by some special and clever people is the domination of the news media by the superpowers and most of the western world. The public is usually unaware of how they are besieged by these powers. Therefore when they become aware of this domination anywhere in the world they start to fight against it. The western world has acquired different monopolies and power in order to strengthen its domination and has not just acquired this domination by accident. Many powerful minds have worked hard and have identified all the sensitive parts of the world in every dimension and have occupied them. Some domination is more or less felt by the people and has more or less been challenged by the people but some domination is invisible and that is the dangerous kind because it is military domination the air, land and sea bases of the enemy will eventually be discovered by the people. If the domination is economic, it will be indicated through poverty and the differences between the deprived and the wealthy and can be very well felt by the people. Sometimes the domination is economic meaning that a power's representative or agent who always makes unreasonable demands in a country establishes domination. For example, the domestic proteges of the colonialists in some parts of the world have become rulers. The stand of these people will finally become apparent. But this is the power and domination of the western news media which is working invisibly and is not felt by the people. The newspaper publishers and those involved with news agencies, politicians and researchers feel this fact very well but ordinary people cannot realize these tricks and once they become aware that some news has caused their defeat or some other news has lead them to victory, they realize they have not paid attention to the origin of this news."

According to IRNA, Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani then referred to the point that one very difficult task is confronting western colonialization and challenging the unjustified demanders in the news campaign which is very deep and perennial and he said: "Mobilizing the people to confront this domination is very difficult. The news media of imperialism has placed people under calculated and planned bombardment and corrupts their thoughts. Any means to acquaint

the world's people with the facts by healthy forces will be annihilated by the imperialist's news media beforehand. We have to confess here that you who are involved with IRNA have a very heavy duty. Your enemy has profited from using the best equipment and experience to collect news from all over the world in the least time and wire it to their news centers. Then in a special section this news is analyzed rapidly and in a short time is echoed throughout the world. The event will be fed to the people in favor of imperialism and world oppression and they use its political effects on their behalf. For example, if they decide to crush a world event they attack it under a shower of opposition and millions of the world's news agencies telex this throughout the world. After the false news has formed in the people's mind, some might realize the reality of the event once it is all over but then it is not easy to change people's minds and make them aware of reality. The news dispatched from the economic wires of the imperialistic news media in the markets and international stock exchanges helps them derive enormous profit while the opposite side sustains innumerable losses."

The speaker of the Majlis then referred to the fact that the duty of the independent and notable news agencies is to fight the imperialist's news media and added: "We are aware that the small news agencies are not present everywhere in order to neutralize the maliciousness of the imperialist's news media. You saw how the news agencies underestimated the tragic incident of the Indian chemical plant which caused hundreds of deaths and invalids and injured many people. The issue was only hot for the first two or three days when it could be advantageous. It was the news agencies which immediately neutralized the heat of the news. The tragic event of Ethiopia and the tragic death of thousands of innocent people who are the victims of oppressive policies was a big issue too. The news agencies due to their frequent travelling in that area were aware of the events but they remained silent. The only time they broke their silence was when they realized it would be favorable propaganda for Israel's so-called humanitarian spirit and to protect this country, the world Jews and receive offerings from them. At the same time they covered the ugly dimension of this issue; gradually everything will be clear to the people but then it will be too late. When the facts are clear, the issue has become old and fresh news will replace old. You notice how the imperialistic news agencies through careful planning use ordinary world events for their expansionist interests and to crush the opposition and charm the people."

The imam's representative on the supreme defense council said: "You must never be disappointed in the fight against the news media of imperialism. Therefore you must create the necessary groundwork. The small news agencies of the third world must be united and through proper planning and calculation clear the minds of the people and make them suspicious of the world oppressor's news agencies. We must teach the people to be doubtful about the news of the world news agencies and place a question mark in front of the news. Then we can bring the facts to these people. Even to collect the contradictory news and lies and show them to the people brings them closer to the facts. For example note how the war news distributed by the imperialistic news agencies is malicious and to their advantage. Up to the day that they thought Saddam could not be defeated, the news indicated that everything was coming to an end,

but since they realized that Iran is not going to be defeated, they changed the course of the news and paraded Saddam as being peace-loving and benevolent. The enemy was defeated in the battle ground and now is sitting behind the false entrenchment of humanitarianism and peace offering. Even America, Great Britain, France and the USSR whose hands are weltering in the world's nations blood, pretend to be peace-loving and even try to induce the martyr nurturing and martyr givers, people who have suffered from war, that they are for peace and Iran wants war. They expect that when Saddam, with all his criminal acts, now talks peace that he be praised and given a medal. One supposes he has defended the Arab dynasty.

"Pay attention to another struggle of imperialistic news. It is a long time that they say Iran wants to start its aggression again or that Iran will attack from another spot very soon and with this news they create anxiety in the world and under the auspices of this anxiety they give a chance to Iraq to attack ships in the Persian Gulf and confront opposition brutally within its country and cover its other crimes. This act of news imperialism causes the tyrant to be indistinguishable from the oppressed. You have witnessed all the hardship and suffering they have caused for the Afghan nation and on the other hand they call these brave fighters terrorists. The question of Lebanon is another criminal case of imperialistic news. The people of Lebanon, especially the deprived and Lebannese Shiites who are the majority, have been living in blood for years. Those who are fighting today with the Zionist regime and its supporters are used to the sound of gun squalls and tanks. In spite of that, the imperialistic news calls the aggressor, criminal Phalangists, peace-loving and civilized. No one can deny the aggressive nature of Israel. All these beastly crimes of Israel against the people of Lebanon and Palestine is a shameful stain on human reputation and will never be erased. If the news agencies considered revealing the criminal visage of Israel they could do so but on the contrary they introduce Palestinians as terrorists. Does this mean that the poor person who has lived for a decade in camps and has placed the slogan 'we will return' above his tent and has become old with this slogan is a terrorist and that Israel is civilized?"

Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani at the conclusion of his talk added: "Our nation knows the names of all these news agencies, since the names of the imperialistic news agencies have been repeated in the mass media. All the people are familiar with the names REUTER, AP, UPI, etc. Therefore we must make the people aware of looking at their news with hesitation and trying to distinguish the facts, and definitely the facts will be placed at their disposal. We have to use our efforts through the issuance of healthy and real news to mobilize the world's thoughts in favor of the deprived and oppressed and against the oppressors."

9815

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18 March 1985

IRAN

EMIGRE PAPER: NATION WILL NOT TOLERATE 'ANOTHER RELIGIOUS RULE'

Paris NEHZAT in Persian 22 Jan 85 pp 1, 4, 12

[Paris NEHZAT in Persian; weekly organ of the Iran National Resistance Movement]

[Text] "After the subsiding of the ruckus of the bankrupt tricksters who claimed to have established a new religious government under the deceptive label of 'democratic,' now some inside and outside Iran insist that a new Islamic government must be sought from within the present tyrannical and corrupt government . . . Let me be more clear: From the bowels of the present clerical government, another clerical government must be born.

"Internally, there is talk of the 'first movement' and the 'second movement' of the revolution:

"As if the first movement was correct, logical and based on Islamic justice, and deviation began later. This is precisely the mistake. Since the beginning, the leader, guide and iconoclast has been the same vile element who founded the first movement." What you have read is another point worthy of contemplation from the radio message of Shapur Bakhtiar on 6 January, which is our topic for this week. Stating the above, Bakhtiar exposes a sinister plan whose aim is nothing but the continuation of the religious government and making chronic the illness of the clerical rule, and warns the Iranian nation of this issue. This discussion might not be new to our people, who, in the course of six years of clerical rule, have suffered and been victims of calamity from the deadly poison of this seven-headed dragon, but perhaps on an abstract and very general level, a reminder, even though repetitive, is necessary, due to the nature of the sectarian government. A sect rather than religion in the position of rule is the imposer of obligatory injunctions, which by nature has a divine and heavenly source and, therefore, does not accept any sort of conformity with historical changes and their effects in its injunctions, except by the decree of such-and-such a religious jurist. As a result, from every

direction, the ways are closed to the people to participate in forming their own destiny. It is obvious that this inherent characteristic can never be in agreement with the principle of national rule, which would refer any kind of decision concerning the affairs of the society to the will of the people. For this reason, it is very simple that in our opinion, the addition of the adjective "democratic" to a sectarian government such as the Islamic Republic is like speaking of "bright darkness." And that is why the leader of the Iran National Resistance movement and all those who are of his opinion, insist on national rule and democracy and envision for the future of Iran a picture of no government less than one which guards basic freedoms and materializes the principle of separation of religion and politics. Also, it is with consideration for precisely this point that Shapur Bakhtiar addresses the Iranian nation in a decisive and brief phrase:

"Send the cleric to the mosque!" He thus proposes and anticipates the establishment of a "secular" governing regime.

On the other hand, the sinister rumor is being passed from mouth to mouth that apparently the "West" does not wish too much time to lapse before the void is filled by a replacement after the fall of the regime of Khomeyni, lest Iran come to suffer chaos and turbulence similar to that in Lebanon or for civil war to flare up in our country. It is on the basis of this weak and baseless logic that they want to fabricate foreign political support for a "moderate clerical government." In this connection, we must repeat again and again that what determines the fate of nations, more than any other factor, is their will. If a nation desires, wills and rises up to achieve its fate, it would be the foreign policies that would have to conform their expectations to the will of the nation in order to preserve their interests. Once and for all, the Iranian nation must forget the idea that others make plans for it, conspire against it, and bring plans to reality for it, a nation that has frequently imposed its iron will on the strongest of powers in the world and has witnessed the kneeling of the superpowers before empty-handed and weak but uprisen and determined nations.

Let us return to the main subject. In this part of his message, Shapur Bakhtiar discusses the public-duping logic of the supporters of a moderate Islamic government, and as an example of such tendencies, refers to the statements and efforts of Mehdi Bazargan, one of the leaders of the theory of Islamic democratic government (or bright darkness) and to his recent book. Emphasizing that both in the "first movement" and the "second movement" of the Islamic revolution, the "unquestioned, shrewd and wise leader of the revolution" and "founder" of the sinister Islamic Republic, the destroyer of Iran, the leader of reactionism and the sworn enemy of the Iranian nation and

nationality, has been Ayatollah Khomeyni, Mehdi Bazargan questions: How can the people be deceived by sophistry and inculcate in themselves the idea that at one time the Ayatollah, in one movement, is a manifestation of mercy, freedom, independence, and iconoclasm, the angel of the liberation of the people, and a source of nationalism, and another time, in a period of less than one year, in the "second movement," the same praiseworthy hero becomes the cause of the movement away from the central government and the destroyer of the "fruits of the magnificent revolution"?

And based on Mr Bazargan's notorious book, we clarify this public-duping sophistry. The honorable Bazargan, after giving a history of the "Islamic revolution," discusses the interviews of the imam and writes:

"These interviews, which were for the most part arranged and translated by Dr Yazdi, were very effective in presenting the national Islamic movement of Iran and the personality of Imam Khomeyni to the world, especially since he revealed the injustice and corruption of the shah, emphasized freedom and democracy, and presented the Islamic government as a just, free, progressive, democratic and ideal human government."

In a note, he also points out:

"In most of his announcements and interviews, the imam mentioned the word freedom before independence."

The quotations and notes of the book are generally of this kind. Here we do not intend to respond to every point, but by providing an example of Mr Bazargan's so-called reasoning, we are trying to clarify that he wants to imply:

The imam pulled the wool over everybody's eyes and we were also deceived.

In response to this unlikely excuse, we say: It is possible for an inexperienced, calamity-stricken and discontent nation to believe and be deceived by an imagined understanding of a luminous cleric who wants to save a nation and who at the end of his life seeks refuge in the sanctuary of her holiness Ma'sumeh, but such is not acceptable from a political figure such as Mr Bazargan, who has a history of decades of struggle and imprisonment and who is the founder of the "freedom movement" and a standard bearer of nationalism, especially in a sensitive period of history when the burden of responsibility, or as he puts it, the "moral obligation," is on the shoulders of the national leaders and the prominent social personalities. How is it that Mr Bazargan has completely ignored the most pedestrian written works of the Ayatollah, which reveal his political ideas?

Khomeyni has offered his understanding of the world in two volumes: "Islamic Government," a collection of his lecture notes, published in Arabic in Najaf in 1970; and "Khomeyni and His Movement," (including) his speeches, published in 1975 in Persian. The main contents of both books are the same. "The Ministry of Justice of the government (meaning the government of the shah), in order to implement its intentions, abolished the requirements for the judges to be male and Muslim and has shown its opposition to the text of the Islamic injunctions . . . We want a king who would cut off the hand of a son who commits theft and would flog and stone his closest relatives if they commit adultery . . . If a just cleric is given the responsibility to carry out religious punishments . . . would he do other than what was practiced at the time of the Prophet? Did the Prophet punish the person guilty of adultery with more than 100 lashes? Could a cleric reduce punishment and create a difference between his actions and those of the Prophet? Of course not! The king . . . is nothing but an executor of God's injunctions and laws."

Yes, there are the written words of Ayatollah Khomeyni, which we have quoted from the book entitled "Retreat," written by Michael (Lehdin) and William (Lewis), translated by Mr Ahmad Sami'i-Gilani, and the above-mentioned writers have quoted from an article by (Mishel Lehdin) entitled, "Khomeyni's Divine Vision," dated January 1979, in the WALL STREET JOURNAL.

As a responsible and morally obligated leader of the Iranian nation, should Mr Bazargan not have read, at least once, the book "Religious Guardianship" and "A Letter to the Kashef al-Ghta" of his revered leader before dragging a nation into fire and turning a country to ruins, ruins which, according to the estimates of technical experts, resulted in damages amounting to \$133 billion by the end of 1982 alone, with more than 500,000 of its young people having died for the desire to conquer Karbala and export Khomeyni's Islamic revolution?

Mr Bazargan can no longer hide behind the sophistry that the deceptive statements of the "sire" in Neuphle-le-Chateau, who continuously spoke of freedom and everywhere mentioned "freedom before independence," worked on the old, experienced politicians until they became deaf and mute.

With the responsibility, "a religious duty," that he accepted as head of the transitional government of Imam Khomeyni's revolution, when so much blood was spilled, so many tragedies occurred and the galloping of the Hezbollah stifled any breath remaining in throats, when His Honor whitewashed all the tragedies by repeating humorous Molla Nasreddin stories, Mr Bazargan cannot pretend to be ignorant and uninformed and thereby try to exonerate himself.

In short, Mr Bazargan and those misguided supporters of a "moderate Islamic government" will never be able to be standard bearers for an "Islamic" democratic government, to propagate their "bright darkness" and to drag the people from the filthy muck of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic into the cesspool of a sectarian, so-called moderate democratic regime.

Our inexperienced people once ignored Bakhtiar's advice during his 37-day premiership, and were misguided with the charm of the imam and Your Excellency's approval, Mr Bazargan. But this time, after the lesson they have learned from the six years of clerical rule, they will not take any path but the one Bakhtiar reveals. You can be sure!

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IRAN

PROGRAMS FOR INCREASING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS OUTLINED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 30 Jan 85 p 4

[Interview with Minister of Agriculture Dr 'Abbas 'Ali Zali by the press on 29 Jan 85; place not specified]

[Text] On the threshold of the anniversary of the Islamic revolution, Dr Zali, the minister of agriculture, explained the results and operation of the Ministry of Agriculture this year in a press interview yesterday morning.

Dr Zali offered his congratulations on the coming of 11 February and first, concerning the major agricultural issues of this year, he said: The Ministry of Agriculture has followed up its work in all the agricultural areas for this year and the previous years; it has taken steps to eliminate the problems regarding essential products. The results have been very good and next year, it is hoped we will have even better results.

Cultivation of Cotton and Wheat

Concerning the cultivation of cotton, he said: Our activities in this connection consist of the preparation and procurement of seeds and fertilizer and cooperation with farmers to eliminate pests and diseases and help farmers in the area of economizing and low cost cultivation.

In connection with the cultivation of wheat, he added: Last year, due to the drought in many provinces, there was no harvest. But with the precipitation after the new year, we think the level of production has been no less than it was the previous year. With the incentives that the government has created for the sale of the surplus wheat of the farmers to the government, this year, a great deal of wheat has been purchased from the farmers. Of course, in connection with the distribution procedures for prizes, since this was the first year such a plan has been implemented, there are problems which will be eliminated next year.

Cultivation of High Yield Rice

Concerning rice and cotton, Dr Zali explained: In this connection, the government carried out its duties to the limits possible, despite the problems which occurred for the farmers, due for the most part to the sale of cotton and the high yield rice figures. Of course, we utilized all of our energy to eliminate these problems. Nevertheless, these problems may not have been solved in time and the farmers may have suffered some losses in this connection. We have determined ways to resolve the problems, which will be announced later.

Concerning sugar beets, unfortunately, there were problems and we had some decrease in cultivation. Of course, since the level of output had increased, production did not decrease very much compared to the previous year. This issue was discussed in the Economic Council and with a plan which is being studied, next year the problem will be eliminated and these two products (cotton and beets) will be insured in the two provinces.

Fodder Imports

Dr Zali then spoke on the issue of fodder and said: One of our problems is that every year we must import fodder. But the Ministry of Agriculture has tried to expand the cultivation of fodder as much as possible and to support the farmers in developing cultivation.

Also, in regards to the revitalization of pastures, some good programs have been planned. In addition, we have been pursuing the cultivation of fodder. Much work has been done on corn and clover. The cultivation of alfalfa and other such fodders is also being developed.

In regards to pastures, the directions are hopeful for us. In Khuzestan, Hormozgan, Gorgan and Gonbad, we have had good examples of cooperation with the people in the revitalization and expansion of pastures.

In Khuzestan, in an 8,000-hectare area, we have started a new plant, wild millet, in the pastures. Certain steps have also been taken to preserve soil moisture and the precipitation reserves.

Also, in a plan which has begun to change low-yield dry farmland into fodder cultivation, we have been successful.

These tasks have begun on an experimental level with the help of the people and even the combatants on the front and it is hoped that fodder needed for the livestock in the country will be provided in this manner.

Fisheries and Their Problems

In regards to the problems of fisheries, the Minister of Agriculture said: What is at issue in the public mind is that the Ministry of Agriculture is able to do everything. This is not true at all and we are trying to make use of the fishermen and the private sector as much as possible to increase production. The information that has reached me from the fisheries shows that the problem is not that the fisheries or Ministry of Agriculture are in charge of everything. Of course, the government has a monopoly on sturgeon, but in regards to other fish, the people and the fishermen are active at the present in the north and the south.

The Ministry of Agriculture is prepared to grant work licenses to the private sector in the area of fishing. At the present, of the existing 5,000 floaters in the south, only 150 are those of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the rest belong to the private sector and the fishermen.

If the private sector wishes to cooperate in this area, we will provide the grounds for it and we hope to be successful in this task. But the problem that we have in this connection is the problem of piers and shelters for ships, which are presently in short supply.

In this area, we have had discussions with the brother governors general to carry out these tasks well, with the help of the people, the fishermen's cooperatives of the fisheries and the Reconstruction Crusade, in order for the grounds to be prepared for the activities of the fishermen and the private sector.

Agricultural Development and Training

Concerning the problems of agricultural development and training, Dr Zali said: The work which was done in regards to the cultivation of wheat and other items was mostly developmental and we have planned to be more active than ever before in this regard. In a seminar which was held in Karaj in this connection, we announced that agricultural training and developmental activities will be announced next year, if possible, and we have also had discussions with the Voice and Vision involving their cooperation.

In response to a question concerning the separation of the duties of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Reconstruction Crusade, he said: The details of the issues which we are not studying and making decisions about will be announced later. But Article 1 of the proposal for the separation of duties has clarified the situation. In other words, we believe that, given the existing

situation in regards to agricultural problems, we will be able to and must make use of all the forces.

Concerning the level of production of essential products this year, the minister of agriculture said: In connection with wheat, despite the existing drought this year, we believe that production has been at the level of last year, between 5.5-6 million tons. Of this amount, 1.2 million tons were purchased by the government and the increase is related to the prizes.

In connection with cotton, fortunately, this year, with the activities of farmers and the help of the government, the level of this product has also been at the level of last year. This year's cotton production is about 350,000 tons, which yields about 100,000 tons of carded cotton and provides for the needs of the country. The problem that we had this year was the excessive import of man-made fibers, which reduced the market for cotton.

Next year, the increase in production will enable us to export some of the produced cotton. At present, Bulgaria, Hungary and Brazil have expressed interest in purchasing it, and since there has been organization regarding the export of cotton, we hope that by next year, with the export of cotton and control over the import of fibers, we will have good customers for cotton domestically.

We have proposed that the government set a guaranteed prize for every essential product during the period 23 September-22 October and for the government to pay the difference if the prize drops lower than the guaranteed prize. In this manner, we will not see the shortage of one product and a surplus of another and the farmer can also be certain about his work.

Concerning rice, he added: With the positive response of the farmers to the high yield harvest plan, we have had a production increase. Of this increase, 75,000 tons of this increase concerns the cultivation of Amol 2 and Amol 3 [rice]. We believe that in regards to rice, we must move towards operational and output increases and avoid expanding the area under cultivation. Also, the amount of our rice production during the period 21 March 1984-20 March 1985 is about 1.1 million tons.

We faced problems concerning beets this year. Last year, we delivered 3.5 million tons of beets to the factories and this year 3.3 million tons. One of the problems concerns mechanization. The Economic Council approved the allocation of 0.7 rials of the price of every kilo of sugar to mechanization.

Another problem is insurance on beets. At the present, the beets for Khorasan, which is the largest center for beet production, will be insured. Of course, the major problem in regards to

beets is the problem of mechanization, which we are trying to eliminate.

In conclusion, referring to the increase in production of other items, such as onions, potatoes, fruits, and the like, in regards to the research budget of the Ministry of Agriculture, he said: With the attention of the government to agriculture, this year we have a good research budget and our funds have improved compared to last year.

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IRAN

CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL TO EXPAND PRODUCTION IN GULF

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 3 Feb 85 p 4

[Text] Economic service. Yesterday, in a press conference, Engineer Aqa'i, the managing director of the Continental Shelf Oil Company, and two members of the board of directors, Engineer Al-e Aqa and Engineer Najafi, explained the establishment of Continental Shelf Oil and its operation during the war years and responded to the various questions of reporters.

First, concerning the duties of the company, Engineer Aqa'i, the managing director of Continental Shelf Oil Company, said:

Iranian Continental Shelf Oil production is a subsidiary company of the Iranian National Oil Company, which is responsible for extraction, planning and supervision of the drilling operations as well as the implementation of all developmental projects within the oil regions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf.

Concerning the formation of the Continental Shelf Oil Company, he said:

Before the victory of the Islamic revolution, production and extraction activities in the oil regions of the Persian Gulf were carried out by several large companies, mostly American and some French and Italian.

After the victory of the Islamic revolution and on the basis of the ratification of the Revolution Council, the activities of the companies under contract and that group of companies whose contracts were contrary to the oil nationalization law were stopped. Following this decision, the Iranian Continental Shelf Oil Company was formed by combining "Ayik," "(Lapco)," "Imenco," "Sufiran," and "Siri" companies.

The Iranian Continental Shelf Oil Company is, in fact, the largest offshore production and extraction company in the world, which began its activities one month before the war started.

The areas of activity of the company in the Persian Gulf consist of

"Behregan," "Kharg," "Lavan" and "Siri."

The "Behregan" region has three oil zones, "Kharg" has four zones, "Lavan" has three offshore oil zones, and the "Siri" region has two oil zones.

Engineer Aqa'i added:

Before the war started, almost all of these oil regions were operational. However, after the war started, due to the locations of these oil regions, particularly "Behregan" and "Kharg" in the war zone, production and operation in them stopped.

Joint Oil Zones

Then, concerning the joint oil zones, Engineer Aqa'i said:

We have joint oil zones with our southern neighbors in the Persian Gulf. These zones include:

The joint Foruzan zone, with Saudi Arabia, in the Kharg area.

The joint Salman zone, with Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates, in the Lavan area.

The joint Nosrat zone, with Dubai, in the Siri zone. These are the major joint oil zones in the Persian Gulf, in which both we and our partners are actively working. It should be pointed out that on the basis of the scheduled priorities and the duties conferred on the company, production in these fields is of special importance and priority for us.

Although since the war we have not been operating six offshore oil zones (non-joint zones) due to the war conditions, in the other areas under the control of the company, we have constant activity, and these activities have shown an increasing trend in the course of the years since the war began.

Engineer Aqa'i added: In the joint oil region of Foruzan in the Kharg area, we began production and operation 17 months after the start of the imposed war, and this region practically began production from mid-winter of 1982.

On the whole, during the period 21 March 1983-20 March 1984, considering the increasing production trend in the Persian Gulf oil regions, we had an increase of about 9.1 percent compared to the period 21 March 1980-20 March 1981, an increase of about 17.6

percent compared to the period 21 March 1981-20 March 1982 and an increase of 5.6 percent compared to the period 21 March 1982-20 March 1983.

During the period 21 March 1983-20 March 1984, drilling, developmental and repair activities began on the oil wells of the Foruzan area. Thus far, 5 developmental wells have been dug in this area and repairs have been carried out on another 15 wells. Together, these steps have resulted in a production increase of 50 percent in the region compared to the previous year.

Among other important steps taken in this region is the designing, planning and construction of a new platform, which has been carried out by the employees of the engineering division of the Continental Shelf Oil Company. This project has been carried out for the first time since the victory of the Islamic revolution.

Operations Carried Out by the Employees of the Company

Explaining the efforts of the employees of the company in the area of self-sufficiency, Engineer Aqa'i said: In the second half of last year, during the period 23 October-21 November, we encountered a severe eruption while drilling on 1 of the wells in the Foruzan area, from which a daily amount of 40 million cubic feet of natural gas was jetted out, creating a very dangerous situation. Since the drilling equipment was also on the well and the platform, we had to harness the well very quickly, and with planning. Fortunately, with the persistent round-the-clock efforts of employees under the supervision and operational guidance of the Continental Shelf Oil Company, the well was harnessed in 21 days.

Concerning the Salman joint oil field with Abu Dhabi, Engineer Aqa'i said:

Despite the imposed war, we have carried out essential and expansive work on this field, some of which has been completed and has resulted in a significant increase in production. Among these steps, we have engaged in drilling 6 wells, acid work on the existing wells, and reconstruction and essential repair work on the compressors of the gas driving system after 13 years. We built the water injection and gas drying system in this area, and the installation of desalination equipment is underway.

In the Lavan oil region also, the installation of storages for newly produced oil has begun. We have also carried out important projects concerning the Nosrat joint oil field with Dubai. Among these is a project which began in 1983 and was completed on 29 August 1984, in which we installed a completed operational platform on the Iranian side. With the installation of this

platform, we are able to have production and operation of six wells.

Another step was the purchase of very modern drilling equipment with a very complicated system from non-U.S., Japanese, sources, which was named martyr Raja'i drilling equipment and was installed in the Nosrat field. With this equipment, in the future, we will be able to quickly start the exploratory drilling in this field.

Operational Methods

Continuing his statements concerning the operational methods in the Persian Gulf oil regions in the past and today, the managing director of Continental Shelf Oil Company said:

Before the revolution, foreign companies were in charge of drilling and production on the Iranian continental shelf and about 30-40 service companies were also in charge of provisional and service affairs. Hence, even works such as the repair of turbines, measuring of the pressure of the wells, testing of the wells, and so on, were carried out by foreign companies and the whole system of management and decision-making belonged to their main expert cadre.

With the victory of the revolution and the halting of the activities of foreign companies, Iranian Muslim employees of these companies gathered in the Continental Shelf Oil Company and changed the system, which up to that time had consisted of replacing and changing parts, into a repair and reconstruction system.

Training for Well Workers

Then, explaining the importance of the role of training in the Continental Shelf Oil Company, he referred to training for well workers in Behregan region and said:

Specialization in well working is a highly valuable expertise in production, drilling and extraction. Also, in regards to scuba diving, it is noteworthy that at present, all under-sea operations are carried out by our experienced and trained divers.

Among other steps taken in the purchase of a large number of service and repair tugboats for production, extraction, and drilling in the sea, of which a great number were delivered this year and are being used in the sea operations of Continental Shelf Oil.

Hence, the exit of currency for leasing ships and tugboats in the Persian Gulf is prevented.

In another part of his speech, Engineer Aqa'i, in response to a question concerning the production level of the joint oil fields, said:

Our total production at present in the joint oil fields is about 280,000 barrels per day. The Continental Shelf Oil Company has 60 active projects underway or being designed, most of which are developmental projects.

Harnessing Wells Damaged in the War

In conclusion, concerning the attacks of Iraq on the operation and production platforms in the Persian Gulf, Engineer Aqa'i said: Iraq's attacks on the oil platforms began mostly during the period 21 January-19 February 1983. At that time, those attacks resulted in fires and the eruption of oil on three of our platforms, Nowruz platform No 3; platform No 9, on which well No 10 erupted; and platform No 5, which resulted in the eruption of wells No 5 and No 6.

In order to harness the damaged wells, a headquarters called "Nowruz headquarters" was established in the Continental Shelf Oil Company, which took over the guidance and planning for the projects. On 17 May 1983 and 3 April 1984, with the persistent efforts of its employees, this headquarters successfully harnessed the wells.

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CSO: 4640/363

IRAN

HEAVY INDUSTRIES MINISTER COMMENTS ON ECONOMIC TIES WITH TURKEY

Tehra ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Feb 85 p 4

[Text] Economic Dispatch--Yesterday afternoon Engineer Behzad Nabavi, minister of heavy industries, gave an interview to the radio, TV and press and answered reporters' questions regarding the purpose and results of a trip to Turkey, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.

First, concerning the installation of the Iranian oil and gas pipelines to Turkey he stated: "The total volume of investment to build the oil and gas pipelines to Turkey will be \$14 billion. With the construction of these pipelines nearly 1.5 million barrels of oil per day and 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year will be exported by Iran."

He added: "According to the preliminary estimates, the cost for the gas pipeline will be about \$11 billion. Iran's share of the total estimated cost will be \$2.5 billion while Turkey and Greece will invest more than \$4 billion each." He said: "The Iranian natural gas will be exported by a pipeline passing through the port of Iskenderun in Turkey first to Greece and then to southern Italy." He continued: "The Iranian gas pipeline will also export natural gas to Syria and Turkey itself." Engineer Nabavi also stated that the cost of construction for the Iranian-Turkish oil pipeline is estimated to be about \$3 billion which will be shared equally by both countries. Meanwhile, Iran's share for the installation of these two pipelines is payable through the barter of oil.

Furthermore, he added that on the basis of the signed memorandum of understanding between Iran and Turkey, the results of an economic feasibility study on the construction of the two pipelines will be ready within the next six to twelve months. If the outcome of the study shows that the technical and economic costs are viable, construction will begin.

The minister of heavy industries also stated: "According to the signed memorandum of understanding, the volume of exchange between Iran and Turkey in the current Christian year will be about \$3 billion. Of this total Iran's share of

the sale of goods to Turkey will amount to \$1.5 billion." He said that Turkish exports to Iran would include industrial raw material, agricultural and industrial machinery, foodstuffs, spare parts for machinery, fibers, thread and fabrics, construction and industrial steel, chemicals, plastics and so forth.

He added that Iran, on the other hand, would export crude oil, a variety of farm and stock products, caviar, laundry detergents, paraffin, zinc and copper concentrates, aluminum products, assembled buses, minibuses, passenger cars and construction stone to Turkey.

Engineer Nabavi went on to add that because of the cultural change in the consumer products, the production of some of the domestic and unnecessary products have been limited. However, if the export market for such items proves to be viable, these products will be produced in sufficient quantities for export. In this regard he mentioned domestically assembled trucks and wallpaper.

In addition he said: "Considering the enormous volume of gas reserves in the country, even with the construction of the above-mentioned gas pipelines, it will take 200 years before our gas reserves are depleted." He went on to say: "Iran would pay even less than \$2.5 billion if some of the gas pipes used came from her own stock." He was asked: With your trip to Turkey and the increase in the volume of trade with that country, one question comes to mind--while Turkey is a prominent military member of NATO, do you believe that the expanding trade relations with Turkey are beneficial to the Islamic revolution? He answered: "We must follow a prescribed path in our foreign policy. We follow a foreign policy concomitant with that of the government of the late martyr Raj'ai. It is a policy based on the guidance of the imam (Khomeyni). It is a policy put together by our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by our cabinet. We consider certain countries as enemies of the Islamic revolution and have no relations whatsoever in the cultural, political or economic fields with such countries.

"The United States, the great satan, is at the top of the list of these countries; after that comes Israel, South Africa, Egypt and France respectively. We do not wish to make all countries in the world an enemy of Iran. It is true that throughout the whole world there is no country with all the peculiarities and characteristics of our system of government. However, there is no reason why we should have unfriendly relations with all the nations.

The enemy of the Islamic revolution must be clearly recognized. Those regimes which openly oppose the Islamic revolution are our real enemies. Those regimes which openly promote racism in the world are the enemies of the Islamic revolution. Those regimes which are supporters of Zionism are the enemies of the Islamic revolution. However, these are not reasons for us to negate all the other countries in the world which are a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact and establish no relations with any one of them.

"Any independent country in the world has to have some relations with the rest of the world. No country can build a fence around itself and consider itself independent by the mere act of this self-inflicted isolation.

"Therefore, we ought to have some relations with other countries in the world. We have completely cut off our relations with countries which are enemies of the Islamic revolution, are racist or are supporters of Zionism. But on the other hand we have no objection to establishing relations with the rest of the countries.

"We have special political and cultural relations with some countries. Likewise, we have certain economic and technical relations with others. These are countries which are ideologically and politically close to our stance. Of course, they number very few. By the same token, there remains more than 100 countries in the world which are neither close to our political stance nor are they an enemy of the Islamic revolution, thus the Islamic Republic will have no objection to establishing friendly relations with them. Such relations are mainly based on the needs and interests of the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic. We gain most from our trade exchanges with our neighboring countries. Turkey is one of our neighboring countries; it is a Muslim nation and our natural relations with this country tend to be towards our mutual needs in cultural, economic and industrial exchanges rather than by entering into a military pact or other political agreement to protect the interests of American imperialism or other great powers. Thus far we have established the best possible relations. We have done the same with Pakistan. As far as we are capable, we have established trade relations with the Soviet Union. However, on many occasions the Soviet Union has not acted fairly and has tried to acquire our goods at little or no cost, thus forcing us to cut off our natural gas export to that country. Other similar instances have been based on the same premise. We have a similar attitude toward our neighboring sheikhdoms. Whereas, for various reasons it is possible that some sheikhdoms show no interest in establishing economic or commercial relations with us. Other countries such as Iraq, with which we are at war, and the Afghanistan government, which is the enemy of the Muslim nation of Afghanistan, and fighting with its own Muslim people is like fighting with our nation. For this reason we do not have economic or trade relations with these two countries. Otherwise, the best possible relations is economic or trade relations with a neighboring country. At any rate, it does not matter if one of our neighboring countries is a member of NATO or the Warsaw Pact. What matters is that if a country acts like Iraq, we will be compelled to fight with it as we have done with Iraq. If Turkey does not have any animosity against the Islamic revolution and is interested in the expansion of economic and technical relations with our country, there is no reason why we should not consider our nation's interest and that of the Islamic Republic and do not expand our relations in a similar fashion -- we can bring the Muslim people of our two countries closer together through these ties"

Reason for the Expansion of Economic Relations with Turkey

One of the correspondents asked: The responsible government authorities have said on many occasions that we do not intend to limit our economic relations to a certain country since special relations with a particular country will make us somewhat dependent on that country. Whereas, if one day our political relations with that particular country face some difficulties and they decide to stop their exports to our country, they can economically create problems for us. Therefore, do you think that expansion of economic relations to such an extent with one country like Turkey is concomitant with this policy? The minister of heavy industries replied: "It so happens that the Islamic Republic follows this policy very carefully. It has been the policy of the Islamic Republic not to be dependent on one single country but to establish foreign trade relations with several countries and we have done that. For instance, in 1362 [21 March 1983 - 20 March 1984] the volume of our trade exchange with Yugoslavia, which is a small industrial nation, has risen from 25 million dollars to 500 million dollars in comparison with the volume of trade before the revolution; that is to say, it has increased 20 times. Likewise, our trade exchange with Turkey has risen from about 30 or 40 million dollars to about 3 billion dollars. Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, India and some of the small countries of the world should also be included in this list with a 10 to 15 times increase in the volume of trade exchange. But here you ought to take into consideration the fact that these small countries have certain limitations. For example, you cannot get from India, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia or Nicaragua what you can acquire from Japan or Germany. Even Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia themselves import a significant portion of their industrial machinery from Japan or Germany.

"As you can see, we have not been inactive in this regard. We have extended our efforts in various directions. Before the revolution, how extensive do you think our trade relations were with Turkey? We were both members of CENTO, but we had no economic or technical relations with Turkey at that time. We had unnatural military relations. But now we have natural trade relations between our two neighboring countries--two Muslim nations, a relation which benefits both our nations. They benefit from dealing with us, similarly, we gain from bartering with them and this is a very nice and reasonable thing to do."

Quality of Turkish Goods

In answer to the question regarding the low quality of the goods which are purchased from Turkey and seem to be even lower in quality than some of our domestic merchandise, Mr Nabavi stated: "We have tried not to accept low quality goods, also we have tried to limit the purchase of consumer goods and accept only those items which are qualitatively and by cost, competitive with current international prices. However, none of these purchases have any political motive. All the representatives of the organizations from our country interested in importing merchandise from Turkey were present. We went to Turkey with a delegation composed of 60 officials and about 42 interested individuals. All the directors of the Centers of Preparation and Distribution of the Ministry of Commerce and representatives and specialists of various ministries were also included in this delegation. They all saw the quality and the price of the goods and were all satisfied. As a result, the memorandum of understanding was entered into. We did not exert any political pressure on any organization for the purchase of goods from Turkey."

PAKISTAN

MEASURES URGED TO CONSERVE ENERGY

GF191000 Karachi DAWN in English 16 Feb 85 p 9

[Editorial: "Conserving Energy"]

[Text] Energy conservation has been one of the priority areas for planners for many years now, but nothing particular has been achieved as far as practical implementation is concerned. The Sixth Five-Year Plan, too, laid great stress on it and even formulated a broad outline of the strategy that could be adopted. In recent days, however, the concern at unnecessary use of energy has extended to the point where some slightly more practical steps have been taken. It is not at all certain that these steps--so far the formation of a working group--will lead to more tangible measures, but at least ways and means will be examined and ideas will crystallise, even if more desirable results are not forthcoming.

The working group is to be headed by the secretary-general of the Planning and Development Division and will have as its members senior officials from various ministries. It is expected to prepare a comprehensive action plan within two months.

In trying to identify measures to conserve energy, the working group is bound to come across so many methods that it will be able to study thoroughly only a few well-known ones. While the better known methods can certainly come up with results, it should be kept in mind at the same time that the more obscure methods can be extremely important to an energy conservation programme and, in certain limited areas, might also hold the key.

Several areas where conservation methods can be introduced with profit have been identified at various times, including in the Sixth Plan. These include incentives for investment in energy saving methods and equipment, introduction of a system of identifying the energy-efficiency of implements and a ban on the manufacture or import of equipment that is less energy-efficient than prescribed standards. These are, of course, a very few of the measures that are possible for conserving energy.

One other that the government has already employed should also be mentioned--changes in the pricing policy to conserve fuel, to facilitate inter-fuel substitution in certain circumstances and to encourage private investment in the energy sector.

Many in this country would have reservations about the use of prices to conserve energy. It can certainly play a useful role in some circumstances, but whether the government can correctly identify these circumstances is a matter of debate. The well-known penchant for generating revenues anyhow leads to increased prices--which is then justified on the grounds of conserving energy. The point is that changes in the pricing policy should be carefully studied--and the rationale made known to the public before changes are made.

Apart from introducing conservation methods, the government must bring changes in the pattern of fuel use. Certain steps have already been taken; the cement industry, among some others, has switched to oil from gas and the price of gas has been raised to reduce consumption. The use of diesel is also being encouraged in preference to petrol.

In future, however, somewhat more radical measures will be needed for obvious reasons. With petroleum supplies falling and prices rising, other fuels will have to be found if the country's needs are to be met. In the longer term, of course, it is likely that new fuels will come in to meet the gap, but there will be shortages until these developments take place. These shortages should best be filled through our own resources.

Coal is an obvious alternative to petroleum but, while its use should be encouraged, it should also be kept in mind that it is a fossil fuel and supplies are restricted. Wherever possible an attempt should be made to switch to renewable sources of energy some of which, like wind and sun, are available in ample quantity in the country. Fuels such as natural gas, petroleum and gas, even if they are produced locally, should be used as sparingly as possible, so that they are not wasted.

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